An aerial view shows a crude oil tanker at an oil terminal off Waidiao island in Zhoushan, Zhejiang province, China January 4, 2023.
An expert from an institute affiliated with Iran's Ministry of Oil has raised concerns about the country's oil dealings with China, revealing that these transactions bring minimal financial returns for Iran.
Ali-Mohammad Naini, the spokesperson for the IRGC, tempered Iran’s rhetoric on Tuesday, adopting a more measured tone regarding sharp revenge for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh.
Israel has neither confirmed nor denied involvement in Haniyeh's assassination in the Iranian capital on July 31, which further escalating the already tense relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
Naini remarked, "Time is on our side, and the waiting period for this response may be prolonged." This shift suggests a strategic withdrawal from Tehran’s earlier threats of immediate and severe retaliation against Israel, as Tehran reportedly delays its strike to avoid disrupting ongoing ceasefire talks aimed at ending the Gaza conflict.
Despite the apparent de-escalation, Naini insisted that "the enemy should expect calculated and precise strikes at the right time," and added that Iran's response might not mirror its past operations.
Naini further claimed that Israel failed to achieve its objectives with the assassination of Haniyeh, arguing that the "Resistance Front" has only grown stronger. He emphasized Iran's resolve to respond to what he described as “the Zionist regime's aggressions,” warning that “those in the occupied territories” are now suffering the consequences of Netanyahu's actions.
Jason Brodsky, the policy director for United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), noted that Naini's remarks about "a long wait" for Israel are rooted in his role as one of the IRGC's top "experts" in psychological warfare and soft war.
He referred to an article by New Lines Magazine in which two Iran experts Saeed Golkar and Kasra Aarabi say Naini’s appointment was made by the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, rather than by the commander-in-chief, Hossein Salami. The importance of this change is highlighted by the fact that Naini's predecessor, Ramazan Sharif, held the role for more than 18 years.
“An assessment of Naini’s expertise and experience in the context of the responsibilities of his role as deputy for public relations reveals a lot about the future trajectory of the IRGC. His appointment is a clear indication that the supreme leader’s office is preparing to step up the IRGC’s psychological warfare operations and intends to better coordinate control over its propaganda, communications and PR operations,” reads their article.
“The appointment of Naini reveals the direction of travel for the IRGC. The speed with which Naini asserted himself to limit the damage to the IRGC following reports that foreign infiltration was responsible for Haniyeh’s assassination gives an indication of the aggressive approach to propaganda and cognitive war the IRGC will take under his tenure.”
At the start of a weekly cabinet meeting on Sunday, Netanyahu issued a warning to Iran and Hezbollah, emphasizing Israel's preparedness to defend itself against any threats from these adversaries.
"We are determined to defend ourselves, and we are also determined to extract a very heavy price from any enemy that dares to attack us, from any theater," Netanyahu underlined.
Netanyahu also reaffirmed Israel’s commitment to its security principles, insisting they would remain non-negotiable despite the complexities of the peace talks.
Israel remains engaged in indirect negotiations with Hamas, with mediation efforts led by Qatar, the United States, and Egypt. The talks, held in Doha over the past week, aim to secure the release of Israeli hostages captured by Hamas during the October 7 attacks, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,100 Israelis. Despite these efforts, substantial disagreements persist between the two sides.
Even goldsmiths were taken aback as huge crowds gathered outside their shops on Sunday, eager to purchase anything from small pieces to expensive gold jewelry. The sudden 'gold rush' was not driven by changes in prices.
Photos and videos posted on social media showed big crowds outside jewelry shops in many areas of Tehran and other cities from the early business hours of Sunday.
The 'gold rush' was triggered by a religious superstition encouraged by some influencers online, who urged people to buy some gold for attracting wealth, or symbols of other big items such as cars that they wish to have.
Mohammad Kashtiaray, Deputy Chairman of Goldsmiths and Jewelers’ Union, says he had never seen such a rush to buy gold in his 64 years of trade. According to Kashtiaray, the rush to buy gold pushed up the prices of gold and gold coins although international prices had remained the same.
He also said most people had purchased very tiny items weighing one gram or less and pointed out the role of social media in forming people’s beliefs and behavior.
There is still no information on the amount of gold sold on Sunday, but prices on Monday were somehow higher than in the past few days.
In a post on X, a gold shop in an arcade in northwest Tehran said they had to stop selling gold coins, which many Iranians buy as an investment, to meet the demand for the gold jewelry on display.
