Iran Denies Chinese Involvement In Lake Urmia Lithium Extraction
Iran’s Environment Department has denied any involvement of the Chinese in lithium extraction from Lake Urmia.
Iran’s Environment Department has denied any involvement of the Chinese in lithium extraction from Lake Urmia.
This follows the circulation of images on social media depicting trucks on the desiccated lakebed. The Director of Environmental Protection in West Azarbaijan, Saeed Shahand, has claimed that the activities in question solely pertain to “salt extraction, not lithium.”
Earlier reports had said that Chinese companies were acquiring brine from Lake Urmia with the aim of obtaining valuable lithium, which can be used to support the country’s nuclear program.
However, officials allege that the lake lacks lithium, underscoring the ongoing authorized extraction of salt from specific areas.
Shahand affirmed that the extraction of salt from Lake Urmia has been a long-standing practice, spanning years, claiming that it has not led to any adverse environmental consequences in authorized areas.
Researchers have sounded a cautionary note, warning about the potential repercussions of salt extraction and disturbance to the lakebed. Pertinent questions have been raised regarding research into the impact of salt compounds in Lake Urmia on plants, humans, and agricultural fields.
The ongoing drying of Lake Urmia, once the region’s largest lake, is causing growing concern among environmental experts who fear its far-reaching effects on various regions of Iran in terms of both environmental and human impacts.
Mohsen Armin, the front's vice chairman has quoted the results of an opinion poll conducted by ISPA of the government-owned Iranian Students New Agency (ISNA) and said 48 percent of Iranians support reforms and another 45 percent want far-reaching changes. In the context of Islamic Republic's political jargon, the latter group are possibly those who want a regime change.
Armin, speaking at a conference in Esfahan entitled "Iran, Reformists, and National Interests," stated that reforms in Iran are currently in a state of isolation. He elaborated that "The country is so disorganized that other political groups are also confused and do not know a way out of the current political impasse."
He said, "our mistake during the 1979 Islamic revolution was that we thought the Shah was the problem. But the real problem was the despotic regime. We thought that by replacing the Shah the problem will be solved. That is how we lost a precious opportunity to improve the political situation in Iran."
Armin emphasized that there has been a misconception in Iran that combating Western civilization is a prerequisite for Islamizing society. This belief has given rise to notions such as the imminent downfall of Western civilization, a stance that aligns with creating an Islamic society. Support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict and reluctance to finalize nuclear agreements with the West are byproducts of this ideology. Consequently, policies like the resistance economy and opposition to maintaining ties with advanced Western nations have emerged to promote Iran's development.
"Nonetheless, when survival becomes the regime's main objective, even ideology ceases to be a priority," Armin said, adding that the strategy of survival calls for barring all those who object to these policies by any form of political activity. He further said that the strategy of survival has led to the emergence of a system that is incapable of solving the country's problems and preventing systematic corruption. He also pointed out that the regime has failed to convince the public about its strategy while it also refuses to listen to reformist ideas that might help it.
Elsewhere, but along the same line, Iranian academic Bijan Abdolkarimi has warned that the underprivileged people in Iran are facing a death and life issue. He said in an interview with Etemad Online that there is a possibility for social upheavals in Iran. He explained that the middle class in Iran has been experiencing a process of decline and many middle-class citizens are now considered low-income as their purchasing power has shrunk.
Iran has been experiencing an annual inflation rate of at least 40 percent in the past three years, and the national currency has lost its value 12-fold since 2018.
Abdolkarimi pointed out that while the middle class has been losing its dreams and sees no bright prospect ahead, family members of some regime officials, who talk about confrontation with the United States, live in America. The latter group do not really believe in the revolutionary narrative but hypocritically defend the revolutionary "values," the academic added.
He pointed out that Iranians are not interested in taking part in the upcoming parliamentary elections because they believe their participation cannot change the country's situation. At the same time, a force from within the government has been exerting pressures on the regime to follow a strategy of political purification that is intended to lead to the creation an all-conservative ruling system.
He said the Islamic revolution has not been able to offer welfare to nation during the past four decades and it is not likely to find that capability anytime soon.
Meanwhile, former President Hassan Rouhani has said in a meeting with his former aides and cabinet minister that the country's only way out of the current political impasse is to start reforms. Rouhani further claimed that the people will take part in the election if they feel that it can make a difference.
Many political figures in Iran, who are considered regime insiders, including former reformist President Mohammad Khatami have said that it appears the Iranian regime can no longer be reformed.
In its policy of finding shelter under Chinese and Russian-dominated international organizations, Iran achieved full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2022 and concurrently pursued entry into the BRICS group. Following an official invitation, Iran announced its acceptance into BRICS on August 24, 2023, with the official membership commencing on January 1, 2024.
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Nasser Kanaani, announced the news on Monday as an important achievement for Tehran, emphasizing the potential for economic potential BRICS can offer. Ehsan Khandouzi, Iran's Finance and Economic Affairs Minister, expressed hope for global engagement and for increased trade opportunities with BRICS countries, despite US sanctions.
Iranian officials, who feel the need to calm domestic anxieties about the economic crisis gripping the country since 2018, routinely tell citizens that BRICS could challenge the dominance of the US dollar, and alleviate the financial crisis brought about by the US sanctions. Despite these assertions, domestic markets know that the Chinese themselves heavily rely on the US dollar for trade. Lack of confidence in the foreign and economic policies of the government has played a major role in the 12-fold devaluation of the Iranian rial against major currencies since 2018.
In Iran’s domestic political dynamics, BRICS is presented as a mechanism and an opportunity to challenge the United States and boost trade.
Despite these perspectives, skepticism remains about the practical benefits of Iran's BRICS membership, especially concerning economic implications. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's strained relations with the United States, complicate BRICS' role as a counterweight to the West.
