Iran has sent small shipments of crude oil to new destinations such as Bangladesh and Oman, according to shipping sources and data, the latest sign of Tehran pushing to sustain output at close to its highest in five years.
Oil sales are Iran's major revenue source and the country has been looking for ways to sidestep US sanctions on its crude exports that former president Donald Trump re-imposed in 2018 over Tehran's nuclear program.
Iran, which is exempt from output quotas set by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), is striving to maximize production and exports, amid a serious, five-year-long economic crisis.
Oil Minister Javad Owji said in July that Iran was selling crude oil to 17 countries, including those in Europe, according to the semi-official Mehr News Agency. The details could not be corroborated. Iran’s main oil buyer is China that defies US sanctions.
In one new trade, the Golden Eagle tanker sailed near the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh earlier this year after receiving oil from another vessel that loaded it from Iran’s Kharg Island according to available evidence based on shipping data, Claire Jungman, from US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, told Reuters.
The Golden Eagle offloaded parts of the cargo to smaller tankers in ship-to-ship transfer operations around Chittagong in April, said Jungman, whose organization tracks Iran-related tanker traffic via satellite data.
The shipment to Bangladesh was separately confirmed by another oil export tracking source.
An official with state-owned Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation, which operates the country's main refinery, said it did not buy the cargo and it was difficult to establish who was the buyer.
The Golden Eagle's Liberia-based owner and manager listed in shipping databases could not be reached for comment.
Iranian officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Violation of sanctions
Iran’s oil exports had dropped to as low as 250,000 barrels per day in 2019-2020, after the United States imposed full sanctions in May 2019. However, after President Joe Biden came to office and started nuclear talks with Tehran, Chinese refineries began buying ever larger shipments of illicit Iranian oil.
Critics say that the Biden administration, hoping to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran, stopped enforcing Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions. By some estimates, Iran has sold around $70 billion of additional oil in the past three years.
Syria, Oman
Tehran's oil output has topped 3.2 million barrels per day this year, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, after posting one of OPEC's biggest output increases in 2023 despite U.S. sanctions still being in place.
Iranian crude exports have reached new highs this year, with March-May being the strongest three-month period since mid-2018, according to Petro-Logistics, a Geneva-based firm which tracks tanker shipments.
"But volumes seem to be plateauing now," said Virginie Bahnik of Petro-Logistics.
At least eight cargoes of oil - mostly from Iran - were heading to Syria with some already discharged, shipping sources said. Shipments to Syria, however, were below their peak some years ago as Iran seeks other export destinations.
Iranian oil deliveries into Syria have averaged 57,190 bpd in 2024 compared with a high of 147,000 bpd in 2022, according to export analysis from UANI’s Jungman. However, it is not clear if Iran is paid for the oil, or the shipments are assistance to its ally, the Assad government and possibly Hezbollah.
A separate tanker delivered a cargo believed to be Iranian crude oil into the Omani port of Sohar in June after loading the consignment via a ship-to-ship transfer with another vessel that picked up the shipment from Iran's Kharg Island earlier this year, UANI's Jungman said, citing shipping data.
The ship tracking source also confirmed the arrival of this cargo into Sohar.
Sohar Port and Oman’s Maritime Security Centre did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Iran has also begun bringing cargoes into China's northeast Dalian port, adding another new destination for its crude, in addition to elsewhere in China.
Tanker trackers and dealers say that traders re-brand Iranian oil destined for China as originating from elsewhere, such as Malaysia, Oman or the United Arab Emirates.
Iranian oil exports have now reached a peak and have stabilized around 1.5 million bpd, since February, said Homayoun Falakshahi, senior crude oil analyst with Kpler.
With reporting by Reuters
On July 31, Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) and Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-New York) sent a letter to Vice-President Harris, inquiring about her national security advisor, Philip H. Gordon, and his possible ties to Iran’s influence network in the US, known as the Iran Expert Initiative. This network was exposed in a joint investigation by Iran International and Semafor last September.