Many people who rushed to buy gold said this was because there was some religious wisdom about purchasing gold on this day.
Some netizens say people were also buying keychains in the hope of being able to purchase homes and cars, or dolls to have children.
“Dream sellers sold dreams to a society whose purchasing power has shrunk… Such happenings are not strange where [economic] development is lacking,” journalist Zahra Ali-Akbari contended in an article published by the moderate Khabar Online news website.
Sunday was the 13th of the Islamic month of Safar in the unofficial lunar Islamic calendar that many Iranians who keep up with religious feasts and other occasions are quite familiar with.
Netizens say the unprecedented rush to buy gold this year was spurred by social media posts claiming the sixth Shia Imam, Imam Ja’far Sadiq (702-765 CE), recommended buying gold on this day to become prosperous. The quote from the Imam, some others say, is not substantiated by any authoritative religious source.
The Instagram and Telegram posts that attributed the recommendation to the sixth Imam were posted by both gold sellers and jewelry businesses and influencers. Whether this was a coordinated campaign by goldsmiths or importers or only spurred by superstition is difficult to gauge.
“Did they really write in Instagram that buying gold on the 13th of Safar is auspicious and people went and did that? Didn’t they think why nobody had heard of this before? Didn’t they think it may have been a marketing campaign by goldsmiths to make up for the slow business in the months of Moharram and Safar?” Iranian journalist Yeganeh Khodami took to X to ask.
In Shia Iran, some businesses, including gold and jewelry shops, experience a setback in these months as many prepare to partake in religious mourning ceremonies.
Another Iranian journalist, Maryam Shokrani, also took to X to comment on the ‘gold rush’. “This degree of superstition is unbelievable!” she wrote.
Iran's security forces stormed the German Embassy-affiliated language school in Tehran on Tuesday, shutting down its operations in what appears to be a retaliatory move for Berlin’s closure of the Khamenei-controlled Islamic Center of Hamburg and the Blue Mosque.
The German Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement condemning the Iranian regime's actions. “We condemn the Iranian security authorities’ action against the German Language Institute in Tehran. There can be no justification for this. Language exchange is fundamental to mutual understanding. The Institute is a well-known and cherished place where people go to great lengths to promote language learning under challenging conditions. Its staff are highly dedicated to their work, which aims, among other things, to strengthen the ties between the people of Iran and Germany,” the ministry stated.
The statement also announced that the Iranian Ambassador would be summoned to the Federal Foreign Office. “We call on the new Iranian government to allow the Institute to resume teaching immediately,” it added.
Jason Brodsky, the policy director for the think tank United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Iran International, that “The Iranians are trying to create an equivalence between the Islamic Center of Hamburg (IZH) and the institute, where there is none. IZH was engaged in supporting terrorism. The institute was teaching language classes. It’s a tit-for-tat propaganda stunt to please domestic hardline audiences in Tehran. European governments, including Germany, should be downsizing their presence in Iran anyway given the security risks there."
According to the X account @mamlekate that provides news from within Iran, "Today at noon, they stormed into the Goethe Institute on Dibaji Street and the Gholhak Educational Institute in Tehran, forcibly removing the teachers, staff, and those taking German exams, using violence. They had cameras and a large number of officers. They were shouting, 'Where do you think you're going?' Afterwards, the NOPO forces tore down the signs and sealed off the institute, which is affiliated with the German Embassy."
One influential pro-Iran regime account on X urged in late July that Iran’s regime shut the institute.
Sheina Vojoudi, an Iranian who fled the Islamic Republic and now lives in Germany, told Iran International that she studied German at the Goethe Institut in Tehran. “There are nationwide protests by nurses in Iran. Many educated Iranians are trying to leave the country because of the Islamic Republic's corruption and incompetence, and the regime is trying to stop them. That may be one reason, but the main reason is that the closure of the Blue Mosque [in Germany] has been very difficult for the regime and they are trying to retaliate."
She added that Germany should continue to fight "the terrorists of the Islamic Republic and prevent them from continuing their terrorism on German soil and Germany should respond very harshly: end the city partnerships, close all the Islamic centers of the regime, cut off relations with the Islamic Republic and designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, in short, maximum support for the Iranian people, maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic.
Vojoudi, who is an associate fellow for the Gold Institute for International Strategy, added, “I learned the German language in 2015… I don't remember the exact date, but I attended the German language course for almost a year.”
