British security firm Ambrey said it had received information indicating that a vessel was attacked on Sunday in the Gulf of Aden about 102 nautical miles southwest of Mukalla in Yemen.
"Vessels in the vicinity were advised to exercise caution and report any suspicious activity," the firm said. It did not say who was responsible for the attack or give further details.
Separately, a missile landed near a vessel in the Gulf of Aden on Sunday but there was no damage to the ship or injuries to crew in the incident, 59 nautical miles southwest of the Yemeni port of Aden, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said.
"The Master of the vessel reports a missile impacted the water in close proximity to the vessel’s port quarter," UKMTO said in an advisory note. "No damage to the vessel reported and crew reported safe," it added.
It did not say who fired the missile or give further details.
Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthi militants have staged months of attacks on shipping in the Red Sea region in support of Palestinians in the Gaza war. They are armed and trained by Iran and began attacking vessels when in November Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on Arabs to blockade Israel.
Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, the leader of the pro-Iran rebels, said in a televised speech Friday tha 90 ships had been targeted in the Red Sea and drone attacks had increased and expanded to additional regions.
The attacks have disrupted global shipping through the Suez Canal, forcing firms to re-route to longer and more expensive journeys around southern Africa. The United States and Britain have launched strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.
Government controlled media in Tehran has been abuzz with bellicose statements by some officials and at the same time warnings of remaining cool-headed by many pundits, following Israel’s April 1 air strike that killed seven IRGC officers in the Iranian embassy in Damascus.
The leadership of the Islamic Republic, and particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei face a challenging political dilemma - launch a forceful retaliatory attack and risk a wider war, possibly involving the United States, or exercise restraint and look for less dramatic alternatives. However, Tehran’s proxies around the region, its domestic supporters, and even ordinary Iranians opposed to the government, might see any hesitation as a sign of weakness.
Former chairman of Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, stated on Sunday that, “The interests of all actors in the region today lie in dragging Iran into war. In the current situation, Iran is alone.” He went on to accuse Russia of pursuing the same goal. Falahatpisheh emphasized that war in the Middle East is in the interest of Moscow. While Russia has refused to deliver Sukhoi-35 warplanes to Iran and its air defenses have not confronted Israeli aircraft over Syria, its diplomats engage in provocative rants at the UN Security Council.
The former lawmaker cautioned against any escalation by Iran. “The country should not make a strategic mistake while in isolation. Therefore, while strengthening defensive capabilities, Iran should not fall into the trap and sedition created by [Benjamin] Netanyahu.”
Rahman Ghahremanpour, another well-known commentator, also reiterated that Iran is alone in the region and Israel’s air strike in Damascus was a unique provocation to drag Tehran into a wider war. He also agreed with Falahatpisheh that other countries in the region would like to see Iran entangled in a war that will destroy its military power and weaken it. Although he did not name any country, but the reference could well be directed at Sunni Arab states in the region that have long been tormented by Iran’s expanding influence and armed proxies.
A relatively independent news website, Entekhab, argued that Tehran has four alternatives to choose from in deciding how to respond to Israel.
First, Iran, relying on its missile and drone capabilities, targets military or infrastructure objectives in Israel in retaliatory attacks. While punishing Israel, it will demonstrate its missile power and deterrent capability at the regional and international levels.
Second, in a tit-for-tat fashion Iran targets an Israeli diplomatic mission in one of the regional countries, thus demonstrating a proportional response.
Third, Iran, relying on the operational capabilities and drone power of its regional proxy groups, carries out targeted and impactful attacks on Israeli military bases and critical centers, in indirect retaliation.
Fourth, to avoid regional escalation, Iran refrains from any immediate response, instead adopting strategic patience, and engaging in a war of psychological attrition against Israel, while preserving its military power.
Entekhab concluded that considering many statements by officials and influential figures in the Iranian regime, it is safe to assume that Tehran has adopted that latter option.
A look at the data on Iran’s oil exports, military revenue, nuclear advancements, and the number of executions in Iran show a trend. When the US posture towards Iran is softer, the regime sells more oil, has more money to spend on terrorism, expands its nuclear program, and brutalizes more Iranians.
Of course, correlation doesn’t necessarily equal causation. And there is no doubt that internal political factors within the regime in Iran, among other things, are a factor. So, let’s break down the data and some of the counter arguments.
Oil Exports
Of the data shown in the graph, Iranian oil exports is the most directly tied to US policy. From 2015 until the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran, on average, exported roughly 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). While the deal temporarily slowed Iran’s nuclear advancements, as will be discussed later, it did so at the cost of boosting the regime’s economy and oil sales through sanctions relief.
