Iranians Boycott Islamic Revolution Anniversary Rallies
Anniversary rallies for the birth of the Islamic Republic fell flat as Iranians rejected the celebrations amidst ongoing suppression and economic depression.
Anniversary rallies for the birth of the Islamic Republic fell flat as Iranians rejected the celebrations amidst ongoing suppression and economic depression.
Images and videos circulated on the main day of celebrations marking the 45th anniversary of the 1979 revolution depicted a stark contrast from previous years, with no apparent presence of people to fill the streets.
In a bid to conceal the failure, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, "People across the country made efforts and showed their enthusiasm and fervor. This year, the people displayed revolutionary pride to the world."
The ten-day period from February 1 commemorates Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's arrival in Tehran from Paris in 1979, culminating in the revolution's victory on February 11th.
People shunned the rallies despite efforts by the government included relaxing enforcement of compulsory hijab, one of the pillars of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising, and providing recreational activities on the streets. Crowds were sparse and venues largely empty.
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Nonetheless, government-controlled media and officials hailed the celebration of the revolution as "epic".
Meanwhile, Iranians in many European and North American cities took to the streets to protest against human rights abuses in Iran as the regime continues its crackdown and accelerates execution of dissidents.
The efforts to portray a veneer of national unity come on the eve of the upcoming elections where voter turnout is expected to be below 15 percent, the country's apathy at an all time low amidst social and economic turmoil.
Qaani met with representatives of several Iran-backed groups in Baghdad airport on January 29, one day after a drone launched by the same groups killed three American soldiers at an outpost near the Syria-Jordanian border. The report quotes Iranian and Iraqi militia sources.
Qaani told the militias they should lie low, to avoid US strikes on their senior commanders, destruction of key infrastructure or even a direct retaliation against Iran, the sources said. Iran was also concerned about direct US retaliation against its own military, within the country or in the region, such as Iranian warships lurking near Yemen.
While one faction did not initially agree to Qaani's request, most others did. The next day, elite Iran-backed group Kataib Hezbollah announced it was suspending attacks.
Since February 4 there have been no attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria, compared to more than 20 in the two weeks before Qaani's visit, part of a surge in violence from the groups in opposition to Israel's war in Gaza.
If this version of events is true, it could explain why Washington hesitated six days before launching military retaliation at bases under the overall command of the Quds Force in Syria and Iraq. During this crucial period, according to reports, many key IRGC and militant personnel vacated bases believed to be likely targets of an American retaliatory strike. Many observers at the time criticized the Biden administration for the delay, while the US has large naval forces in the region ready for action since war broke out between Israel and Hamas.
However, Qaani’s alleged role in convincing Iran’s proxies in Iraq to suspend attacks, clearly did not extend to Houthis in Yemen, who have continued targeting commercial shipping and even Western navies in the Red Sea region. If Qaani’s argument about the cost of US retaliation dissuaded the militants, no such change of heart has occurred among the Houthi leadership who have come under air strikes but remain adamant to continue attacks against shipping.
Iran’s proxies in Iraq have been used for years as a means of pressure on the United States, with periods of aggression and relative calm, depending on factors such as secret talks or nuclear negotiations with Iran. These attacks intensified in 2019, when the Trump administration implemented “maximum pressure” sanction against Tehran. As militant activity reached a peak in December 2019, Trump ordered the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s top Middle East military and intelligence operative who had made the Quds Force and its proxy militias into a serious force across the region.
The Iranian regime, meanwhile, has spearheaded a campaign to push the small US military presence out of Syria and Iraq. Its proxy forces use the issue to justify attacks, although their recent attacks have been in support of Hamas.
The Reuters report also argues that the tense situation prevailing up until early February played into the hands of the Iraqi government, which initiated a new push to end the US military presence in the country, which is used by pro-Iran groups to create tensions.
With Iran bracing for a U.S. response to the Jordan attack, Qaani made the visit quick and did not leave the airport, "for strict security reasons and fearing for his safety," the senior Iraqi security source said.