According to a statement on the website of the Goethe Institute, “From 1958 until 1987, the Goethe-Institut had its own center in Tehran. Then, in 1995, the German Embassy opened the Deutsche Sprachinstitut Tehran (DSIT). A Goethe-Institut expert runs it.“
Iran’s regime closed the Institute in 1981 because of a diplomatic spat between Berlin and Tehran, according to a Wikipedia entry. Iran International could not independently verify the 1981 closure.
Iran International sent press queries to the German Goethe Institute in Germany and in Tehran and to the German government. The Facebook page of the Goethe Institute in Tehran was down.
Katrin Sohns, a spokeswoman for the Goethe Institute in Germany, told Iran International "Thanks for your request on the situation of the Deutsche Sprachinstitut in Teheran (DSIT)." She referred questions to the German foreign ministry.
There are currently campaigns in Germany run by Iranian dissidents to compel the mayor of Freiburg, Martin Horn, to end his city’s partnership with Isfahan. German-Iranian dissidents, who are part of the US Iranian-American organization AAIRIA, launched a campaign to force the Hamburg-based pro-Iran regime Körber Foundation to sever ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and former Iranian regime ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian.
In remarks at the Iranian parliament, ultraconservative lawmaker Amir-Hossein Sabeti appears to have badly undermined his position by challenging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s authority for the second time in less than two days.
While most Iranians pay little attention to parliamentary proceedings, the tensions between the ultraconservatives and President Masoud Pezeshkian—still supported by reformists and Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—could lead to subtle shifts in power. These dynamics might reveal who holds sway and who doesn’t by Wednesday, when the Majles votes on the new ministers.
On Sunday morning, while speaking in parliament(Majles) as a critic of Abbas Araghchi, the nominee for Foreign Minister in Pezeshkian’s administration, Sabeti said, “Some people here are saying that we should vote for Araghchi because someone told them to.” Sabeti, a member of the ultraconservative Paydari Party, made this remark seemingly unaware that the "someone" he referred to was none other than Khamenei himself, who traditionally selects a few key cabinet ministers, including the Foreign Minister.
Other lawmakers quickly accused Sabeti of disrespecting Khamenei and questioning the loyalty of Iranian lawmakers to the Supreme Leader. In the Islamic regime, obedience to Khamenei is a point of pride for politicians and referring to him as merely "someone" is considered highly disrespectful, even if the remark wasn’t directed at Khamenei himself.
IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency in a commentary on Monday wrote that Sabet’s remark was “a major mistake at the beginning of his career as a member of the parliament.”
Sabeti was elected in the heavily engineered March election, where most candidates were disqualified by the Guardian Council, which is controlled by Khamenei himself.
Tasnim described Sabeti’s rhetoric as “impolite” and “arrogant,” accusing him of implying that he and his allies in parliament are "more revolutionary than other revolutionaries." Tasnim cautioned that such reckless and misguided remarks could pave the way for more serious and unacceptable errors.
Meanwhile, the IRGC’s newspaper Javan criticized the lawmaker in its Monday morning editorial, stating: “While criticizing the proposed Foreign Minister, a former TV presenter turned parliamentarian made remarks that gave foreign media a pretext to attack the Supreme Leader and cast accusations on other lawmakers in the Majles. His comments undermined the independence of the Majles and played into the hands of counter-revolutionaries. Additionally, social media users seized on his remarks to portray the country’s situation in a negative light.”
The commentary also said that the comment was against Khamenei’s recent advice in which he told the lawmakers to avoid controversy and discord and reminded that Khamenei had also stated that such behavior can only make the Islamic Republic’s enemies happy.
Javan described Sabeti as a "newcomer" and labeled his behavior as "a folly that could lead to further blunders." This wasn’t the first time Sabeti made such a significant mistake. Just a day earlier, during a televised debate with fellow lawmaker Abbas Moghtadai, who supported Araghchi, Sabeti questioned Khamenei’s authority. Moghtadai had argued in favor of Araghchi by noting that Khamenei had appointed him as the secretary of his own Foreign Relations Committee and had praised his diplomatic qualifications. Sabeti retorted by stating that not everyone endorsed by Khamenei should automatically receive the support of others.
