The British government on Monday imposed fresh sanctions against three Iranian individuals as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force's Unit 700, which is said to be a critical conduit for arming Iran's regional proxies.
In June 2023, Israel's public broadcaster Kan exposed the IRGC Quds Force's Unit 700, a secret unit responsible for smuggling supplies and logistics, particularly military equipment, to Iran's proxies in Syria and Lebanon.
The UK Foreign Office on Monday introduced sanctions on the Unit 700, accusing it of involvement "in hostile activity by an armed group backed by the Government of Iran, namely through conduct which facilitates (or is intended to facilitate) or gives assistance to the planning or conducting of activity which is intended to cause the destabilization of the United Kingdom or any other country."
Gal Farsat, a former Quds Force official with significant ties in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, is said to be running the Unit 700, according to Israel's public broadcaster.
The British sanctions also targeted three Iranian individual for their engagement in "hostile" activities that destabilized Britain, Israel, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.
Hamid Fazeli, the former head of Iran's Space Organization and head of Unit 340 of the IRGC's Quds Force, is one of the three individuals sanctioned over his involvement in supporting armed groups intending to destabilize Israel.
Iran International reported in June that Fazeli directs the oversight of rocket launches by Harakat Al-Nujaba (HaN), a strategic and integral arm of the Quds Force, which carries out its military activities under the IRGC's supervision.
The UK also sanctioned Behnam Shahriyari over his alleged involvement in assisting the planning or conducting of activity intended to destabilize Israel, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.
Shahriyari was sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2011 for "acting for or on behalf of Liner Transport Kish (LTK), an IRGC-linked shipping company that was designated by Treasury in December 2010 for providing material support, including weapons, to Hezbollah on behalf of the IRGC."
Abdolfatah Ahvazian was also sanctioned by Britain for his involvement in “threatening, planning or conducting activity which is intended to cause the destabilization of the United Kingdom or any other country.”
Ahvazian, an advisor to IRGC Quds Force commander, "assumed a direct role in providing and coordinating IRGC material support to Hamas, including for the construction of the Hamas tunnel network in Gaza," according to the US-based advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).
"Ahvazian has disclosed he had foreknowledge of Hamas preparations for the October 7, 2023, massacre in Israel when, on November 23, he revealed the Palestinian terror group had 'prepared 8,000 people over the course of one year for this [Al-Aqsa Storm] operation,'" the UANI said in January.
In October 2023, MI5, the UK’s security service, warned that amid the war between Iran-backed Hamas and Israel, Tehran may be exploring new ways to threaten the security of Britain.
Despite a host of old and new sanctions against IRGC commanders, Britain has refused to designate IRGC as a terrorist organization.
Owji, who led what is arguably the most critical ministry in Iran, is accused of having “misled” the public with “fake statistics and concocted data.”
Rouydad24 did not mince words last week, suggesting that the former Minister's behavior could cause some “to question [his] mental stability.” The publication lambasted Owji for wasting four years of resources with no tangible achievements, describing his tenure as one filled with empty rhetoric.
Following the death of Iran's former President Ebrahim Raisi and the apparent exit of the ultraconservative Paydari Front—the radical party that gained prominence during his term—some observers note that the press is seizing this moment with newfound assertiveness, though it's uncertain how long this will last. With a seemingly reduced fear of repercussions compared to Raisi's presidency, the media are now more openly exposing the shortcomings of the previous administration’s oil policies.
In his final remarks as Oil Minister, Owji claimed that his ministry had made fundamental strides in addressing the gas imbalance and managing the country's growing energy consumption.
Rouydad24, however, cited experts who challenged the validity of Owji's statement. “Not a single word in his speech corresponds to reality. The Raisi administration’s performance in the gas industry was a complete failure, even according to official statistics,” one critique stated.
Weighing in on the criticism, Nasrollah Zarei, a former deputy in the oil ministry under President Hassan Rouhani, offered his analysis of Owji’s claims.
“The key elements in the discussion of the imbalance in energy products or carriers are, most importantly, natural gas and gasoline. When Owji boasted about increasing natural gas production, the truth was quite the opposite—natural gas production in Iran actually decreased under his watch,” Zarei stated.
He further added, “The claimed increase in natural gas consumption due to industrial and residential growth was nothing but a lie. The reality is that there has been no significant increase in these sectors.”
Zarei also pointed out that the imbalance in natural gas was due not to an increase in consumption, as Owji suggested, but to a decrease in production—a direct result of unmet plans, unexecuted projects, and the failure to implement necessary measures on time.
“This issue is particularly true for gas fields like South Pars, where natural declines in pressure were not adequately managed,” Zarei explained, underlining the systemic failures of the previous administration.
The former administration’s claim to have completed Phase 14 of South Pars, a key gas project, using domestic capabilities, was another point of contention. Zarei criticized this narrative, stating, “The majority of the work on Phase 14 had been completed during Rouhani’s presidency. What Owji did was merely superficial. It had no real impact on production.”
The daily Entekhab also took aim at the former administration's oil sales policies.
The outlet detailed how Iran’s oil exports, particularly to China, were carried out under heavy discounts due to sanctions. While Owji said that Iran was exporting oil to 17 countries, the reality was that China remained the primary, if not the only, significant buyer. Even then, these sales were heavily discounted, with Iran selling its oil at $15 less per barrel than Omani oil, leading to significant financial losses for the country.
