Iran International
During Friday prayers in Tehran, a group of worshippers hurled sharp insults at Mohammad Javad Zarif, amid intensifying pressure on newly elected Masoud Pezeshkian from hardline factions as he navigates his cabinet formation.
Some pundits interpret Pezeshkian’s much-publicized participation at these ceremonies, and his speeches in some instances, as an attempt to appeal to a broader population than those who voted for him in the recent snap elections, during which most famed and influential ‘eulogists’ (maddahs) publicly endorsed his rivals.
Ashura, the anniversary of the killing of Shias’ Imam Hussein 1,400 years ago, is one of the most significant dates on Iran’s religious and political calendar. Hussein, the son of Ali—the fourth Caliph after Prophet Muhammad—and himself a victim of assassination, was killed in a dispute over who should rule the expanding Arab empire. This event is central to Shia Islam, which primarily continues the power dispute from fourteen centuries ago.
Iran’s clerical regime is based on the religious ideology that regards Ali and Hussein as the rightful heirs to Muhammad and Islam. Therefore, religious symbolism plays a crucial role in the politics of the Islamic Republic. The Shiite rulers believe their legitimacy draws from Hussein’s killing on October 10, 680. They pay special attention to Ashura and other religious occasions to mobilize people and claim political support through various ceremonies.
Maddahs play an increasingly influential role in the regime's religious propaganda. They are laymen who perform eulogies of Shia imams, often accompanied by stirring music to attract younger audiences at religious gatherings. Since the 1990s, the status of maddahs in mourning ceremonies has significantly expanded, elevating their role to be on par with, if not more prominent than, that of clerics.
Some maddahs have also formed strong political alliances with rival politicians. They comment on political matters and disputes and together with their congregations often act as political pressure groups. Sitting next to a ceremony's maddah is usually interpreted as a political endorsement.
Some famous maddahs supported the ultra-hardliner Saeed Jalili in the recent snap elections while others rallied behind his more pragmatist rival Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.
Maddahs and their profession enjoy Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s support. Some maddahs known for their highly aggressive political views often perform at his public mourning events.
The Jomhouri Eslami newspaper, a conservative daily run by a cleric in Tehran, described the increasing involvement of maddahs and their mourning groups in politics as "political games," a "bitter fact," and a "deadly disease" that cannot be ignored.
The paper argued in article on July 14 that endorsements by maddahs and their claims that “saving Islam depended on voting for one or another of the candidates” and that the victory of the rival could “obliterate religion” represent “a clear deviation” from the righteous path.
“Some of these people desire to appoint presidents and some others are seeking to turn the Islamic Republic into a ‘republic of maddahs’!” the newspaper which often voices the concerns of conservative clerics wrote.
Some well-known maddahs, such as Mansour Arzi and Mahmoud Karimi, have insulted and slandered high-ranking political figures, including presidents like Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Hassan Rouhani, in their highly politically charged eulogies. These maddahs have acted with immunity, especially when their actions were perceived as aligning with Khamenei's wishes. In fact, the rise of maddahs has coincided with the ascendancy of Khamenei in the past three decades.
Maddahs are often affiliated with one or more mourning groups (hey’at), which may be funded entirely or partially by donations from various sources, including mosques, neighborhood residents, clerics or groups of clerics, guilds, wealthy and influential business owners, government bodies, and municipalities.
The principal role of hey’ats is organizing gatherings to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein.
The ceremonies and processions take place mainly during the first ten days of the Islamic month of Muharram and on Arba’in (Arbaeen) that marks the fortieth day of the Imam’s martyrdom.
Hey’ats, which played a significant political role in Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1901, the uprising that followed the arrest of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1963, as well as the Islamic Revolution of 1979 have also assumed the role of political pressure groups over the past three decades.
Some hey’ats and their maddahs are believed to be closely connected with the Revolutionary Guards’ (IRGC) militia force (Basij) and security forces.
There are at least 150,000 maddahs in Iran now some of whom receive “astronomical” sums as “gifts” for their much-advertised performances from hey’ats as well as benefits and healthcare services from government and state propaganda bodies.
