Several Iranian government and private organizations as well as the campaigns of some presidential candidates in Iran are known to be conducting surveys and opinion polls before the June 28 election.
Zarif revealed Tuesday morning that he would accompany Pezeshkian to the roundtable discussion at the national TV.
The former foreign minister, who has consistently maintained that he does not belong to either the reformist or conservative/hardliner camps, remained silent for much of the discussion. However, he broke his silence with a fiery speech in defense of Pezeshkian’s proposed foreign policy advocating improved ties with the West aimed at ending sanctions that have crippled the country's economy.
At the same time, addressing the hardliners who have controlled the government since 2021, Zarif asserted that their ability to sell more oil since 2021 was solely due to US President Joe Biden loosening the sanctions.
The hashtag ‘Zarif’ rose to the top of the trending Persian tweets shortly after the speech.
“Today’s foreign policy roundtable, as expected, came under the sway of Zarif and his fiery speech. The text that Pezeshkian read as an introduction, however, also had passages that could help the audience to understand his political vision. Pezeshkian said the goal of his foreign policy was not just survival, but also the country’s development,” Khabar Online, a news website linked to the moderate conservative former Speaker Ali Larijani wrote.
In his introduction, Pezeshkian said his future government would aim to revive the 2015 nuclear deal to end sanctions and international banking restrictions and accede to the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) which has blacklisted the Islamic Republic.
The pro-reform candidate stated that he did not consider diplomacy, negotiation, and reaching an agreement with the West as “humiliation” but as a reasonable and low-cost way to attain dignity. “We don’t have time to stand still and linger, in the best-case scenario, when regional countries are rapidly developing,” he said.
“I don’t want people to keep watching the news to find out if more sanctions are meted out to us or not, whether the dollar exchange rate is going up or not. I want foreign policy to give people stability and psychological security so they can plan their lives for the long term without doubts and anxiety,” Pezeshkian said.
So far, he had remained mostly silent about the Iranian regime's foreign policy and its nuclear program, like the other five hand-picked candidates. However, speaking in favor of talks with the West can be an effective way to obtain support by a large segment of the Iranian population whose financial situation has dramatically worsened since the United States imposed sanctions in 2018 and demanded to re-negotiate the 2015 nuclear accord.
Pezeshkian also contended that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei draws the general outlines of Iran's foreign policy but “planning and execution” of such policies is a duty that the president and his government carry out based on Khamenei’s three principles of “dignity, wisdom, and expediency” rather than militancy, sloganeering, and damage to national interests. Iranians want respect and dignity but not militancy, he said.
However, evidence does not support Pezeshkian's optimistic interpretation of Khamenei's stance. The Supreme Leader has consistently spoken against the United States, calling it "the enemy" over the years, demanding its expulsion from the Middle East. He also gave a lukewarm blessing to the nuclear deal and allowed hardliners to systematically criticize it.
“I have just one question for Dr. Pezeshkian. I will vote and collect votes for him if the answer is yes,” a tweet addressed to Pezeshkian asked. "Will he pledge to resign if experts assert that negotiation and interaction with the United States is the only way to save Iran, and the Supreme Leader objects?"
Zarif’s speech came after a pro-Jalili ‘expert’ panel member, Foad Izadi, incessantly attacked Pezeshkian’s views and insisted that the disputes between Iran and the United States over the nuclear issue could never be resolved and sanctions would never be lifted unless Iran surrendered and made huge concessions to the West.
In his speech, Zarif defended the Rouhani administration and his own performance regarding the 2015 JCPOA agreement with world powers and its economic outcome.
He also contended that the administration of Joe Biden was prepared to return to the deal that former US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from in 2018. However, according to Zarif, the opportunity was spoiled by both Israel and Iranian hardliners, who pressured the government to escalate the nuclear crisis.
Referring to Pezeshkian’s hardliner rivals, Zarif contended that the competition in these elections was between the discourse of the reformist former President Mohammad Khatami and that of the “Miracle of the Third Millennium”, a clear reference to the populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under whose eight years of presidency Iran came under extensive international sanctions.