The strike in 2020 that killed former Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani outside the airport followed an attack Washington also blamed on Kataib Hezbollah that killed a U.S. contractor, and at the time sparked fears of a regional war. Along with Soleimani, the drone killed former Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Both Tehran and Baghdad wanted to avoid a similar escalation this time round, nine sources told Reuters. "The Iranians learned their lesson from the liquidation of Soleimani and did not want this to be repeated," a senior Iraqi security source said.
Firstly, the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement, which operates independently of religious affiliations, renders religious reformism largely irrelevant. Secondly, the impending sham elections scheduled for March 1, have divided reformists on whether to engage or boycott, further undermining their cohesion and leadership.
For over two decades, Abdulkarim Soroush has been a leading advocate for modern interpretations of Shia sacred texts. Meanwhile, as an ex-political prisoner and disciple of the late Hossein Ali Montazeri, Mohsen Kadivar has emerged as a prominent figure in religious traditionalism. Montazeri, once Khomeini's designated successor, was sidelined by the security establishment. Now, Soroush and Kadivar find themselves engaged in a religious and political rivalry, each vying to position themselves as an alternative to secular figures like Prince Reza Pahlavi.
The dispute between Soroush and Kadivar, stemming from theoretical disagreements over the interpretation of religious texts, has escalated. Kadivar has excommunicated Soroush and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, while Soroush has called for Kadivar’s public repentance. However, amidst these theological debates, many Iranians, particularly those actively opposed to the regime, have shifted their focus away from such issues. Nevertheless, Soroush and Kadivar persist in their efforts to sway politically motivated believers within Iran, despite residing on the East Coast of America.
This ongoing debate holds significant importance for observers of Iranian politics and society. It sheds light on the fate of the reformist project of the 1990s, which aimed not only to challenge the authority of Shia clergy in interpreting texts but also to introduce political and social reforms. Initially viewed as a promising alternative to religious authoritarianism, reformism gained momentum, leading to significant political shifts, such as Mohammad Khatami's election victory in 1997. However, subsequent events, including the Green Movement's defeat in 2009, marked the decline of religious reformism, paving the way for other political movements.
Internationally, Mohammad Khatami's presidency was initially welcomed by Western governments and the UN, who saw him as a moderate seeking dialogue and cooperation. During this time, figures like Soroush gained attention in Western academia for their efforts to reinterpret Islam. Books and academic dissertations were written and published about his project on the ‘de-shariatization’ of Islam and the negation of totalitarian Islamism through the channel of new religious interpretations.
However, the regime’s suppression of the reformist-led Green Movement in 2009, was the end of the religious reform movement, and after that, its ideologues were sidelined by the opposition constitutionalist or secular republican movements. Instead of supporting the secular, libertarian, and nationalist discourse of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, the religious reformists opposed women leaders and constitutionalists, and as a result mostly isolated themselves. Even before recent protests, Western governments, academia and think tanks had concluded that the engine of reformism and religious moderation had broken down and could no longer be an alternative discourse for the Islamist expansionism. For this reason, for a decade, the technocrat lobby of the Islamic Republic gradually took the place of the pioneers of religious reformism in Western academia, think tanks, and media.
Domestically, during Hassan Rouhani's administration, hopes for de-escalation with the West diminished, polarizing Iranian society between pro-Khamenei factions and those advocating for regime change. Figures like Soroush and Kadivar found themselves increasingly marginalized within this landscape, as the political discourse shifted away from religious reformism.
As the social credibility and access to power of reformists has waned, internal strife has intensified among different factions. The current tension between Soroush, Shabestari, and Kadivar underscores the decline of alternative religious discourses in the face of the government's totalitarianism. This rift becomes especially apparent on the eve of the upcoming elections, where reformers' attempts to participate are met with skepticism, reflecting the disillusionment of a population weary of political Islam and religious reformism.