Following these two incidents, hardliners in the parliament, including members of the Paydari Party, quickly distanced themselves from Sabeti and his remarks. Reformists criticized him for undermining Khamenei’s authority, with some even calling for the annulment of Sabeti’s credentials. Additionally, it has been suggested that Sabeti never completed his mandatory two-year military service. While the future consequences for Sabeti remain uncertain, it is evident that the IRGC is no longer backing him.
The stakes go beyond just one lawmaker’s fate; the recent incidents have played directly into the hands of Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who has unresolved scores with Paydari and its leading figures, such as Sabeti and cleric Hamid Rasai. Ghalibaf strategically denied them further opportunities to speak in the Majles, citing changes in the house agenda.
The true influence of Paydari will be tested on Wednesday when the Majles votes on confidence for Pezeshkian’s 19 cabinet ministers. In their most recent test, during the vote for the Speaker of the Majles a few months ago, Paydari managed to secure only 60 votes. Wednesday’s vote could reveal whether their influence has grown or diminished.
Iran International has learned that Iranian filmmaker Navid Mihandoust was jailed for refusing to cooperate with Iran's Intelligence Ministry in targeting US-based journalist and women's rights activist Masih Alinejad.
In an interview with Iran International, Neda Mihandoust revealed that intelligence agents pressured her brother Navid to contact Alinejad under the pretense of making a new documentary about women. When Navid refused, the state retaliated by re-arresting him in August 2023, placing him in Evin Prison to serve a three-year sentence.
First arrested in December 2019, Navid was taken to Evin Prison’s notorious ward 209, run by the Ministry of Intelligence, on charges related to a 2009 documentary about Alinejad. After two months of interrogation, he was released on bail in February 2020. The presiding Judge of Branch 28 of Tehran Revolutionary Court, Mohammad Reza Amouzad, notorious for issuing long and harsh sentences, and sanctioned by the UK and Canadafor being involved in serious human rights violations, sentenced him to three years in prison.
Neda told Iran International that after Navid was released on bail, intelligence agents repeatedly pressured him to cooperate by reaching out to Alinejad.
“The interrogator told my brother that if he complied, they could halt the execution of Navid's sentence…every few weeks, he kept contacting Navid and asking him for an answer…The interrogator was asking him to call Masih,” Neda said.
This pressure coincided with a broader plot by Iranian intelligence to kidnap Alinejad and lure her back to Iran, where she could face the same fate as Iranian dissident journalist Ruhollah Zam, who was executed in Iran after being abducted.
“The incident coincided exactly with the disclosure of the Islamic Republic's plan to kidnap Masih Alinejad, which was stopped by the FBI,” Neda added.
US Justice Department announced in July 2021 that the FBI had foiled an attempt by Iranian intelligence agents to abduct Alinejad, luring her back to Iran in a plot that had been in the works since at least June 2020. Four Iranian nationals were indicted for their involvement in the plot.
Alinejad, speaking to Iran International, expressed deep concern over these developments, stating, "I am gravely concerned to learn that Iran’s security apparatus has attempted to coerce an innocent filmmaker into leveraging his connection with me in an effort to cause harm. This disturbing incident highlights the ongoing misuse of Iran’s judiciary by security forces to fabricate charges against innocent citizens, compelling them to collaborate with the regime or serve as instruments in their nefarious objectives."
She added, "These actions provide further evidence that Iran’s judiciary functions not as a genuine system of justice, but as a mere tool in the hands of the security apparatus."
Navid’s refusal to cooperate with the authorities led to multiple warnings and pressure tactics, including the freezing of his bank accounts, and his eventual re-arrest in August 2023. "They warned him that if he didn’t turn himself in, they would take action against his bail. Eventually, after the third warning, they closed his bank accounts to put pressure on him," Neda said.
While on bail, despite a ban on making films and the pressures from Iran’s intelligence agents, Navid turned his experiences into a source of inspiration, directing the underground film Café. The film, starring Setareh Maleki is currently being screened at the Incríveis Film Festival in São Paulo.
Neda Mihandoust speaking at the screening of Café at the Incríveis Film Festival in São Paulos on August 1, 2024
Speaking to Iran International, Maleki, who herself was forced to flee Iran following her appearance without the mandated hijab in another underground film commented on Navid’s courage despite state pressures: "Navid truly stood by his principles and refused to cooperate with them to avoid prison. While awaiting his sentence, he made this film underground and without a permit."
The film tells the story of Sohrab, a once-prominent director who, after being banned from filmmaking, spends his days in a cafe.