During the BRICS summit in August 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized bilateral cooperation and opposition to “American unilateralism.” While some individuals are optimistic, Tehran observers doubt practical benefits, emphasizing the need to address relations with the US and resolve the dispute about Iran’s nuclear program for meaningful membership impact. Former UN diplomat Kourosh Ahmadi has warned against illusions about potential benefits from SCO and BRICS, suggesting such beliefs could be more harmful than not being members at all.
Challenges
Not all BRICS members may be equally enthusiastic about Iran's inclusion, and not every existing member supported Iran's decision to join. Additionally, the impact of US secondary sanctions, restricting Iran's global business activities, may not be substantially alleviated by BRICS participation, especially given the organization's alignment with China and Russia, both with their own serious economic challenges and disputes with the West.
Nevertheless, Iran's energy sector is expected to experience significant changes with BRICS membership, particularly due to its major role in gas and oil production. Joining BRICS is seen as a strategic move to enhance energy trade and collaboration, especially with China and Russia. Anticipated benefits for Iran include increased energy exports, investment in energy infrastructure, and potential relief from US sanctions through the use of national currencies in energy trading.
While Iran aims to leverage BRICS membership to weaken sanctions, boost its economy, and access broader markets, experts caution that economic gains may be limited without a nuclear deal with the West. The uncertainties about the effectiveness and cohesion of BRICS policies also raise questions about the immediate and long-term benefits of Iran's membership.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global monitor on money laundering, announced on Friday that it has made no modifications to its blacklist, which includes Iran, Myanmar, and North Korea. Iranian economist Mohammad Mehdi Behkish has emphasized potential difficulties in business transactions with BRICS countries if the FATF issue is not resolved. He has also underscored that, despite additional countries joining BRICS, the economic significance of the United States to China will surpass that of all BRICS nations, emphasizing the necessity of easing financial restrictions for Iran to fully benefit from BRICS membership.
It is claimed that Iran's membership in BRICS represents a strategic alliance with China and Russia, with opportunities for enhanced infrastructure investment and commerce. The goal to change the dynamics of the global energy market and lessen reliance on the US currency in energy-related transactions is supported by China and Russia. Higher energy exports and the possible use of national currencies as a hedge against US sanctions are anticipated benefits. However, Iran or any other country, needs revenues in hard currencies for most imports, and replacing the US dollar in energy exports does not seem to be a wise policy.
Moreover, considering the significant trade volumes they maintain with the United States, some BRICS members would be reluctant to take on economic risks in their dealings with Iran. This complicated situation highlights the numerous difficulties and factors that go along with Iran's involvement in BRICS, calling for a systematic and careful strategy to deal with these complications.
Speaking to the reformist Etemad newspaper, Ali-Akbar Haghdoust, head of the Covid Taskforce’s epidemiology committee, said estimates based on some studies, including a study by Ardabil Medical Sciences University published in early March 2023, shows that 240,390 Iranians died from Covid between February 2020 and February 2022 against the official figure of 136,166.
According to Haghdoust, other studies have shown that real number of deaths from Covid ranged from 45.2 to 49.4 percent higher than official figures.
“It does not entail much negative consequences to say this today, but many experts and specialists in the field of health and even other fields such as economics and politics, who criticized the government for untrue reports of Covid infections and deaths between 2020 and 2022 were harshly treated, because questioning the official figures proved health authorities were hiding the facts,” he said.
Iran was the second country in the world after China to declare an epidemic in February 2020 and reported nearly 145,000 Covid deaths, the Middle East’s highest official level, and 7.5 million confirmed cases.
From the early days, some health specialists and others alleged that Iran’s reported deaths were much lower than the real figures. Based on statistics like burials in Tehran, some suggested that the true number of deaths could be as high as 500,000.
Researchers tracking the pandemic globally have noted that “excess deaths” reflect many factors, including those indirectly due to Covid including a stretched health system, but allegations abounded at the time that Iranian authorities were deliberately under-reporting Covid deaths.
A study published by the Lancet in March 2022 suggested that in the first two years of the pandemic − up to December 31, 2022 −there were globally 18 million excess deaths, with only 6 million officially attributed to Covid.
Many Iranians also blamed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for putting a ban on importing vaccines developed in the United States and Britain in January 2021, for causing many more Covid deaths than if vaccination efforts of the government of President Hassan Rouhani had not been delayed for months.
Iran's Supreme Leader argued that these vaccines had to be avoided because these countries could be testing their vaccines on other nations and urged developing vaccines domestically.
Khamenei's ban was supported by hardliners who following his lead said Iranians could not be used as "guinea pigs" to test Western vaccines. The Rouhani administration reluctantly backed off and looked for joint production with Cuba, purchases from several countries including China, Russia, and India, and using homegrown vaccines as they would become available.
At the time, the US-German Pfizer, US-made Moderna and the British-made AstraZeneca were the only vaccines approved internationally, although Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates had already approved the use of China’s Sinopharm which was later imported by Iran too. Sinopharm accounted for over 80 percent and AstraZeneca for around 10 percent of all vaccinations in Iran.
Vaccination picked up when hardliner Ebrahim Raisi assumed the presidency in August 2021 and vaccines that had been ordered began to arrive. In September 2021 only around 14 percent of Iranian had been vaccinated.
Some of the country’s vaccine producers, including the state-owned Barekat Foundation, received hundreds of millions of dollars to start their vaccine development program from scratch despite having had no experience in the field. None of the several vaccines developed domestically was ever approved by the World Health Organization.
Homegrown Covid vaccine factories, however, began shutting down in mid 2022 for lack of demand as many who were vaccinated with foreign vaccines refused to get homegrown ones as boosters.
