Iranian officials have been promoting last year's $5 billion in foreign investment as a success despite sanctions. However, this amount pales in comparison to the much larger sums being attracted by neighboring countries.
The Chairman of the Iranian and Foreign Joint Investment Association, Hossein Salimi, in an interview with ILNA admitted that Iran's energy crisis could be the final nail in the coffin for its already anemic foreign investment prospects. According to Salimi, the ongoing shortfall in energy production and consumption is so severe that it may deter foreign investors more than any other issue.
$5 Billion: A contrast to regional success stories
Iran’s much-publicized $5 billion in foreign investment last year is dwarfed by the figures coming out of neighboring countries. For example, the UAE attracted $22.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2022, and Saudi Arabia, riding the wave of Vision 2030, secured around $21 billion the same year. These numbers are several times higher than Iran’s, highlighting how far the Islamic Republic has fallen behind its regional rivals in the race to attract global capital.
While Iranian officials like Salimi say that the $5 billion investment is a small victory, the reality is that it’s hardly enough to compensate for the country's systemic mismanagement, outdated infrastructure, and the suffocating impact of international sanctions. In comparison, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, free from such constraints, have built an investor-friendly environment supported by stable energy supplies, global trade relationships, and consistent economic reforms.
Energy crisis: A ticking time bomb
Salimi’s comments underscore a critical point: even if foreign companies wanted to invest in Iran, they would face challenges due to the country’s dysfunctional energy sector. Years of underinvestment, combined with poor management, have left Iran with a 14,000-megawatt electricity deficit. As a result, the country is struggling to meet even its current consumption, let alone the additional energy needs of foreign industrial investors.
Salimi’s warning points to a reality: "If tens or hundreds of foreign industrial companies come to Iran... will we be able to provide the necessary water, electricity, and gas for these industries?" The answer, it seems, is no. Any influx of foreign business would likely run into the same problems that Iranian citizens already face—frequent blackouts, water shortages, and limited access to energy resources.
The problems run deeper than just energy shortages. Salimi’s reminder of energy giant Total's departure from Iran is emblematic of how the country’s geopolitical entanglements have stunted its growth. In 2018, after the US reimposed sanctions, Total, one of the world's largest oil and gas companies, pulled out of a multibillion-dollar gas deal, signaling to the world that Iran was simply too risky for long-term investment. Since then, the situation has only worsened, with Iran remaining on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, limiting its ability to engage in international banking and financial exchanges.
Small investments, big problems
Salimi's mention of the $5 billion in foreign investment last year underscores another issue: the size and type of investments Iran is attracting. According to Salimi, 10-20% of this investment came from Iranians living abroad, while small Afghan investors accounted for less than 20%. More than half of the remaining investment came from companies outside these two groups, mostly in industries like food production, which require relatively small capital outlays.
Meanwhile, an energy expert, Morteza Behroozifar, warns that Iran’s oil industry alone needs $250 to $300 billion in investment to remain afloat. “We are currently experiencing shortages of gas, gasoline, and diesel," Behroozifar said in a recent interview with ISNA, adding that without massive foreign investment and a change in management, Iran’s energy sector is headed for collapse. The $5 billion that officials are highlighting is a fraction of what is required to stabilize and grow the economy.
The road ahead: Will Pezeshkian's government deliver?
President Masoud Pezeshkian has acknowledged the need for at least $100 billion in foreign investment to tackle the country’s growing problems. Yet, according to observers, attracting that kind of capital will require more than just rhetoric—it will demand systemic reform, transparency, and above all, the resolution of Iran’s energy crisis.
With a 14,000-megawatt electricity deficit, Pezeshkian’s cabinet will have to overhaul the country’s infrastructure while navigating the complex web of sanctions and international isolation that has crippled previous administrations.
Iran's Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture (ICCIMA) serves as the voice and the representative body for the private sector. However, the government maintains a tight grip on the chamber, often resisting its efforts to operate independently.
After about a year of controversy surrounding Hossein Selahvarzi’s election as head of the chamber, which eventually led to his dismissal late last year, *Mizan News Agency*, linked to Iran's judiciary, reported on Sunday that the Tehran Court of Appeals sentenced him to six months in prison and a fine for "spreading lies." The campaign against Selahvarzi was reportedly orchestrated by figures close to former President Raisi's administration, further intensifying the political nature of his case.
Last year, EcoIran reported that Tehran deputy prosecutor general had issued an order for the indictment and prosecution of Selahvarzi on charges of insulting the founder of the Islamic Republic Ruhollah Khomeini and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the Tehran Revolutionary Court.
