With only ten days remaining before the March 1 elections in Iran, politicians are still weighing the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the vote amidst broad government electoral manipulations.
“Reformists cannot participate in meaningless, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective elections in governing the country.” This is strategy number 4 of the Iranian Reformist Front’s statement on the 2024 elections. Contrary to this strategy and the majority vote of of Reformist organizations to boycott the elections, 110 Reformist activists have urged people to participate. This request has sparked intense debate among the Reformist activists and strategists.
Now it is evident that a faction of the Reformist camp cannot overlook the sacrifices of the “Women, Life, Freedom” Movement, which include 550 deaths, tens of thousands of arrests, more than 10 political executions, and the blinding and maiming of hundreds of individuals, and encourage people to return to the polls. Another faction still advocates for voting for the lesser evil, forming a minority in the Majles (parliament) to promote economic development.
However, they fail to explain how development and progress can be achieved while maintaining intact the nuclear and expansionist programs, which have brought on crippling US sanctions.
Pro-boycott arguments
What are the main arguments of both sides of this debate? Pro-boycott Reformists present arguments that diverge significantly from the reformists’ trajectory in the past two decades. From their perspective, the main issues with the statement of 110 activists include the futility of participation, the lack of significance of the 2024 elections, legitimization of disqualifications through participation, and the absence of any clear boundaries set by these 110 individuals. This same argument could have been raised during the 2000 presidential elections that led to Khatami's second term, yet the Reformists participated in all elections from 2000 to 2020.
Pro-boycott activists believe that both the Majles and the Expert Assembly are irrelevant in governing the country. The Majles lacks real checks and balances and monitoring power, with tens of councils in the country possessing legislative authority. The Expert Council has never fulfilled its responsibility to hold Khamenei accountable, and the next leader will be chosen by the security and military establishment.
Critiquing the statement of pro-participation Reformists, Mohsen Armin the vice president of the Reform Front said: Society is so dissenting and angry that any participation in the elections will not yield any results beneficial to the public." He considered the pro-participation group to be a minority among the Reformists and accused them of employing "fantasy-based theories" to highlight their fundamental differences with the majority, resulting only in division.
Blaming Ali Khamenei for Iran's "defective political system," imprisoned political activist Mostafa Tajzadeh, has declared in a letter that he will not vote in the upcoming elections. He cites several strategic mistakes by the leader of the Islamic Republic, including "rendering elections meaningless and rendering elected institutions ineffective, especially the parliament."
Pro-participation arguments
The pro-participation camp argues for consensus-building, gradualism, problem-solving coalitions, and attention to the institutional and structural contexts of the goals. However, the Reformists did have strong presence in the parliament prior to 2020 and failed to achieve any of these goals. The numerous instances of Reformists' participation through allegiance to the regime have not sufficed to prove their loyalty and good intentions. Their candidates were massively banned from the 2020 parliamentary and the 2021 presidential elections.
"Since 2020, according to all indicators, we have been moving in the wrong direction, proponents of boycotting the 2020 and 2021 elections…should evaluate the consequences of this policy," says one of the signatories of this statement. According to this interpretation, economic and social decline is not attributable to the regime's corruption, incompetence, waste, expansionism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism but rather to the decreased participation of people over the past five years. It is the people's fault for not voting sufficiently.
There is also a foreign element in the pro-participation arguments. Some argue that alleged enemies such as Donald Trump or Benjamin Netanyahu will take advantage of a low turnout in the elections as the legitimacy of the regime comes under question. This implies that, out of fear of Trump and Netanyahu, Iranians should embrace their brutal and corrupt leaders and pledge allegiance to Khamenei, despite the Reformists having a very slim chance of winning any parliamentary seats.
The documents encompass a spectrum of sensitive subjects, ranging from internal deliberations within the National Security Council following the death of Mahsa Amini to efforts aimed at quelling unauthorized VPN vendors, protests against the 2020 employment examination, and cases related to economic corruption.
The group unveiled a series of documents suggesting the complicity of the Iranian government in prosecuting prominent public figures during the 2022 uprising and preceding events.
Edalat-e Ali exposed document highlighting the Iranian regime's clandestine endeavors to exert control over public figures, particularly those occupying influential positions in the realms of entertainment and sports. Financial sanctions, bank freezes, travel bans and more have hit celebrities across the board.
They revealed a list encompassing 29 cinema and television figures alongside football stars accused of crimes including "anti-government propaganda activity" and allegations of "conspiracy and collusion against national security."
Actress Katayoun Riyahi, known for her public appearances without compulsory hijab during the uprising following Mahsa Amini's killing, faces charges encompassing “conspiracy, anti-government activities, and inciting moral corruption through her actions.”
Similarly, football icons like Ali Daei, Aref Gholami, and Voria Ghafouri have been accused of fomenting dissent and engaging in activities deemed against national security.
The document, authored by Mohammad Mehdi Heidarian, the then head of the Joint Working Group on Celebrity Management and advisor to the Minister of Culture in 2019, outlines a comprehensive strategy involving multiple government entities tasked with overseeing and managing public figures, thus underscoring the regime's efforts to suppress dissent and enforce conformity.
Edalat-e Ali's ascendancy to prominence traces back to August 2021, marked by their penetration of the surveillance infrastructure at Evin Prison, supporting the ongoing protests and voicing advocacy for the release of political detainees.
The group's previous revelations, including documents implicating security forces in acts of sexual assault and extrajudicial violence against protesters, underscore the gravity of the situation and the need for accountability within Iran's governing apparatus.