After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions, oil exports sunk to a low of 440,000 bpd in 2020, with an average of 790,062 bpd during the “maximum pressure” years. US led sanctions were effective in limiting the number of countries able to purchase Iranian oil. However, when the new US administration took office in 2021 with the intention of re-entering the JCPOA, they abandoned the “maximum pressure” sanctions for a posture of appeasement, which in this instance refers to the United States relieving sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the Islamic Republic in the hopes that the regime would agree to a nuclear deal. The result is evident in Iran’s oil exports, which have risen back up to nearly 1.1 million bpd in 2024 and have averaged 925,562 bpd since 2015.
Though US sanctions may still be in place, that doesn’t mean they are being enforced. For example, the US reportedly agreed to a diplomatic arrangement with Iran in 2023 that included “stepping back from seizing Iranian oil cargoes.” According to the advocacy group, United Against a Nuclear Iran, the Islamic Republic had generated approximately $80 billion in revenue from oil sales between 2021-2023, hitting a five-year high in 2023. As noted in a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, observers have speculated “competing global interests, a desire not to escalate tensions with China, or the pursuit of lower petroleum prices may have also informed the Biden Administration’s Iran sanctions policy in a way that de-prioritized the enforcement of sanctions.”
Military expenditure
Notable data points include a high of approximately $13.9 billion in 2017 in military expenditures, a low of roughly $3 billion in 2020, and a rise back to nearly $6.9 billion in 2022, likely to be higher in 2023, for which data is not out yet.
The explanation for the fluctuation in Iran’s military expenditure mirrors that of Iran’s oil exports. Relieving or not enforcing sanctions that target key industries which produce revenue for the Islamic Republic gives the regime more money to spend – and Tehran will always prioritize spending on its military over the Iranian people.
Recent US policy on Iran has operated under the belief that the United States can dictate how the regime spends its money. This has been the justification for many of the sanctions waivers the US has granted to allow money to flow from countries like Iraq into the regime’s pockets, as Biden administration officials claim the money can only be used for humanitarian purposes. The flaw in this logic, including the inherent fungibility of money, has been extensively written about.
Executions
Of the data in the graph, executions in Iran are the most influenced by internal political factors within the Islamic Republic despite their rise and fall aligning with US policy stances. This includes the transition from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to President Ebrahim Raisi in 2021, as Rouhani’s tenure included an August 2017 amendment to the Islamic Republic’s narcotics law that raised the bar for a mandatory death sentence. This was likely a factor in the decreased execution rate until Rouhani’s successor, President Raisi, took office in August of 2021.
However, this need not diminish the effect US policy has on executions in Iran and Iran’s broader human rights abuses of the Iranian people. Under President Obama, the US adopted a policy of non-interference regarding internal Iranian matters, particularly during the 2009 Iranian Green Movement protests. Obama's refusal to comment significantly on the protests signaled indifference. This approach was likely interpreted by the Islamic Republic regime as a tacit green light to deal with internal dissent as it saw fit, potentially contributing to a harsher domestic policy.
Conversely, the Trump administration took a markedly different approach. President Trump was personally a vocal critic of Iran’s human rights record and his administration imposed additional human rights sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The president of the United States regularly putting out statements letting the regime know “we're watching you” likely factored into the Tehran’s calculations on domestic policy, potentially influencing the number of executions.
Finally, the data suggests a shift back to increased executions under the Biden administration. Starting in 2021, the United States’ weaker posture towards the Islamic Republic, characterized by attempts to offer concessions to the regime in exchange for re-entering the JCPOA, emboldened the regime to increasingly suppress internal dissent without fearing international repercussions. This period correlates with an increase in executions.
Nuclear Advancements
Of course, the JCPOA temporarily restricted Iran’s nuclear program. The nuclear deal is why Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium was nonexistent in the beginning of the graph. As already noted, this temporary feat was accomplished by sacrificing pressure constraining other key aspects of the Islamic Republic’s malign activities.
Although the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran started producing 20 and 60 percent uranium only after November 2020. Similarly, while Iran did begin increasing its amount of installed advanced centrifuges during the “maximum pressure” years – from 41 in 2018 to 512 in 2020 – that increase was rapidly accelerated after the 2020 election in the United States, jumping to over 2,000 in 2021 and 6,200 as of 2023.
It's fair to debate whether withdrawing from the JCPOA was the right call, but the answer is irrelevant to this discussion. There are two realities every policy maker should accept: (1) The JCPOA is dead; (2) The Islamic Republic has shown no interest in reaching a new, reasonable nuclear deal that would meaningfully push back its nuclear breakout time. This data suggests that, so long as these are the realities, the United States has a better chance of thwarting the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program through pressure than they do through appeasement.
Critics will note that Iran did begin producing lower enriched uranium, beyond the JCPOA-mandated limit, prior to 2021. 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium, as well as installed advanced centrifuges, are better measures of Iran’s nuclear advancements as they are stronger indicators of Iran’s nuclear breakout time.
