After the decisive defeat of ultraconservative candidate Saeed Jalili in Iran’s July presidential election, his political allies have become increasingly isolated in both the political arena and the Iranian parliament (Majles).
Shia Islamists, whether clerics or laymen, preachers or officials, often speak in a way that discourages critical thinking and engagement. Their audience expects serious and decisive words, as these Islamists hold significant influence over the fate of the Iranian people. However, their speeches are designed to stifle analytical thought, suppress demands, and leave listeners in a state of uncertainty. What are the characteristics of this style of communication?
The first tactic is to position oneself as a savior, effectively shutting down any demands or questions. Words from the savior are treated as invaluable treasures to be appreciated, not analyzed or criticized. For example, the head of the policy council for Friday imams across the country stated, "All people of Iran owe a national debt to the Friday prayer headquarters of Mashhad." This implies that there is no room for accountability. The authorities of the Islamic Republic see themselves as creditors to the people, rather than debtors or responders.
The second tactic is to present oneself as ascetic and devout, seemingly unconcerned with power, wealth, or status, while having unfettered access to the nation's resources. For instance, Kazem Nourmofidi, Khamenei's representative in Golestan Province, says, "The most important right of God is that His servants do not set their hearts on position, status, and wealth, but follow the path of obedience to God… Attachment to worldly matters is a sign of being distant from God's piety." Ironically, the person preaching this has a corruption case and is part of a group that controls the country’s resources. When he speaks of "servants," he refers to followers, not religious leaders.
The third characteristic is a lack of accountability. Shia Islamists tend to blame the country's problems and crises on external factors, from America and Israel to the West, modernity, and liberalism. For example, Habibollah Sha'bani, Khamenei's representative in Hamedan Province, claims that "liberal views and feminist tendencies... have created cultural problems in the country. What is presented as modernity today contributes to cultural and social issues." Given how disconnected these views are from reality, engaging in meaningful dialogue with such individuals often proves futile.
The fourth characteristic is the bold linking of unrelated matters. For example, there may be no significant connection between the decision to have children and wearing the hijab, but such a connection is nonetheless asserted, aligning support for family values with support for mandatory hijab. Hossein Seyyed Samei, head of the Islamic Propaganda Department of Dilijan, claims, "If no action is taken regarding chastity and hijab, the economy and the foundations of the family will be damaged, and society will face an aging population in the future."
Another example is linking divorce to communication tools. Hossein Hosseini Qomi, an instructor at the Qom Seminary, states, "The main reason for divorce is mobile phones, Instagram, and free and open cyberspace. If you want the foundation of the family not to be destroyed, you must first control virtual space, then control the street and market space, and take the areas of sinning seriously." These connections are made to align various social and cultural issues under a single ideological framework, regardless of the actual relevance between them.
The fifth characteristic is portraying themselves as victims. This rhetoric began when Islamists were not in power but has continued even as they hold significant authority. Despite the fact that Sunnis in Iran are denied the right to have mosques in major cities, Shia clerics frequently complain about restrictions on Shia Islamic centers in other countries, often imposed due to concerns over terrorism and the preaching of hate. For example, Hossein Nouri Hamdani, a state-sponsored religious figure, condemned the closure of the Hamburg Islamic Center by German police in July, calling it "a great cultural injustice, a violation of the sanctities of all Muslims, and an attack on the rights of all united people who support justice, freedom, spirituality, and human rights." This narrative allows them to deflect criticism and maintain a stance of moral superiority, even in the face of legitimate concerns about their actions.
The sixth characteristic is creating an exaggerated, illusory need for the presence of Shia clerics. For instance, Mohammad Reza Modaresi Yazdi, a member of the Guardian Council, claims, "The Islamic Republic needs seminary students in various fields... The Islamic society is hungry for virtuous seminary students, and the people also need them in their lives." However, no research or surveys support such a claim.
The seventh characteristic is tautology, where clerics use circular reasoning to reinforce their points. They argue that if people engage in religious practices, they will undergo religious transformation. For example, Abdul Karim Abedini, Khamenei's representative in Qazvin province, says, "If people have a relationship with the mosque, congregational prayers, pulpits and preachers, we will witness change, and religious concerns in society will be strengthened." Essentially, this means, "If people observe their religiosity, they will become religious."
They project their own beliefs and interests onto the general public. For example, Nasser Makarem Shirazi, a state-sponsored religious figure, claims, "People still consider the clergy as a reliable authority in their religion and world, and they expect them to interpret the Holy Quran and explain the hadiths... People expect the seminaries to guide them to happiness, both in this world and the hereafter." However, no independent research or surveys support this assertion.
All the rhetoric mentioned above can be easily dismissed by the public without any real consequence. Propagandists of the Islamic Republic speak not to inform or analyze, but simply to speak. Their words neither convey valuable information, articulate policies, nor address the concerns and demands of the people. Shia Islamists essentially exploit their audience, offering nothing in return for their attention. Listening to them does little to enlighten the public about governance or spirituality. To them, speaking is synonymous with ruling and fulfilling divine responsibilities, devoid of any civil accountability.
Ali Khamenei publishes a poem from time to time to remind the Iranian people that he is not only in the business of wiping Israel off the map and slaughtering Jews and dissidents but also has a soft and mystical side. In his new sonnet, he calls himself "a guru" and "in the color of spring". He depicts himself as a flood that borrows its freshness from mountains. His mysticism is a reaction to a lack of charismatic perception in the minds and hearts of the Iranian people.
As a result, looking to their words for insights into the government’s policies, plans, or decisions is misguided. These individuals are merely propagandists of a religious totalitarian regime, and everything they say serves to bolster the authority and survival of this system. They have no red lines. Their rhetoric is filled with lies, carelessness, speculation, and conspiracy theories. They do not speak to convey facts or realistic perspectives; they speak to create illusions.