The letter from Cotton and Stefanik followed a similar letter by Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Congressman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) on July 30 to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, expressing concerns about Iran's influence operations in the US and threatening to subpoena the State Department if it failed to respond to their May 6 requestregarding Robert Malley’s alleged sharing of classified documents.
These efforts to verify the relationship between Iran’s Expert Network and a senior advisors like Philip Gordon are part of a broader investigation that began in October 2023 and cannot be dismissed as mere partisan rabble-rousing.
Until the Cotton-Stefanik public letter, Gordon's career and influence were mostly unfamiliar to those outside Washington, DC. On August 2, 2024, Politico article offered some background on Gordon for European readers, yet it failed to offer a thorough account of his career and national security vision.
Gordon’s influence on Harris’s policy is evident in her televised remarks after meeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 25, where she condemned the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and urged Israel to accept the US-backed ceasefire plan. This aligns with Gordon’s long-standing advocacy for de-escalation and multilateral engagement in the Middle East. However, skepticism persists around Gordon’s recent post on "X," where he reassured the public of Harris’s unwavering support for Israel against Iran and its proxies, reflecting doubts rooted in his extensive diplomatic history.
Given Harris's limited foreign policy experience before becoming vice president, intense scrutiny of Gordon's background is essential for both the press and politicians. Analysts viewed Harris as a “neophyte” in foreign policy as she prepared for the vice presidency. Over the past four years, Gordon likely offered the vice president strategic counsel and education on US diplomacy's nuances. Assessing how Gordon’s perspectives might have shaped Harris’s approach and how they might influence her policies if she becomes president—and potentially appoints him as her national security advisor, a role not requiring Senate confirmation—is vital.
Understanding Gordon’s extensive intellectual and diplomatic career requires piecing together his various roles, interviews, articles, op-eds, and books, as no comprehensive biography of his exists. This thorough examination is essential to grasp his current national security stance, which notably aligns with pro-Iran “engagement” and “incentives” advocates.
Philip H. Gordon: From a Europeanist to an expert on Middle East
Philip H. Gordon is a distinguished diplomat and scholar, a European languages polyglot, with a PhD from Johns Hopkins University (1991) on Gaullist Legacy and France’s Security Diplomacy (1993). Known for his mild-mannered demeanor, Gordon has held key diplomatic roles under Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Biden. Unlike many diplomats who maintain a nonpartisan approach, Gordon is noted for his strong partisan alignment in foreign policy. This contrasts with figures like Victoria Nuland and Brett McGurk, who have served across party lines while maintaining a more neutral stance in their careers. For instance, McGurk, now serving as the White House’s Middle East Coordinator—a position Gordon once held under Obama—has worked under both Republican and Democratic presidents. He resigned in protest during the Trump administration, showcasing his commitment to his principles despite political pressures and accusations of "careerism."
Gordon acquired much of his expertise on the Middle East during his sabbaticals from the Bush and Trump administrations. In a 2004 interview promoting his book “Allies at War,” he argued against military confrontation with Iran and advocated for a mix of sanctions and incentives to encourage Iran's cooperation on its nuclear program. He also contributed to the “2005 US Compact with Europe,” which proposed a US commitment to allow EU investment in Iran in exchange for halting its nuclear fuel cycle. Mentioning Iran 24 times, the document can be seen as a precursor to shaping Obama's policy toward Iran. In his 2007 book “Winning the Right War,” Gordon proposed a “New Deal for the Middle East,” advocating withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, an Arab-Israeli détente (distinct from Trump’s Abraham Accords), and engaging Iran through sanctions and incentives.
After Obama's election, Gordon served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs from 2009 to 2013. The May 2010 National Security Strategy closely mirrors many ideas from Winning the Right War, particularly on engaging Iran, though it is not easy to fully assess his influence on the document.