Iran's ongoing housing crisis has seen a 70-square meter apartment in one of Tehran's cheapest neighborhoods, Berianak, now cost at least $460 a month, way beyond the average salary of around $240 a month.
To delve deeper into the issue, we investigated the cheapest districts in Tehran to examine the costs of a modest flat. Districts 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 in the southern capital are known as the cheapest areas for renting and buying houses.
Divar, a classified ads and e-commerce mobile app, is widely used in Iran to check real estate prices. Founded in 2012, Divar serves as an online platform for real estate, vehicles, goods, community services, industrial equipment, and jobs. Our research converted deposit amounts and monthly rents to US dollars for better reader understanding, using the day's exchange rate of 580,000 rials per dollar.
In Iran, the deposit is treated as part of the total rent. Paying a deposit of 1,000,000,000 rials ($1,700) upfront can reduce the monthly rent by 30,000,000 rials (over $50). Alternatively, depositing the same amount in a bank can yield a monthly return of 20,000,000 rials ($35).
A 50-square-meter apartment in Shahrak-e Valiasr in District 18 is offered for 125,000,000 rials per month, or about $215. This leaves an average income earner with only $25 for other expenses for a family to live on for a month.
A larger but older apartment is offered for 225,000,000 rials ($387) per month. This flat is nearly 20 years old but has been newly painted and refurbished.
In the southernmost neighborhoods, such as district 20, mostly the Rey region, a 40-square-meter flat is advertised for $205 per month. Another flat without a lift and parking space, located on the third floor and 15 years old, is offered for $230. The owner is willing to rent it to a single person, a rare option, especially for single women who often struggle to find suitable housing.
In districts 15, 16, 17, and 19, the monthly rent for a 50-square-meter apartment ranges from $200 to $400, depending on factors such as age, parking space, number of floors, and proximity to amenities like parks, schools, and the metro.
Empty promises from officials to reduce rent rates
On Wednesday, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Mehrdad Bazrpash, stated that “the cap on housing rent increases in the provinces was set at an average of 25%” for the current year (ending in March).
However, in reality, rents have increased by nearly 50% compared to the previous year according to the Vice President of the Real Estate Union, Davoud Beiginejad, citing data from the Central Bank and completed transactions.
This starkly contradicts all the promises the government has made regarding the reduction of housing rent.
Criticizing the policy announced by the minister, Namad-e Eqtesad, an economic website, wrote that mandated actions in the market are detrimental to both the market and tenants, such policies possibly leading to a decrease in the supply of rental housing.
"Currently, paying rent has become unaffordable for a large number of tenant households, and the fact that some groups are still managing to pay rent under the current conditions is nothing short of a miracle," the site noted.
Mahan, who married two years ago, works for a private company and told Iran International that his salary is about 170,000,000 rials ($295) monthly. He lives in a flat in Tehransar, southwest of Tehran.
His wife is a housewife, and he is the sole breadwinner. They have no children yet. He says he rented a flat for $150 right after marriage, but the landlord asked for $200 the following year and $300 this year to renew the contract.
"I am so desperate. I don’t know what to do. This means I have to pay more than my income for rent, and nothing will be left to live on. We are thinking of getting divorced and living with our parents," he added.
We also spoke with Mahdi, a worker at a furniture workshop in Mortezagerd near Tehran. He is a father of two and works 14 hours a day to make ends meet, but still struggles.
His wife runs an online clothing shop. Together, they earned almost $400 monthly last year, but with nearly 50% inflation and the rise of the US dollar against the rial, their income has dramatically dropped. Mahdi said he paid $200 for rent per month last year but now has to pay $300, which consumes all their income after the rial's depreciation.
Reza Gheibi, an economic journalist, told Iran International that the rise in the cost of land, labor, and construction materials amid heavy global sanctions on the country has all contributed to the increase in housing prices and rents.
He predicted this trend will continue as it began in February with the rise of the US dollar against the rial, and after a few months, its effect on the rent market became evident. "The coming months will see worse incidents, especially for tenants," he predicted.