* All the quotes in this article were taken from the short news section of Iran International Persian website in July 2024.
The revealing insight comes from a new survey conducted by a department affiliated with the Ministry of Culture, published by the pro-reform daily Ham-Mihan on Sunday.
The results, part of the Fourth Wave of the National Survey on Values and Attitudes of Iranians, offer a rare glimpse into public sentiment in a system that often avoids transparency about the true depth of dissatisfaction among its citizens.
Conducted in November 2023 by the Office of National Plans of the Research Institute of Culture, Art, and Communications, the survey polled 15,878 Iranians over the age of 51 across 15 provinces.
While the full survey results have not yet been made public, sections of the data have been released to researchers and are slowly being published. According to Ham-Mihan, 92% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the country’s current trajectory, with about one-third of them going so far as to state that “the country’s situation is beyond repair.”
This figure comes as no surprise in a country that is in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the founding of the Islamic Republic, international isolation, and rising authoritarianism.
Among the most pressing issues identified by respondents were inflation and high prices (81.9%), unemployment (47.9%), addiction (26.9%), corruption (13.1%), housing shortages (12.1%), and, notably, the issue of the hijab (11.9%).
The prominence of the hijab issue, which has risen to become the sixth most important concern, reflects a dramatic shift in public sentiment following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 while in the custody of the morality police.
Protests that erupted after her death challenged the Islamic Republic’s dress codes and have since shifted the national debate on personal freedoms, particularly for women.
The survey also underscores the growing sense of insecurity among Iranians, with 54.8% of respondents stating that their property and belongings are not safe. Women, in particular, expressed concerns about safety, with 14% stating they feel "very little" safety in public, and 21.5% indicating they feel "somewhat unsafe."
Sociologists warn that this overwhelming sense of hopelessness could lead to greater unrest. Speaking to Ham-Mihan, sociologist Simin Kazemi pointed out the fact that 60% of eligible voters did not participate in the first round of the 2024 presidential election, a sign of widespread political disillusionment.
“If the new government fails to seize this opportunity and address the concerns, growing dissatisfaction could spiral into political and social crises larger than anything we’ve seen before,” Kazemi said.
The outlook painted by the survey echoes past studies, including a 2022 poll by the Gamaan Institute, which found that 81% of respondents inside Iran wanted an end to the Islamic Republic altogether. Similarly, a 2021 survey by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) revealed that 59% of Iranians had no hope for the future of their country.
Adding to this, a former aide to ex-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad revealed that Ahmadinejad, who had Jalili as his nuclear negotiator from 2007 to 2013, had almost fired him during his tenure. This internal criticism further highlights Jalili’s diminishing influence.
In an interview with Khabar Online, hardline cleric Abbas Amirifar claimed that Saeed Jalili has never secured more than four million votes in any election. In the most recent presidential race, Jalili reportedly received around 3.5 million votes out of the nearly 30 million ballots the government claims were cast.
He also argued that Jalili could not be an effective president, although he was Masoud Pezeshkian’s main rival in the election, because he lacks executive experience. "He has never been even a deputy minister or the head of a small organization,” Amirifar said.
The cleric also alluded to the transformation of the political balance in recent months with the election of conservative Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as parliament speaker and Masoud Pezeshkian as president. This has weakened the ultraconservatives, he said and quoted Ghalibaf as saying that "some individuals do not want the government to be successful," he clear reference to Jalili and his allies.
Amirifar pointed out that some hardliners entered parliament with as little as 3 percent of the vote in their constituencies. He also claimed that Jalili's 3.5 million votes in the recent presidential election were partly due to the influence of hardline local officials. Furthermore, Amirifar suggested that hardliners harbor resentment toward Speaker Ghalibaf for steering the parliament in a way that ensured all of Pezeshkian's cabinet ministers received a vote of confidence, undermining their political influence.
The cleric further accused hardliners in the Majles of opposing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, despite his call for full support of Pezeshkian’s administration. He pointed out that some of these hardliners have been convicted of various offenses and should not even be in parliament. Amirifar emphasized that their resistance to Khamenei’s directive and their questionable backgrounds raise concerns about their credibility and commitment to national interests.
Meanwhile, conservative activist Hossein Naqavi Hosseini has also told reporters that the hardliners in the Majles are the same individuals who were nicknamed as the "deviant group" during Ahmadinejad's presidency. He said the hardliners, particularly the members of the ultraconservative Paydari Party are the only group in parliament who do not believe in Pezeshkian's "national accord" policy.
He stated that Iran's conservatives have already warned hardliners they are on the wrong path. They have told them that fair criticism of the government is not the same as outright confrontation. Conservatives cautioned the ultraconservatives that they risk isolation if they refuse to join the unity call by Pezeshkian.
In another development, former conservative lawmaker Mostafa Mirsalim claimed that unlike the hardliners in the ultraconservative groups, the main body of the Iranian conservatives are quite transparent in their political behavior. He said the radicals among ultraconservatives will soon vanish from Iran's political scene.
Prominent conservative commentator Nasser Imani told reporters that Iranian conservatives have a responsibility to confront the radicals among ultraconservatives. He added: "We are facing a group of radical politicians who should not be allowed to expand their influence."
Like Amirifar, Imani accused radicals in the Majles of ignoring Khamenei's advice to maintain parliamentary calm. However, he noted that by overwhelmingly endorsing Pezeshkian's administration, the main body of the Majles has demonstrated its independence from radical influence. This overwhelming vote of confidence, he suggested, shows that the radicals do not have the control they claim, and the broader parliament is committed to supporting the new government rather than aligning with extreme factions.