During the Arab Spring and the Iran nuclear negotiations, Gordon was appointed Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region. While the specifics of his role in the 2013-2015 negotiations remain unclear, his expertise in European diplomacy, Middle Eastern affairs, and intelligence was probably helpful. Gordon excelled at processing piles of detailed daily briefings from the CIA, Pentagon, and State Department and was an effective liaison between the White House and negotiators in Oman and Vienna, leveraging long-standing relationships with key figures like Anthony Blinken and Rob Malley; his colleagues and soccer buddies from the late 1990s. His policy recommendations on Iran, outlined in Winning the Right War, influenced the November 25, 2013, “Joint Plan of Action,” which later became the framework for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal(JCPOA).
During his busy sabbatical from government service, Gordon researched and authored "Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East" (Macmillan, 2022), a work that mirrors the arguments and tone of his earlier book, "Winning the Right War." Revising US foreign policy from 1945 onwards, with specific emphasis on the confrontational approaches adopted by both the Bush and Trump administrations, "Losing the Long Game" underscores Gordon's concerns about "escalation," "American credibility," and the necessity of "engaging" with various Middle Eastern actors, regardless of their rogue status from the US perspective. The book in effect consolidates the vision previously articulated in "Winning the Right War," advocating for a more innovative foreign policy that emphasizes diplomatic engagement and de-escalation.
The similarities between the vision outlined in Gordon's "Losing the Long Game" and Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy are striking. Both emphasize de-escalation and diplomatic engagement, contrasting sharply with Trump's confrontational approach to the Middle East. Gordon's vision, as detailed in "Losing the Long Game," aligns closely with the principles in Biden's strategy, highlighting the need to avoid unnecessary escalation and maintain American credibility through engagement.
When Biden assumed office in 2021, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards-affiliated national security strategists publicly discussed how Iran could exploit the Biden administration’s de-escalation approach, characterized by reluctance to confront Iran directly, to the advantage of the Islamic Republic.
Gordon's vision, as articulated in his writings and public statements, emphasizes diplomatic engagement and multilateralism. Gordon has been part of an exclusive group of advisors to "democratic" presidents. Judging by his writings before and after assuming high office, one can infer that he advocated for restraint and multilateral diplomacy over unilateral military intervention, particularly in the cases of Syria and Ukraine. However, this approach may overlook the possibility that hardline strategists within Iran's regime could interpret such diplomacy as a sign of weakness. Many observers argue that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, guided by a similar vision, was perceived by adversaries like Russia’s Putin and Iran’s Khamenei as a sign of American weakness. Historians, perhaps thirty years from now, may be able to establish from the archives the pivotal role Gordon played in shaping Obama’s response to key events such as Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, or Obama’s strategy in addressing the rise of ISIS and Russia’s intervention in Syria, or Biden’s policy towards the Taliban and the regime in Tehran.
As Kamala Harris is now in a tight race with Donald Trump, the prospect of Philip H. Gordon becoming her administration’s national security advisor warrants scrutiny. The scrutiny over Gordon's connections and influence is amplified by the current political climate, with Kamala Harris's presidency a distinct possibility and the broader implications of U.S. foreign policy decisions in a volatile global landscape. Republican lawmakers' inquiries and demands for transparency reflect a broader concern about ensuring that U.S. national security policies are not unduly influenced by foreign entities, particularly those linked to adversarial regimes like the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Philip H. Gordon’s Work History
The country face severe power shortages every summer and gas shortages every winter. Each year, policymakers opt to cut industrial power to keep household lights on. The shortfall reaches up to 14,000 MW, or 20%, during the summer.
Iran International reported last month that due to high summer temperatures, Iran faces a huge energy deficit, but the situation has not improved since early July.
Industrialists argue that it is truly perplexing for energy policymakers to choose the easiest route of cutting power to factories and steel plants rather than developing infrastructure or purchasing electricity to meet the country’s shortfall. They question how policymakers plan to compensate for the lost production, cover the insurance and costs incurred by power outages, and address customer commitments and the financial losses due to production delays.
Hamidreza Ghaznavi, Secretary-General of the Entrepreneurs Association, reacting to the frequent power cuts, told Khabar Online on Thursday, "The Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade (Ministry of IMT) must resolve the power cuts affecting industries. However, there is no vocal support for the industrial sector."