A scene from Navid Mihandoust's film Cafe, starring Setareh Maleki
Maleki also noted that the character Sohrab is deeply reflective of Navid himself. "When I read the script, I asked Navid if the character Sohrab was him. He laughed and said, ‘No, it’s not me.’ But after his sentence came and I learned more of his story, I realized it was him. He created the character of Sohrab so that even behind bars, he could still breathe on the cinema screen."
Although there has been no update on Navid’s case, even behind bars, he continues to resist.
“On August 20, 2024, it will be exactly one year since Navid was imprisoned in Evin. Initially held in Ward 4, he was placed in solitary confinement for three days after sharing the story of a fellow prisoner who died due to delayed medical attention. During that time, he went on a hunger strike to protest his confinement. Afterward, he was moved to Ward 8,” Neda explained.
Asked if Neda herself has faced any threats by the Iranian authorities while advocating for Navid's release outside of Iran, Neda said:
"Navid's interrogator told him that we have a charge against your sister, and when my brother asked him the reason, he said we can explain it to her when she comes to Iran."
As Navid serves his sentence, his story highlights the ongoing struggle for artistic freedom and the Islamic Republic’s pattern of transnational repression, using intimidation and punishment to silence critics both within Iran and beyond its borders.
"Today, we are selling oil under deplorable conditions—at low prices with steep discounts—and in return, we are importing substandard Chinese goods at best," Morteza Behrouzifar from the Institute of International Energy Studies remarked in a candid discussion with a local website about the ongoing challenges facing Iran’s oil industry.
In an interview with ILNA, Behrouzifar further highlighted that Iran's current situation leaves it heavily reliant on China, which poses significant risks to the nation's economic sovereignty. This starkly contrasts with official claims that Iran sells crude oil to 17 nations, including some in Europe.
The expert also criticized the broader strategic missteps within the oil sector, describing them as rooted in "showmanship" rather than substantive achievements.
Over the past three years, he said there have been claims of massive foreign economic contracts—exceeding $100 billion—but these were often mere memorandums of understanding presented as binding agreements.
He argued that this has led to the depletion of national resources, including the National Development Fund (NDF), without any significant return on investment. "We did not achieve any results proportionate to the money invested," he noted, underscoring the inefficacy of these deals.
NDF, Iran's national wealth fund, is intended to reserve around 30% of oil profits for future generations. However, due to international sanctions and an inefficient economy that have perpetually strained the government's budget, the majority of the over $100 billion in savings has already been depleted.
The most recent instance that could be inferred from his remarks is the May agreement, in which Tehran Municipality discreetly finalized a two-billion-euro contract with a Chinese firm for the import of transport and traffic surveillance equipment, including electric buses. This clandestine deal sparked significant backlash, even among members of the city council.
"The president of the 14th government [Masoud Pezeshkian] must understand that if these conditions continue, the oil industry will not be able to survive," Behrouzifar warned.
Despite US sanctions reinstated in 2018 over Iran's nuclear program, China has continued to purchase Iranian oil, but under conditions that are far from favorable to Iran.
Last July, The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran's crude oil exports had surged to their highest levels in five years, albeit at steep discounts of up to $30 per barrel. The report corroborated estimates indicating that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day in May and June, a significant increase from the 250,000 barrels per day recorded in 2019 and 2020, shortly after the US reimposed comprehensive sanctions.
In addition to discounts, China apparently does not pay in cash for most of the oil, because Iran is also under US banking sanctions. Although on paper Iran annual oil revenues reach $35 billion, it is not clear how much hard currency Tehran receives.
China imports Iranian oil through tankers, which avoid detection by operating without transponders. Known as "ghost ships" or "dark fleets," these vessels employ sophisticated methods to conceal their ownership and movements, enabling them to circumvent international sanctions. They partake in high-risk operations such as ship-to-ship transfers in open waters and deactivate Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders to mask their identities and evade detection.
Once they reach Chinese shores, the oil is rebranded as Malaysian or Middle Eastern crude. It is primarily bought by "teapots," small independent refineries that have absorbed the bulk of Iran's oil exports since larger state-owned refineries withdrew due to sanction fears.
As the Atlantic Council reports, China’s payments to Iran are made in renminbi through smaller, US-sanctioned financial institutions like the Bank of Kunlun. This minimizes exposure for China’s larger banks but leaves Iran with limited options for using the currency.