The latest hacking is one in a long line of cyber attacks on the regime. The incidents have escalated since the 2022 uprising. From breaches in the judiciary's servers to infiltrations of surveillance infrastructure at Evin Prison and servers belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), these hacks have underscored the vulnerability of Iran's digital infrastructure.
Each breach has not only exposed confidential information but also served as a catalyst for heightened scrutiny of the regime's activities and policies. The frequency and scale of the hacks reflect the ongoing tensions within Iranian society and the determination of hacktivists to challenge the status quo.
In the past year, MEK-affiliated hackers have targeted the portals of several other government agencies including Tehran Municipality, the Presidential Office, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, and Culture as well as the parliament and published thousands of documents. In December, a cyberattack paralyzed much of the country's network of gas stations.
This week, documents were leaked following the hack of the Iranian parliament’s media arm, revealing a wide range of Tehran’s strategies to circumvent US sanctions.
Last week, hacktivist group Uprising till Overthrow took responsibility for the recent cyberattack on the Khaneh Mellat News Agency, the media arm of the Iranian Parliament.In a statement released by the group, closely affiliated with the Albania-based opposition Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) organization, it was disclosed that the attack reached 600 of the the main servers of the parliament, commission servers, main chamber servers, parliament assistant servers, parliament bank server, and other servers related to administrative functions.
Cybersecurity specialist Amin Sabeti claims Iran will continue facing increasing cyberattacks due to “structural defects” in their cyber defense systems. He claimed that many projects aimed at developing what the regime terms “domestic services” have failed due to their reliance on corrupt connections and nepotism rather than meritocracy and expertise.
It has led to domestic criticism in the face of the regime's weakness. Shahriar Heydari, deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament, stated that the National Organization for Passive Defense and the Intelligence Ministry should be held accountable for the recent cyberattacks.“Cyberspace is a war of information. Every country needs to secure its systems against hacking and data theft,” Heydari said.
Zanjani, a regime insider once hailed as Iran's wealthiest man, was tasked with exporting oil circumventing international sanctions in the early 2010s when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president. He failed to pay back about $3 billion. Zanjani was arrested and convicted in 2013 after Hassan Rouhani was elected president. His accomplices in the government were never identified. It would not have been possible for him to embezzle such a large amount of money without insider support.
Earlier in the week, his lawyer, Rasoul Kouhpayehzadeh, pleaded for his release in light of recent disclosures by the Judiciary, which stated that Zanjani’s assets abroad have been located and transferred to Tehran to offset his debts and liabilities.
Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei claimed that, according to preliminary assessments, the collected assets are worth more than what he owes. Zanjani's assets in Iran had been confiscated by court order after his arrest but they were reportedly only a fraction of the assets abroad that he initially refused to repatriate. Iranian authorities have not released any details or figures about his assets.
However, Khabar Online website, which is close to moderate conservatives, reported Tuesday that the total value of Babak Zanjani's assets abroad is estimated to be around $4 to $5 billion. According to the report, approximately $2 billion has been deposited into the central bank's account following the sale of his foreign assets. Zanjani's total debt was about $2.8 billion. A portion of this amount, approximately $1.3 billion, was repaid after the seizure of Zanjani's assets within the country, which included Sorinet Holding Company and Qeshm Airlines. The remaining $1.5 billion was updated to $2 billion, taking into account the accumulated interest over several years.
Zanjani sold Iranian oil on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) during Ahmadinejad's second term (2009-13) through an elaborate network of black-market dealers and money-launderers − particularly in the UAE, Turkey and Malaysia. According to his statements, he had managed to transfer $17 billion of the proceeds from oil sales to the country by 2013.
The shifting political landscape in Iran transformed Zanjani, once synonymous with immense wealth and influence, into a figure facing legal scrutiny and international sanctions, thrusting him into a high-profile legal battle with widespread ramifications. His name is linked to various high-profile economic scandals and legal investigations.
In addition to failing to repatriate oil sales proceeds, he is also accused of securing foreign currency from Iran’s Central Bank for imports, selling it in the black market. In another case he was accused of misappropriating funds from Iran's Social Security Organization in collaboration with Saeed Mortazavi, the former head of the organization who was also Iran’s former deputy prosecutor general.
At the time of his arrest and trial, Iranian media highlighted his ties to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), while some outlets portrayed him as a scapegoat. Subsequently, he was sanctioned by the Council of the European Union in December 2012 and by the United States Treasury in April 2013.
Zanjani, now over 50 years old, built a business empire in a short time, claiming his net worth was $13.5 billion. Zanjani had reportedly stashed billions of dollars from oil sales in foreign bank accounts or invested the money abroad in a range of enterprises including hospitality, commercial aviation, infrastructure, and real estate. He once said in an interview that he owned 64 companies.
The Islamic Republic has numerous mechanisms in place through a wide range of entities and organizations to sell its oil via third parties to evade sanctions. The country has also started giving oil to state organizations, including the IRGC, to boost their budgets without allocating any money to them. Such operations are usually carried out by a network of state bodies and businesspeople with close ties to the regime, who usually gain huge profits in the process. However, with every new administration in office, former assets become a liability and bear the brunt of the political games of the regime.
Documents leaked by a cyberattack on the Iranian parliament’s media arm last week revealed the parliament's coordination with designated Iranian entities and individuals to facilitate their trade activities and conceal their identities and connections from international regulatory bodies as the ever evolving web of sanctions evasions continues.
