One Year Since Detente, Tensions Remain Between Iran, Saudi Arabia
A year after the detente restoring diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, relations between the regional rivals remain tense.
A year after the detente restoring diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, relations between the regional rivals remain tense.
On March 10, the two nations agreed to reopen embassies and exchange ambassadors, ending a seven-year diplomatic freeze. However, progress has been slow, and ties between the countries remain at a minimal level.
Despite efforts to mend ties, including meetings between top security officials in Beijing and the signing of diplomatic and security cooperation agreements, Saudi Arabia and Iran have yet to translate diplomatic gestures into substantial agreements. The ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to hamper progress with the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen still at work with Saudi-backed coalition forces.
The Israel-Hamas conflict has heightened the need for peacemaking efforts in the region, with concerns over Iran's support for proxies destabilizing the area. While there have been discussions regarding potential areas of cooperation, including Saudi investment in Iran's economy, disagreements persist over regional issues.
Saudi Arabia has discussed economic measures to incentivise Iran to reign in its proxies, but as the Houthis' blockade of the Red Sea continues to hamper global trade, the Saudi influence remains in question.
A major obstacle between the two remains to be claims over the Arash/Dorra oil and gas fields in the northern Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia and its allies refusing to recognize Iranian claims.
Saudi Arabia severed ties with Iran in 2016 following the storming of its embassy in Tehran during a dispute over Riyadh's execution of a Shiite Muslim cleric. Subsequent conflicts, including missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities and tankers in the Persian Gulf from Iran's Houthi militia further strained relations amid an almost decade-long war.
Following each manipulated election in Iran, where the precise level of participation remains undisclosed, and the resulting parliament remains loyal to the Supreme Leader, it becomes feasible to discern the impact on the regime's stability.
In brief, the fraudulent elections of 2024 not only failed to alleviate doubts regarding Iran's electoral procedures but exacerbated them. While such elections carry certain advantages, including a facade of democracy, temporary regime propaganda, and the stirring of dissent among opposition factions regarding participation, these benefits come at a cost. With the increasing challenges of manipulating votes, deceiving the public, and clandestinely tampering with ballots in the digital era, the feasibility of sustaining these manipulations is dwindling.
The lowest turnout ever delegitimized the next Majles (parliament) and Experts Assembly when the government desperately needed more legitimacy after its image became badly damaged in 2022-2023 repressions against the Mahsa Movement. The figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior and government propaganda channels regarding eligible voters (61 million instead of 65 million), disqualification of hundreds of candidates, and total turnout (40 or 41 percent compared to a more realistic 16-34 percent) have raised considerable doubts among the populace.
Materials related to these doubts are still being published in Iran, although the IRGC spokesman ordered news websites to stop discussing the elections three days after the vote and even before announcement of the official results.
Continued skepticism about statistics
Not only the opposition and the people in the streets and bazaars, but also former officials who are still in contact with government personnel, do not believe the official results. "Based on the calculations of the voting in Tehran and the most votes obtained, it seems that there were more than 500,000 invalid votes in Tehran," says Ali Rabi’i, a former high-ranking member of the Ministry of Intelligence in three administrations, and Minister of Labor. He is aware that he will be prosecuted if he does not have reliable sources. The government claims that well over 1.5 million votes were cast in Tehran without announcing the exact number, so blank or invalid protest votes were at least 25-30 percent of the total.
Glorious elections
Iranian officials called the election a miracle and epic. However, the candidates with the highest votes in 31 provinces won an average of 5% (from 2% to 17%) of votes according to the manipulated statistics of the Ministry of Interior from the 18-year-old and above population. Despite the non-participation of 59%, according to the official statistics, the many Reformists are still trying to prove their loyalty to the regime and their followers despite the fact that the regime barred them from the elections. Former President Mohammad Khatami did not even mention that he was not going to vote before the election day, which could have reduced participation even more.
The hardliners who engineered and carried out the now failed elections try to justify the low turnout by an inverted logic and strange excuses, while at the same time boasting about “good elections.” One of the excuses is the impact of US sanctions on voters, while according to their own logic of popular anti-American support, participation should have been higher. They also argue that if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s guidelines and policies were fully implemented, more people would have voted. In fact, the current economic crises and the harsh repressive policies that drove away the voters are the direct results of Khamenei’s policies. His foreign policy, for example, has brought on the economic sanctions and lack of normalcy in Iran’s international ties that have impoverished the voters.
A court in Tehran ruled Monday that German-Iranian Sharmahd and the United States government should pay the amount as compensation for the families of the victims of a terrorist attack in Iran, of which Sharmahd is accused.
Sharmahd, a 68-year-old software developer and California resident, was abducted by Iranian agents during a visit to the United Arab Emirates in 2020 and forcibly taken to Iran. In February 2023, the Iranian judiciary sentenced him to death on charges of endangering national security a verdict upheld by Iran's Supreme Court. Sharmahd was convicted of heading a pro-monarchist group named Tondar accused of a deadly bombing incident that occurred in 2008 at a religious center in Shiraz, killing 14 and injuring 215 more. However, many years ago other people were already arrested and convicted for the bombing.
However, Sharmahd along with his family and lawyers have denied the charges and Iran has provided no evidence to support its allegations. Amnesty International has condemned the trial as a sham.
The US-based activist whose group Tondar purportedly aims to restore the overthrown monarchy, toppled in the 1979 revolution, is believed to have been forced to confess to the charges against him, in a typical fashion of forced confessions.
Iran’s change of approach towards the case seemed like a detour to gain concessions from the US in exchange for reducing Sharmad's death sentence. The Biden administration last year agreed to release at least $6 billion in frozen Iranian funds for the release of five hostages similarly convicted in sham trials. The Qatar-brokered deal to free up frozen Iranian funds in South Korea in exchange for five US citizens, led to allegations that the Biden administration is playing a dangerous game encouraging the hostage-taking of yet more dual nationals abroad.
The recent ruling by the Islamic Republic's judiciary is seen as a way to pressure the United States and Germany to pay what amounts to a ransom for Sharmad's release. The Islamic Republic has a history of taking hostages and using them as bargaining chips in negotiations.
Many former officials and experts from the US and other countries, as well as Iranian dissidents, had warned that the prisoner release deal with Iran would set a “dangerous precedent” and would only encourage the regime for taking more hostages. "This will only encourage more hostage taking by the Iranian terrorists” the former US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, said.
Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former White House National Security Council director for countering Iranian weapons of mass destruction, had echoed such fears. “President Joe Biden’s decision to trade $6 billion for five American citizens unlawfully detained in Tehran isn’t just the largest hostage ransom payment in American history—it’s also the second phase of an unacknowledged agreement with Tehran that strengthens the ayatollah’s position in the Middle East and frees the regime to cross the nuclear weapons threshold at a time of its choosing. Americans need to brace themselves for the consequences of both realities.”
It is not the first time Iran has won in the hostage diplomacy stakes. In 2015, President Barack Obama agreed to pay Tehran $1.7bn for the release of four Americans as part of the broader negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal.
Iran took more hostages in the months and years thereafter, believing it could get an even better price from a future US president. While the Trump administration turned to pressure instead of ransoms and won the release of two hostages without paying any money, under President Biden, ransom payments have returned at multiple times the cost. While the Obama administration paid $425 million per American in 2015, the Biden administration agreed to pay $1.2 billion.