He has frequently criticized officials and their policies in his tweets, and it appears that the main reason for this verdict is his tweets criticizing authorities and supporting protesters during the 2022 protests.
Known for his criticism of government’s economic policies, Selahvarzi was elected as the president of the Chamber of Commerce in June 2023. The election immediately sparked reactions from the hardliners and state media. A few days after Selahvarzi’s election, around 30 hardliner lawmakers had urged the government to annul the elections.
IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published images of his social media posts from the 2022 nationwide protests for "Woman, Life, Freedom," labeling the Chamber of Commerce president as a "dissident. Mehr News Agency also released documents claiming that Selahvarzi had been disqualified by the Ministry of Intelligence before the Chamber of Commerce board election.
On several occasions, the state media announced that Selahvarzi had resigned but he denied the reports himself on social media. Finally in November, Selahvarzi was dismissed by the Minister of Economy.
Over the years, Selahvarzi has held various economic positions, though he is politically aligned with the so-called Reformists. While the election of reform-minded President Masoud Pezeshkian raised hopes for a shift in economic policy, the entrenched influence of the previous administration's hardline economic stance seems to have limited the potential for significant change.
The chairman of the chamber, often referred to as the “private sector’s parliament” with over 400 members, has the role of coordinating between the private sector and government and is sometimes required to participate in meetings with government officials.
Members of the chamber have often criticized regime policies that have led to an economic crisis, including a confrontational foreign policy. The chambers often produce economic reports that the government finds embarrassing, or they criticize proposed budget bills and other plans.
“Chairmanship of the chamber of commerce is not a government position in the Islamic Republic. The chamber is a non-governmental and non-state body and represents the private sector,” Abdolreza Davari, one of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's advisors and confidants, said last year, calling “politically-motivated interference” in chamber of commerce elections by the state “a dangerous phenomenon”. “The affairs of the chamber of commerce should be decided and regulated by the members of the chamber itself,” he added.
Amir Reza Hamedi, a young conscripted soldier, had been enlisted into Iran’s compulsory military service, and was killed at the hands of law enforcement officers in Shaft, Gilan.
Sources told Iran International that Hamedi, who had previously been detained for his participation in the recent nationwide protests, was deeply troubled by conflicts with his superiors and had expressed to his family that he did not wish to continue his mandatory service.
Despite his pleas, his father took him back to his post, where, just hours later, the family received a call saying Hamedi had "committed suicide." However, sources confirmed that the young man’s death was the result of beatings, with visible injuries on his body.
In the other case, Maziar Moaddab, 35, was beaten to death after being tortured in a police detention center in Rasht. He was accused of theft, but instead of facing a fair investigation, was reportedly beaten with batons until he succumbed to his injuries.
His family, unaware of his arrest or the charges against him, was later informed that he died while being transported to the hospital. Fearing the worst, the family has since hired a lawyer, suspecting their son’s death was caused by torture at the hands of the police.
These latest deaths are not isolated incidents, echoing a pattern of abuse in the Islamic Republic’s military barracks and detention centers, where torture, beatings, and suspicious "suicides" have claimed countless lives. For decades, the system has been accused of covering up deaths resulting from violence in custody, using intimidation tactics to silence the families of victims.
Hamedi’s death, in particular, shines a light on the realities of compulsory military service in Iran, where soldiers often find themselves at the mercy of corrupt and abusive superiors. Many young men are subjected to punishments, prolonged detentions, and physical violence, especially if they are suspected of harboring dissenting views.
Last week, Mohammad Mir-Mousavi also succumbed to injuries from severe torture while in custody again in Gilan province.
The Islamic Republic refuses to join the United Nations Convention against Torture. However, despite Article 38 of Iran’s own constitution banning the use of torture, the reality on the ground reveals a government that systematically violates its citizens' most basic rights. Families of victims are often left to seek justice in a system that offers none, their voices silenced by threats from security forces.
Amnesty International reported that between January 2010 and September 2021, at least 72 people died in Iranian prisons and detention centers due to torture or other forms of physical abuse inflicted by intelligence and security agents or prison officials. Iranian authorities have repeatedly denied responsibility for the deaths.
Human Rights Watch has also reported on the common use of torture in Iran. In April, they reported "Iranian security forces’ use of torture and sexual assault against men, women, and children, as well as suspicious deaths in detention". They said that the "authorities did not provide medical treatment or even basic hygiene supplies to those assaulted by security forces, exacerbating their long-term injuries, and have not investigated these cases or held anyone accountable for these serious violations."