“No matter how much weaponry you own, you will not attain any results if people are not with you,” Zarif told hardliners while adding that Iran could not “spend $800 billion a year” on its military, a reference to US military spending.
“Zarif led the elections and Pezeshkian to a new stage. The real debate was today’s program, not last night’s,” journalist Reza Ghobeishawi tweeted referring to the lackluster debate of the six candidates Monday evening.
Shortly after the discussion ended, Hassan Rouhani’s minister of communications, Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi released a video on social media urging Iranians not to boycott the elections and to vote for Pezeshkian. “Boycotting means surrendering our share of life to rivals,” he said.
Azari-Jahromi’s tweet was seen 100K times in an hour and is being widely shared by others including Zarif who shared it with the line from a famous song. “Walk along my dear, because this shared pain will never be healed if we go our separate ways,”Zarif tweeted with Pezeshkian’s campaign hashtag “For Iran”.
Other Iranians strongly attacked Zarif, accusing him of trying to "heat up the election" when a large segment of the population has lost trust in the Islamic Republic's stage-managed exercise.
The mass circulation German tabloid Bild on Sunday reported that it obtained “confidential files" of the Iranian atomic program.
The Bild wrote “As the documents show, representatives of the UN agency met with Javad Karimi-Sabet in Vienna in early 2022…. Karimi-Sabet has been on a US sanctions list since 2020 and is considered one of the masterminds in the development of the Iranian atomic bomb. According to internal emails, the IAEA paid Karimi at the meeting. Since a bank transfer was not possible due to the sanctions, the scientist was paid the money in cash.”
Karimi-Sabet is the vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
The IAEA told the Bild that US sanctions are not applicable to its work and did not deny the payment.
“As part of the United Nations (UN) system, the IAEA follows the UN sanctions regulations and does not implement national sanctions regulations, “noted the IAEA.
When asked about the Bild story, which was headlined “Did the UN help the mullahs build the atomic bomb?, David Albright, one of the world’s leading experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s illicit nuclear program, told Iran International “I do not agree with the claim that the IAEA is contributing to Iran's nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, there are many issues with the IAEA's technical support programs when it comes to states violating their safeguards agreements in fact or by intention. Today, Iran should not be benefiting from IAEA technical support programs.”
Albright, physicist and founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C., added “The visit by Karimi is deeply troubling because of his role in establishing Iran's centrifuge program. See photo from our website from earlier days; In this picture from 2008, President Ahmadinejad holds a carbon fiber rotor tube; visible is also a bellows. Karimi is standing to the left of Ahmadinejad, who was touring Natanz. Karimi is likely still working on centrifuges, based on some of his recent publications. “
Albright added Karimi-Sabet “worked in other sensitive nuclear areas, not just on centrifuges.”
The Bild reported that the confidential documents revealed that the IAEA launched funding programs for Iranian nuclear science. The IAEA said, according to Bild’s information, that project “IRA2018001” was coordinated with the Iranians in 2019, with the aim of “Improving the skills and knowledge of scientists and improving the hardware and software infrastructure, which contribute to improving the operation and use of research reactors.”
The paper added “The IAEA also financed numerous training programs for scientists from Tehran in Russia…selected experts were sometimes under the wing of Putin's Rosatom for weeks - the state authority is also responsible for the civil and military use of nuclear energy.”
An IAEA spokesman confirmed the training to the Bild; "The IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) program supports member states in (...) development and management of nuclear knowledge." The IAEA added that it ensured that the Iranian participants did not obtain knowledge about nuclear weapons during the training.
Ukraine’s president has long suspected that the quid pro quo between Iran and Russia entailed Tehran receiving support for its atomic weapons program from Moscow in exchange for providing lethal drones to Russia in its illegal war to conquer the Ukraine.
Separately but related, in March, 2023 Fox News Digital reported that the clerical regime in Tehran allegedly secured secret deals with Russia to guarantee deliveries of uranium.