Varied impact on different sectors
In response to how much current capacity is affected by power cuts, Ghaznavi noted, "Some industries have been shut down for two months. Others operate only at night, and some alternate between two weeks of operation and two weeks of shutdown." He explained that while different industries face varying challenges, the steel and textile sectors are particularly hard-hit. He stressed that although all manufacturers are struggling, these sectors are in worse conditions.
Policy failures and economic consequences
Ghaznavi criticized the Ministry of IMT for not sufficiently protecting production. He noted that reducing electricity consumption in the public sector could increase the supply to the industrial sector, but this approach has not been effectively implemented. He pointed out that there are many ways to reduce power consumption, such as implementing penalties, but these measures are not being enforced to prevent the deteriorating conditions in factories.
To prioritize residential energy needs, the government has imposed limits on energy supplies to the industrial sector, causing annual losses estimated at $6-8 billion.
Official statistics reveal that 13% of Iran's generated electricity is lost during transmission and distribution due to an outdated grid. Experts belive losses reach 30%. This loss is equivalent to the total electricity consumption of the steel industry, which generates export revenues. Moreover, many of Iran's power plants are inefficient gas or steam types. Rather than modernizing the grid or converting to more efficient combined-cycle plants, the government has opted for measures like adjusting office hours or imposing restrictions on industrial power supply.
Dire outlook for Iranian economy
Ghaznavi emphasized the dire situation, urging the Ministry of IMT to take more action on power cuts and support investments. He noted that a resolution was passed to encourage factories to adopt solar power and clean energy, but this has yet to be implemented. There has been little support for factories to transition to solar energy, and no immediate actions have been taken to facilitate this shift.
Despite the recurring power cuts to industries, the CEO of the Iran Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Company recently announced that the country’s electricity consumption demand reached an astonishing 79,872 megawatts, a record-breaking figure in Iran's electricity industry history. According to Mostafa Rajabi Mashhadi, only 128 megawatts shy of breaking the 80,000 megawatt mark, the figures are astonishing. This level of demand is equivalent to the electricity consumption of both Egypt and Spain combined.
Instead of addressing the fundamental energy imbalance, authorities have resorted to cutting off electricity and gas to industries—a short-term solution that fails to resolve the country's energy deficit. Ghaznavi stressed that people need jobs for their livelihoods, and factories need to operate to meet market demands. If prices rise due to shortages, those who have had reliable power might find themselves unable to afford necessities, he added.
The group led by Ibrahim Al-Hefl (الهِفل), from the ruling family of the Al Aqeedat tribe, which has received military support and training from Iran, carried out a sudden and coordinated attack against the SDF in areas like Abu Hamam in Al-Shaitat and Dhiban, resulting in casualties.
Iran’s support for this group includes advanced equipment and intensive training in secret bases, reflecting Tehran’s intention to strengthen its regional influence. At the same time, Deir Ezzor is experiencing widespread resentment toward the Syrian regime, Iranian, and Russian forces, prompting the local population to support the SDF despite earlier reservations.
The recent developments highlight the complexities of the Syrian conflict and the increasing involvement of external powers exacerbating humanitarian and political crises. The situation remains unstable, with the potential for either escalating violence.
The Role of Iran and Tribal Groups
Among these groups, Ibrahim Al-Hefl's faction stands out, having received substantial military support from Iran, including not only military training but also advanced equipment, enabling the group to carry out sophisticated and coordinated operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
These developments worsen the region's security, intensifying clashes between Al-Hefl's group and the SDF and destabilizing previously safe civilian areas. Iran's growing influence through these groups is also alarming some Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which sees this as a threat to its strategic and security interests. This situation underscores the need for urgent diplomatic solutions to manage rising tensions and secure long-term regional stability.