Altogether
The juxtaposition of these various measurements shows that US policy on Iran influences both American national security and the welfare of the Iranian people. Therefore, both aspects should be integral to the formulation of any future US strategy regarding Iran. While applying 'maximum pressure' on the regime has yielded positive outcomes, providing 'maximum support' to the Iranian people is an essential complementary measure.
This is not about politicians nor personalities, but rather policy – you may note that the time periods in the graph are divided based on US policy on Iran, not US presidents. The United States needs a bipartisan policy on Iran, one that has a clear long-term goal and doesn’t dramatically shift every few years. Such a policy should not only aim to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism but also seek to uphold human rights and democratic values.
The data presented suggests that a US policy characterized by consistency, clarity, and firmness is more likely to restrain Iran's adversarial actions than one marked by conciliation and appeasement. As we move forward, it is crucial for policymakers to internalize the lessons learned from past engagements with Iran, crafting a coherent strategy that addresses the multifaceted nature of the challenge at hand.
“This threat is about opening a broad front against the Zionist regime, which is probably the most dangerous of all fronts because it could geographically threaten all the cities of the occupied territories and could facilitate attacks against many of the most sensitive targets, including Tel Aviv and [Israel’s] nuclear facilities,” Iran's semi-official ISNA wrote.
According to the agency, following Israel’s attacks against Iran's consulate building in Damascus, Iraq’s Hezbollah voiced its readiness to provide "Jordanian resistance forces” with light and medium weapons, anti-armor weapons, advanced missiles, and millions of tons of explosives and ammunitions.
“Axis of resistance” or “resistance forces” are terms coined by the Iranian authorities to refer to Tehran’s proxies in the region, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Yemeni Houthis.
“The resistance is ready to take the necessary measures. The mere order of Hamas and Islamic Jihad is enough to block the land route to the occupied territories,” ISNA quoted Abu Ali al-Askari, head of security for Iraqi Hezbollah, as saying.
Though Tehran has avoided any direct military involvement in the Israel-Hamas conflict, it has used its proxy groups such as Houthis and Hezbollah to attack Israeli and American targets in the region. However, there are concerns that the recent deadly Israeli air strike in Damascus and Iran’s possible response might lead to serious escalation in the Middle East.
On Monday, a precision Israel strike killed seven IRGC officers in Damascus, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the highest-ranking commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force (IRGC-QF) in Lebanon and Syria, and his deputy, Mohammadhadi Haji Rahimi.
Since then, Tehran’s officials have vowed revenge against Israel. In a message released Tuesday, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, “The nefarious regime [of Israel] will be punished by our brave men. We will make them regret this crime and other ones like it, by God's will.”
In a statement issued on Saturday, the IRGC thanked the supporters of the government who participated in the funeral and burial ceremonies of those killed in the Israeli strike. “To the heroic and revolutionary nation of Iran, we assure you that your zealous children in the IRGC will, by the grace of God, fulfill the national demand in inflicting a regrettable punishment on the Zionist enemy and its supporters,” the statement read.
Meanwhile, Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces, threatened the harshest possible response to Israel. However, he emphasized the Islamic Republic’s strategic approach towards recent developments, further adding that Tehran will determine the time and type of the retaliatory operation itself.
Considering such statements from Bagheri and some other Iranian officials, analysts contend that the regime's longstanding strategy of refraining from direct engagement with Israel will persist.
Earlier in the day, ultra-conservative lawmaker Hossein Jalali remarked that Iranian officials do not consider it expedient to implicate the country in an open war with Israel. “We will respond to Israel on a proxy basis through our groups,” he maintained.
According to the lawmaker, the headquarters of the resistance front is in Iran but its armies are in different countries.
Jalali’s remarks are a rare acknowledgement of direct ties between the Iranian regime and militant groups in the region. Tehran has always claimed these groups make their own decisions and act independently. In an interview with CNN on October 31, 2023, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian insisted that no group takes orders from Tehran, and that Iran has no proxies in the region.
Nonetheless, some observers believe that the positions expressed by Iranian officials in recent days suggest that Tehran may be looking to open new fronts in the region via its proxies in an attempt to counter Israel. This is where serious threats would put Jordan's stability in question.
In a report released on Wednesday, Ayelet Savyon, director of Iran Media Studies project at Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), warned that Tehran has a “great plan” which intends to “bring down the Jordanian regime, attack Israel from the East, and thwart the Western-Sunni normalization project.”
Savyon added that in the past days, pro-Palestinian demonstrations have ramped up in Jordan, with many protesters urging Jihad against Israel, the expulsion of the US ambassador in Amman, and even toppling the Jordanian government. According to the analyst, “Jordanian sources reported on recent Iraqi-Iranian efforts to infiltrate Jordan via the Iraqi convoys delivering aid to the Palestinians.”