Majid Ansari, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, disclosed in July 2024 that, under international sanctions, the Islamic Republic was offering daily discounts of $26 million to its sole oil buyer, China. In a video published by the Jamaran website, Ansari stated, “We asked at what price are you selling? They give a discount of 15 to 30 dollars per barrel, with an average of 20 dollars per barrel… That means $26 million a day from the money of the Iranian people.”
That sentiment was echoed by Masoud Daneshmand, a shipping industry expert, who elaborated on the scale of Iran’s losses in an interview with Entekhab.
“We are currently selling oil to China and giving a discount of 8 to 10 dollars per barrel, but they say they will buy our oil, but keep the money in yuan, which we must use to buy goods from them. If we want to free our money and buy from another country, there will be about a 16% currency transfer cost. With the discount we give on oil, this results in about a 25% loss in our transactions with the Chinese,” Daneshmand explained. He further confirmed Ansari’s estimates, stating, “The number Ansari mentions—at least $10 billion a year—is the loss being imposed on the Iranian people.”
Despite Owji’s efforts to downplay the extent of the discounts, the data indicates otherwise. Under the previous administration, Iran’s oil sales were not merely about offering discounts; they symbolized a broader failure to seize investment opportunities, resulting in reduced production and the decline of the country’s oil industry infrastructure.
Another industry expert who talked to Entekhab commented on Iran’s daily losses from oil sanctions back in February 2022.
Seyed Hamid Hosseini explained to the outlet, “We have a daily loss due to the inability to sell oil, and some of it is also the costs imposed on us because of the sanctions. The combination of these two determines the loss. We have an annual financial turnover of $100 billion through imports and exports, and we pay about 10 to 20 percent in additional costs for transportation, money transfers, discounts to customers, and other expenses; therefore, we lose about $10 to $15 billion this way.”
The media’s post-Raisi revelations, bolstered by expert analysis, paint a stark portrait of Owji’s tenure as Oil Minister.
As Iran navigates an uncertain future, with the potential for stricter sanctions enforcement hinging on the results of the upcoming US elections, the shadow of the previous administration’s failed oil policies is poised to linger --- casting its influence over both Supreme Leader Khamenei's leadership and the newly elected President's term.
The Supreme Council of Economic Coordination announced on September 1 that the NDF's share from oil and gas revenues, initially set at 40% of oil income, will be slashed to 20% this year (ending in March). The decision, proposed by President Masoud Pezeshkian and greenlit by Khamenei, redirects the equivalent of $5.8 billion to pay off overdue debts to struggling farmers and drivers—debts that the government has repeatedly failed to manage.
This move, framed as a "loan" from the NDF to the government's budget, is a reminder of Iran's ongoing financial crises. The NDF, established with the lofty goal of converting Iran's oil and gas revenue into long-term economic assets for future generations, has been steadily depleted since international reactions began against Iran's nuclear program and economic sanctions intensified around 2009.
Despite the NDF's intended purpose, the government has treated it as a piggy bank. Earlier this year, Mehdi Ghazanfari, the head of the NDF, revealed that of the $36.5 billion allocated from the Fund, a staggering $17.76 billion has never been repaid. With the government showing no intention of returning the borrowed money, the Fund's original purpose has been all but abandoned.
The National Development Fund (NDF), established to save up to 30 percent of oil revenues initially for future generations, experienced withdrawals amounting to $13.6 billion from 2010 to 2013, a period when global oil prices remained above $100 per barrel. Despite this, more funds were retained in the NDF than withdrawn during Ahmadinejad's administration.
International sanctions imposed by the UN, along with most US and EU economic sanctions, were lifted in mid-2015 following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement, which limited Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the removal of most sanctions.
However, withdrawals from the NDF continued during President Hassan Rouhani's two terms (2013-2021). In his first term, $30 billion was withdrawn. After former US President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear accord and reimposed severe sanctions, Iran increasingly depended on its reserves, leading to a negative cash flow in the NDF. During Rouhani’s second term (2017-2021), the government withdrew another $37 billion to maintain fiscal stability, despite the NDF's charter prohibiting its use for routine government operations.
The systematic depletion of the NDF is further compounded by the government's continued refusal to honor its obligations. Nasser Mousavi Largani, a parliament member and observer of the Fund's board, admitted last year that the government owes nearly $100 billion to the Fund—an amount that continues to grow as the government fails to increase the NDF’s share from oil revenues as mandated.
The latest raid on the Fund comes at a time of unrest among Iran's workforce. Small truck operators across the country, already suffering from reduced income and fuel quotas, have repeatedly gone on strike in protest. Just this past May, drivers in cities including Tehran and Sistan and Baluchestan halted work, citing the government's failure to allocate subsidized diesel fuel and enforce fair wages.
Similarly, wheat farmers, who are now the supposed beneficiaries of this latest financial maneuver, have been protesting the government's inability to pay for the harvest, collected and processed by the state. With only partial payments made and many farmers left waiting, their trust in the regime has been further eroded.
Pezeshkian, who proposed the Fund diversion, openly acknowledged the dire state of the government’s finances in a recent interview, lamenting the empty treasury and the inherited mess left behind by previous administrations. Yet, instead of addressing the root causes of the country's economic woes, the government has once again chosen to rob future generations to pay for its current failures.