Almost two thirds of Iran's population now live below the poverty line, with record unemployment and ongoing international sanctions which have seen even Iran's educated middle class thrust into poverty.
An unidentified group of worshippers at Imam Khomeini Mosalla can be seen in a viral video chanting against former Foreign Minister Zarif, telling him to "get lost." Zarif heads the Pezeshkian administration's Strategic Council for Transition, which was formed to search for and propose ministerial candidates.
Numerous politicians and pundits, mainly but not limited to reform faction, swiftly rallied to Zarif's defense on social media, with some even suggesting that “Mossad” orchestrated the criticism against him.
Abdolreza Davari, a former aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called on the country's security agencies to review the video to identify and arrest the instigators. He asserted, "There should be no doubt that the scene of insulting Javad Zarif is a Mossad plan."
A prominent reformist political analyst, Abbas Abdi, remarked, "The chanting against Zarif during Friday prayers demonstrates their utter inability to tolerate any loss of privilege. Moreover, they show no respect for the sanctity of Friday prayers, misusing and destroying religious and public resources for their misguided objectives."
The X account of Pezeshkian's election campaign, now rebranded as "Iran News," condemned the actions depicted in the video as "the insults and abuses of a negligible minority." The account further questioned the origins of these “planned actions,” asking, "Where are these directives coming from?"
The apparent campaign against Pezeshkian grew even more severe on Saturday, as several hardline papers, including Kayhan—financed by the office of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—began assailing the new president for surrounding himself with "corrupt political thugs."
"The rightful place for those convicted of security offenses and the instigators of sedition, corruption, and destruction is in the courtroom, not on the council responsible for selecting the cabinet," Kayhan wrote, apparently referring to former officials who served under President Hassan Rouhani.
Supporters of Pezeshkian assert that the Strategic Council, with Zarif at its helm, demonstrates his commitment to his campaign pledge of leveraging expert advice to tackle pressing issues.
However, hardliners contend that Pezeshkian remains largely inactive, encircled by what they derisively term "incompetents."
Amidst the turmoil, Pezeshkian's supporters raise a pertinent question: Where do these directives originate? More precisely, what is their true source if these actions are indeed orchestrated rather than spontaneous?
The potential answers become intricate in light of last week's Reuters report, which stated, "Khamenei decided to plan a carefully orchestrated election, setting the stage for a little-known but trusted moderate, Massoud Pezeshkian, to rise to the presidency."
Reuters reported that the "engineered" election was driven by Khamenei's belief that Iran needed "a president who could appeal to different layers of society but would not challenge the ruling Shi'ite theocracy."
This implies that Khamenei may be seeking to avoid repeating the mistake of hastily endorsing Ahmadinejad's ascent to the presidency. Some analysts posit that Ahmadinejad's win in 2005 was primarily attributable to Khamenei's endorsement and that his approval legitimized Ahmadinejad’s highly contested reelection in 2009.
However, Ahmadinejad ultimately rebelled against Khamenei, leading to his subsequent isolation within the political arena.
When Kayhan, often regarded as Khamenei’s mouthpiece, fervently criticizes Pezeshkian, it may be a calculated effort to ensure his continued obedience—a trait he has consistently demonstrated thus far.
Another underlying reason for the criticisms is that hardliners, despite not securing the presidency, are eager to gain positions within Pezeshkian's cabinet—a prospect that appears unlikely if Zarif remains the one selecting the appointees.
Kayhan has explicitly issued a warning, stating, "Given that the elected president often references Quranic verses, I suggest he retain some members of Martyr Ebrahim Raisi's cabinet, who have made significant contributions and established a strong foundation for the country's progress, to prevent any disruptions in the government's ongoing affairs."
The hardliners hold a majority in parliament, so Pezeshkian cabinet selections must secure their approval. These lawmakers have made it clear they will obstruct the process if their demands are not met.
This situation underscores the rationale of some who boycotted the elections, arguing that even with a reform-leaning candidate, substantive change remains impossible within this system.
