Iranian Expert Warns Of Increased Sanctions Under Potential Trump Presidency
Mirghasem Momeni, an Iranian energy expert, highlighted concerns over the potential return of Donald Trump to power and its impact on Iran's oil market.
Mirghasem Momeni, an Iranian energy expert, highlighted concerns over the potential return of Donald Trump to power and its impact on Iran's oil market.
"If Trump returns to power, sanctions and pressure on Iran's oil and its oil partners will increase, and efforts will be made to further isolate us, resulting in a reduction in our foreign currency revenues. This will be a political and economic lever for Trump to align Iran with his policies or bring it to the negotiation table," he warned.
Trump's withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, marked the beginning of what he termed 'maximum pressure' sanctions on Tehran.
The move drastically reduced Iran's oil exports to less than 500,000 barrels per day and blocked revenues in foreign banks.
Regarding oil prices, Momeni explained that they are influenced by supply and demand dynamics, international developments, and geopolitical tensions.
He suggested that while clean energy initiatives are gaining traction, fossil fuels remain essential, and any crisis in oil-producing regions could affect prices.
Iran's crude oil production stood at an estimated 3,163,000 barrels per day as of January 2024, showing a slight decrease from December 2023's output of 3,168,000 barrels per day and significantly lower than the 4,376,194 barrels per day Iran was producing in 2016.
Under the Biden administration, both sides of the political spectrum have accused the president of being too soft on Iran, which has continue to accelerate nuclear enrichment, suppress human rights and expand its diplomatic hostage taking policy.
Governments in the US, UK, and EU have long faced criticism for their unwillingness to confront an increasingly aggressive state that has is fast approaching the nuclear threshold and employs several proxies to cover its aggression in the Middle East.
Now, the "tentacles" of Iran’s terror network, as described in a recent Daily Mail exclusive, are stretching "across Western Europe," in what the paper calls "gangland hits."
The clerical-military rulers in Iran have two entities that plan such attacks, the ministry of intelligence and the Revolutionary Guard's (IRGC) intelligence organization. However, attempts to put the IRGC on Europe's and UK's terror lists have failed so far.
The report, detailing several recent Iranian plots overseas –including recent ones against Iran International and its journalists in London– suggests that this “terror campaign is being conducted with staggering impunity”, a direct result, perhaps, of the West’s confused, if not placating, approach to a state that has never hidden its intentions to intimidate or eliminate those it doesn’t like.
“Last month, it emerged, for example, that Iran had sent agents to a range of countries using the cover of Afghan asylum seekers,” Daily Mail reports. “One such couple lived in Sweden as part of a 'sleeper cell' until 2021 when they were 'activated', apparently to assassinate three prominent Jews. Fortunately, they were arrested by security services before the hit could be carried out.”
This is in line with what seems to be Iran’s default procedure these days: to hire willing operatives or outright criminals of non-Iranian origin to do its dirty jobs overseas.
Last December, 31-year old Chechnya-born Magomed-Husejn Dovtaev was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in jail by a court in Britain for collecting information for terrorist purposes. He had been arrested in a Starbucks near Iran International premises earlier that year, having been spotted filming the broadcaster’s building in West London.
One or two days before that verdict was issued, the British broadcaster ITV revealed that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) had plotted to assassinate two Iran International TV anchors in 2022, amid the channel’s round-the-clock coverage of widespread protests against the regime in Iran.
That plot was foiled because the man hired to do the job turned out to be a ‘double-agent’ working for a western intelligence agency. His communications with his IRGC handler, which he’d relay to his other handler in a western intelligence agency, and he later shared with ITV, betrayed a ‘kill’ operation sordidly called the Wedding, with the two targeted anchors, Sima Sabet and Fardad Farahzad, codenamed the Bride and the Groom.
Sabet and Farahzad escaped what could have been a tragic event, of which they knew very little until the ITV scoop. But their friend Pouria Zeraati, another Iran International anchor, was not so lucky.