According to the Fox News article, Putin agreed to return enriched uranium that it received from Iran if a prospective nuclear deal collapses. According to the intelligence officials cited in the Fox report, the Iranians exploited the opportunity during Putin’s pressing need for drones and demanded a "nuclear guarantee" that would enable Iran "to quickly restore its uranium stock to the quantity and enrichment levels it had maintained before the resumption of the agreement."
The most significant reasons for the declining trust include the mass disqualification of candidates by the unelected 12-member Guardian Council, the use of tens of thousands of mobile ballot boxes (up to one-third), voting in military barracks, and the involvement of dirty and non-transparent money.
Although many were aware of the undemocratic nature of elections long before, participation rates in some periods reached more than two-thirds of eligible voters, such as in 1997 and 2013. One of the main reasons for this high participation was the government’s propaganda machine, which effectively "heated up the election."
There are three main methods. The first is dedicating significant airtime on state TV and radio stations, which have dozens of networks, to election-related content to encourage participation. This includes debates between candidates, interviews with them, and election roundtables, all orchestrated by government outlets. For the 2024 elections, the candidates and their consultants have dozens of introductory interviews, and panel discussion programs, other than five collective debates.
The second method involves billboards and banners funded by public resources, displayed throughout cities and along roads across the country. These advertisements use quotes from Shia saints, leaders of the Islamic Republic, and celebrities who cooperate with the government to encourage voter participation. These ads are displayed alongside the individual advertisements of the candidates.
However, the most effective method of attracting silent majority voters is to amplify the voices of university professors (especially those residing in Western countries), non-conformist celebrities, and figures occasionally critical of regime policies. This approach helps bring a segment of the undecided population to the polls. Typically, the opinions and positions of these figures, which are not necessarily independent, are not featured by government-controlled outlets during ordinary times.
However, the effectiveness of these methods has waned since the February 2020 parliamentary elections, followed by the presidential vote in 2021 and the second parliamentary election in March 2024. Turnout in these elections was significantly below 50%, according to official figures, which many believe are inflated to portray a more favorable picture.
“A new wave of hope”
During electoral campaigns, supporters of the Islamic Republic have employed three tactics both inside and outside the country to encourage voter turnout.
The first tactic involves instilling misleading hopes in a society desperate for change. "With the announcement of the names of the approved candidates, a new wave of hope has flowed through Iranian society. If political groups use it correctly and follow the right principles, we will have one of the most refreshing choices in the history of Iran since Mr. Khatami," said Saeed Leilaz, a high-ranking member of a 'reformist' party within the Reform Front, supporting the 'moderate' candidate Masoud Pezeshkian.
President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) aimed to reform some notorious characteristics and undemocratic practices of the Islamic regime but was stopped by conservatives supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard. The same scenario repeated itself during the eight years of relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), who was constantly pummeled by hardliners.
Leilaz believes 40 million people may participate in this election. Of course, according to the IRNA news agency, based on the content analysis of people's posts on Instagram pages of "about 31 million active users" the electorate has not become mobilized for the election.
Abbas Abdi, one of the leftist figures of the Khomeini era and a leading figure among the students who took the American Embassy staff hostage for 444 days, also repeated the above hope: "The elections of June 28, 2024, can create a social wave with over 60% participation," Abdi predicts, though he does not specify which poll supports this claim. He emphasizes Pezeshkian’s personality rather than his executive performance or experience, which is not particularly notable: "The most important and outstanding feature of him... is that he is an honest person who does not lie, and this is a rare quality among Iranian officials, and people are very hungry for that."
Abdi and Leilaz spent time in prison just for expressing their views in the past, which has made their voices to be heard outside the ruling elite.
“Surprising decision of the Guardian Council”
The second tactic used to stir up election enthusiasm is to portray the Guardian Council's decision to approve Pezeshkian as a surprising move, framing him as a reformist candidate to attract those who still believe in reforms within the regime.