Iran's Strategic Preparations and Timing
Iran has long recognized the importance of local Sunni Arab tribes in Syria to bolster its influence in the region. Consequently, it has worked to attract and direct these tribes to achieve its goals. Iran's cultivation of loyalty within this tribe has further complicated the Syrian conflict and provided Tehran with a stronger foothold in the region.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), known for its advanced training capabilities, has provided intensive training to Al-Hefl's group. This training covered unconventional warfare tactics, the use of advanced weapons, and espionage and reconnaissance techniques. Members of the tribe were trained in secret bases within Syria and sometimes in Iran, making them an effective combat force capable of conducting complex operations against Iran's adversaries in Syria, local sources claimed.
IRGC and its proxies occupy the western side of the Euphrates River, while the SDF and US forces are stationed within a few kilometers of its eastern banks. Al-Helf’s group are therefore very close to US forces and pose a serious danger.
Iran's support for Al-Hefl's group is part of a broader strategy aimed at enhancing its influence in that part of Syria and countering its opponents. By supporting these groups, Iran aims to pressure US forces and undermine their efforts. Furthermore, Iran seeks to use these groups as leverage in future negotiations, particularly concerning its conflict with Israel. The military operations conducted by these groups also serve to distract and strain the resources of Iran's adversaries.
The Attack on SDF and Iran's Role
The attack on the SDF can be described as sudden and well-coordinated. It began in the morning, targeting SDF positions in areas such as Abu Hamam in Shu'aytat, Al-Dhiban (Al-Hefl's hometown), and the city of Al-Busayrah, all of which are located east of the Euphrates River. Al-Hefl's group used advanced tactics and weapons. The attack was a clear message from Iran and its allies, demonstrating their ability to deliver significant blows at any time and place and their willingness to use force to achieve their objectives.
The Role of Ibrahim Al-Hefl and Syrian Regime Involvement
Ibrahim Al-Hefl, who played a prominent role in leading the tribe, has been absent from the current scene for unknown reasons, raising many questions. He was considered an influential figure in the region and had a significant impact on the tribe's military role. His absence has led to speculation as to whether it is due to internal tribal pressures or external intervention.
The Syrian regime's role in supporting and training Al-Hefl's group cannot be overlooked. Figures like Hashim Al-Sattam, a security officer with the regime, played a significant role in funding and providing logistical and training support to the group and others. Through these alliances, the Syrian regime aims to bolster its influence and exploit the ongoing conflict to achieve political and military gains. The collaboration between the Syrian regime and Iran in this context reflects the intertwined interests and objectives of both parties in confronting their common adversaries.
IRGC's strategy of planting cells
The IRGC's strategy in the Middle East is one of the key factors shaping the current developments of the conflict in Syria. This strategy focuses on enhancing Iranian influence by supporting militias and supplying them with weapons and training, thereby increasing their capability to execute Iran's regional objectives. These weapons include anti-aircraft weapons and RPGs, enabling militias to conduct effective offensive operations against the SDF and the international coalition.
Iran targets the international coalition through this combination, aiming to undermine the operations of the US-led coalition in the region. Part of this strategy involves equipping militias to target coalition helicopters, requiring special equipment and advanced training. Iran supplies militias with guided missiles and anti-aircraft systems, reflecting its intent to weaken the coalition's military presence in Syria and enhance its capacity to conduct sophisticated offensive operations.
Iran's Agendas
Hashim Al-Sattam's role in Al-Dhiban serves as an indicator of the increasing role played by Iran-supported groups in areas previously under opposition control. This indicates the subjugation of these areas to the Iranian regime, enhancing its ability to impose control and achieve its strategic objectives in the region. This presence also reflects how Iran uses local militias as tools to achieve its regional interests. For over a year, Iran has been preparing cells in Syria to attack the SDF.
In addition to supporting Syrian militias, Iran also equips and arms Iraqi cells operating under tribal groupings. These cells are used to achieve the same strategic goals in the region, as Iran seeks to expand its influence through multiple local alliances. Equipping these cells includes providing them with advanced weapons and special training, enhancing their capability to conduct offensive operations against coalition forces and other targets in the region.