Zeraati was stabbed right in front of his home in south London as he left for work. He survived the attack with leg injuries, perhaps because the attackers wanted to scare (not kill) him. They failed spectacularly if that was their intention. Zeraati returned to work right after he was discharged from hospital and presented his show a week later.
The Metropolitan Police has said that the three suspects involved in the incident fled the UK shortly after the attack, and that the ‘motive’ remains unclear. But the investigation is headed by the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, due to a history of threats emanating from Iranian intelligence circles against Iran International journalists.
In the two years preceding the stabbing of Zeraati, Iran and its proxies had mounted at least 15 credible plots to kill dissidents or journalists on UK soil, according to Scotland Yard. Even more troubling, perhaps, is the suggestion by Daily Mail, that the MI5 has warned at least a dozen Iran International staff that the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Intelligence may snatch them off the streets unless they quit.
Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been engaged in such plots against Iranian dissidents and journalists in exile. Not all attempts have been successful, but the regime has never ceased threatening and targeting those who dare speak against it, even those ostensibly safe in western Europe or the United States.
Many believe that the reluctance shown by American and European governments to exact a high price for Iran’s malign activities has contributed to its continuation. The culprits, even those found guilty, have often been handed back to Iran in ‘exchanges’ –made possible, in the first place, because the regime takes hostages where and when he can.
Many journalists (or dissidents) affected by Iran’s plots say their host nations (in the EU, UK or US) should do more, not just to arrest attackers or foil their plots, but to establish credible deterrence.
President Ebrahim Raisi participated in an evening session of Iran's National Security Council shortly after the incident, yet no definitive actions were announced.
Following the extraordinary meeting, Iran dispatched a letter to the UN Security Council regarding Israel's attack, delivered by the nation's deputy representative to the United Nations. Apart from this diplomatic action, holding funerals, and engaging in extensive propaganda emphasizing martyrdom, the regime has refrained from further measures.
"Definitely, in connection with the attack on the Iranian consular building in Damascus, several meetings of the Supreme National Security Council have been held at the level of leaders" says the Raisi administration’s Minister of Sports and Youth. The recurrence of these meetings suggests an internal divide among security, military, and political leaders regarding the appropriate response to what Tehran perceives as a significant Israeli provocation. The absence of concrete action a week after the incident may also indicate underlying disagreements.
The Islamist government and its supporters faced a significant setback following the killing of Qasem Soleimani, compounded by the opposition's jubilation, praising Bibi Netanyahu as "the only friend in difficult times." Their reactions have been limited to mere promises of retaliation and statements from the Leader’s office vowing the destruction of Israel. While these actions may serve as propaganda tools, they fall short in alleviating the humiliation felt by the regime.
While IRGC circles continue to threaten a harsh retaliation, other regime circles, such as Friday Imams call for caution and “strategic patience. The publication of a claim that Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the top general killed in Damascus, was one of the planners of the October 7 Hamas attack partially reinforces the idea that revenge has already been taken and there is no need for further action.
This reluctance to respond indicates that the IRGC is further entrenching itself in its predicament. Tensions are escalating both internally and externally, with society increasingly resentful toward the authorities. The decision to forego a separate funeral for the deceased and instead incorporate their memorial into Friday prayers underscores this sentiment.
Any serious escalation and possibly a direct war with Israel, will deal a heavy blow to Iran’s beleaguered economy, a scenario probably loathed by many politicians within the clerical-military system. Already, the currency rial has fallen by 30 percent since early January, and now stands close to 650,000 to the US dollar.
Another significant hurdle to a military retaliation is the profound deficiency in Iranian intelligence operations within Syria, enabling the success of Israel's actions. Furthermore, as time elapses, the range of available but untapped options diminishes, complicating the decision-making process for a response. Since October 7, the foreign operations of the Quds Force have already exhausted some of their most readily deployable strategies, such as missile launches and assaults on commercial vessels.
Some believe that Israel has already given Iran’s rulers the opportunity for justifying inaction, by saying that the attack on the embassy in Damascus was a response to a serious attack on Eilat by Iran’s proxies. The panic-buying in Israeli supermarkets was also portrayed in Iranian government-controlled media as a victory without having fired a shot.
The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International