Pezeshkian, who is known more as a ‘reformist’ than a conservative is the only non-hardliner candidate approved by the Guardian Council. All sorts of regime supporters, including some individuals in the United States, portray his candidacy as a good omen showing the Islamic Republic’s goodwill. However, in the past eight days after his candidacy was approved, Pezeshkian has come across more as a conservative loyal to Ali Khamenei than a reformist.
“Not voting is not a political act”
The third tactic is to frame non-participation not as a protest, but as an apolitical act. "I don't consider not voting to be a political act," an American-Iranian supporter of the Tehran government said on social media. This viewpoint fails to distinguish between democratic and totalitarian regimes. In totalitarian regimes, not voting can lead to the loss of certain rights, such as employment in government affairs. Therefore, abstaining from voting is a costly political act. In fact, the decline in election turnout in the past four years has shaken and weakened Islamic Republics claims of legitimacy.
The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.
The polls aim not only to gauge the electability of individual candidates but also to provide meaningful forecasts of voter turnout, which can significantly impact the chances of various candidates.
However, some pollsters and political commentators report that certain officials have instructed them to withhold their information, fearing that discrepancies between their predictions and the actual results could lead to social disturbances. Following the post-election unrest in 2009, the Iranian government appears to be wary of the possibility of post-election upheavals.
On the other hand, managers of government-owned polling agencies refrain from publicizing their data, fearing that their activity could annoy future government officials after the election. It is customary in Iran for new presidents, cabinet ministers, and other officials to replace many officeholders with trusted individuals. Polling agency managers do not want to be among those dismissed on the first day of the new administration.
Some government offices, however, choose to make their findings public for various reasons. This year, the Culture, Art, and Communications Research Center's Polling Agency is one such example. It is the first government center to publish the results of a study conducted between June 11 and June 13. The Culture Ministry-affiliated center states that the study was conducted through nationwide telephone interviews but does not disclose the number of individuals interviewed. The results of this poll have been quoted by several well-known and traceable social media users.
The study's first finding estimates voter turnout for the election to be between 51 and 56 percent. Most commentators, including those from other polling agencies, have similarly predicted a turnout of around 50 percent, following the Guardian Council's approval of one 'reformist' candidate. However, pessimistic observers insist that despite Masoud Pezeshkian's candidacy, the turnout is likely to be closer to 40 percent.
The study says that some 62 percent of the voters willing to take part in the election have still not made up their mind about their favorite candidate. Based on the study, the other 40 percent votes are going to go to:
Saeed Jalili 36.7 percent
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 30.4 percent
Massoud Pezeshkian 28.3 Percent
Alireza Zakani 01.7 Percent
Mostafa Pourmohammadi 01.4 Percent
Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh 01.4 Percent
However, according to estimates on social media, Pezeshkian is generally believed to be way ahead of Jalili. On the other hand, the undecided voters' say if they ever decide to vote. They will vote for:
Massoud Pezeshkian 15.8 Percent
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 12.0 percent
Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh 03.8 Percent
Saeed Jalili 3.0 percent
Alireza Zakan i0.8 Percent
Mostafa Pourmohammadi 0.0 Percent
The situation could have changed over the past five days, but that remains to be seen after similar poll results come out.
In the meantime, an unscientific poll conducted on a popular Telegram page, which has over 23,000 subscribers, among around 6000 voters who had voted for pragmatist candidate Hassan Rouhani in 2017, returned the following results about their voting pattern in the 2021 and 2024 presidential elections:
Did not vote in 2021 but will vote in 202410 percent
Voted in 2021 and will vote in June 202410 percent
Did not vote in 2021 and will not vote in 202456 percent
Voted in 2021 but will not vote in 202411 percent
Still undecided 13 percent
The account pointed out that based on voter comments not included in this study, Pezeshkian is far less popular than Abdolnaser Hemmati, a reformist candidate in 2021.
These were the only two polls with known sources. Other polls, with unidentified origins, appear to be part of some candidates' campaigns and likely contain more opinion and advocacy than factual data.
