The US State Department on Thursday offered a reward of up to 20 million dollars for information on Shahram Poursafi, accusing him of seeking to former US national security adviser John Bolton on behalf of Iran.
"From October 2021 to April 2022, Iran-based Poursafi attempted to hire criminal elements within the United States to murder Mr. Bolton in Washington DC or Maryland in exchange for $300,000," the state department said.
The statement described Poursafi as a uniformed member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tehran's transnational paramilitary organization dedicated to confronting Israel and the United States.
"Poursafi allegedly provided material support and resources to facilitate the attempted killing. Poursafi told the potential assassin – who actually became a confidential source for U.S. investigators – that once he completed the Bolton murder he would have a second assassination job for him."
The US treasury designated Poursafi a "specially designated global terrorist" in 2023 after the justice department unsealed aspects of the allegations against him the previous year.
The announcement comes days after Donald Trump's campaign said US security agencies had briefed him on threats to the former president's life.
Trump said on Wednesday that the United States should threaten to bomb countries "to smithereens" which seek the assassination of US leaders in the wake of the alleged Iranian plot.
The figure represents a sixfold increase compared to the same period last year, when only 7.3 tons, worth $466 million, were imported.
Mohammad Rezvanifar noted that most of the gold was cleared through the International Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran, with a small percentage handled by customs offices in various other locations across the country.
In a similar period last year, 7.3 tons of gold bullion, valued at $466 million, were imported into the country. This year, "96.8% of the imported gold bullion was brought in and cleared through Imam Khomeini Airport Customs,” he said on Tuesday.
Regulatory shifts impacting gold imports
Iran has been adjusting its approach to foreign exchange regulations in response to international sanctions. Exporters, particularly those dealing in petrochemicals, steel, and oil products—key sectors in the country's non-oil exports—have been allowed to import gold as an alternative to repatriating foreign currency earnings.
However, a directive issued in June by the Central Bank, halted the practice for some exporters. Observers have pointed out that the surge in gold imports may reflect broader efforts by the country to shield its economy from currency shortages and manage international trade amid sanctions.
Conflicting reports on Central Bank's gold reserves
The rise in gold imports comes amid conflicting reports regarding the true state of Iran’s gold reserves. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, the Central Bank stopped regularly disclosing its gold reserves and import data, attributing the decision to the impact of sanctions.
In 2011, then-Governor Mahmoud Bahmani said that Iran’s reserves stood at 500 tons—a figure that was later debunked. Subsequent reviews under Hassan Rouhani's government revealed that the actual reserves in 2011 were around 45 tons.
In July, Mohammadreza Farzin, the Central Bank governor appointed by Ebrahim Raisi, without mentioning the amount of gold reserves, said: “One of the main goals of the Central Bank is to increase currency reserves, and it can be confidently stated that free currency and gold reserves are increasing.”
The August gold rush
An unprecedented public rush to buy gold occurred on August 18, driven by social media campaigns promoting the superstition of "good fortune" on that particular day. The sudden surge in demand shocked officials, with the vice president of the Iran Gold and Jewelry Union noting that he had never seen such a phenomenon in his 64 years in the market.
Although specific data on the amount of gold sold that day hasn’t been released, the Customs report on gold imports might help explain the surge. Some have speculated that the promotions to increase gold sale to citizens were linked to entities within the government to offload gold imported for currency stabilization. Thus, the owners of those 42.8 tons of gold likely managed to sell a portion of the imported gold during the rush.
Gold-for-drones
Iran's use of gold in international transactions has a long history, often as a tool to bypass international restrictions on currency flows. In February, a hacking group exposed documents from Tondar Sahra, a company involved in drone technology and reportedly linked to the Islamic Republic’s military.
The hacked documents showed Russia paid Iran approximately $1.75 billion in a deal for Shahed-136 drones. Part of the payment was made with several tons of gold ingots.
The leaked files also detail the establishment of a production line in Russia for these drones, set up by Alabuga Special Economic Zone, a Russian state-backed entity. This arrangement allows Russia to manufacture Shahed drones domestically, reducing costs and dependency on imports from Iran.
During Ahmadinejad's tenure, it was revealed in a court session involving Babak Zanjani, an Iranian oil sales middleman, that 1.5 tons of gold had been purchased from Africa. Zanjani testified that the gold, coordinated by the Central Bank, was seized in Turkey and later found to be fake when it arrived in Dubai.
At his first press conference, responding to a female journalist's complaint about the morality police, Pezeshkian remarked, "They were not supposed to harm. We will follow up to ensure they don't bother you." During the election debates, he had an even more critical stance, referring to compulsory hijab enforcement as a “dark agenda.”
However, just two days after this statement, the Guardian Council approved the restrictive hijab law passed by the previous parliament in May 2023, imposing a range of restrictions and punishments on women’s clothing choices.
Later, the firebrand Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, Ahmad Alamolhoda, criticized Pezeshkian’s stance, saying, "The administration may not agree with a particular method of enforcement, but it has the authority to implement an alternative approach... however, rejecting the hijab is intolerable."
Reports indicate that the activity of the morality patrols has decreased since the start of the new administration, though this pattern has been seen in previous governments as well. The vice police patrols have historically been periodic and seasonal.
Meanwhile, many women in Tehran and other major cities have continued to defy the mandatory hijab since the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody. Since then, violent arrests have persisted, keeping the government on edge as it faces the constant threat of renewed public unrest.
The approval of the new hijab law, while the previous one remains unenforced, has drawn criticism from government-backed clerics. The challenge now is how to address these contradictions.
Three strategies for compulsory hijab enforcement
When analyzing the decisions of the Guardian Council, parliament, and officials' statements, alongside field observations, it appears the government has adopted a three-pronged strategy regarding the controversial hijab enforcement.
First, the strategy involves delaying the implementation of the new hijab law, even after its formal approval. This approval seems designed to appease Shia clerics, religious authorities, and Sharia-oriented officials within the ruling class. However, the law may remain unenforced, much like the longstanding ban on satellite TV equipment, which, after years of raids and confiscations, was largely ignored or forgotten. The public, accustomed to the inconsistent enforcement, is unlikely to protest the lack of rule of law, while religious loyalists will gradually shift focus and forget the issue.
The second strategy involves reverting to the previous method of enforcement—seasonal and periodic implementation of the new hijab law (such as the usual crackdowns every early summer) to maintain a constant level of intimidation. Simultaneously, the government may distance itself by unofficially suggesting that enforcement is not carried out by government or municipal employees, but by self-motivated individuals. This approach mimics the "volunteer" narrative seen with the Hijab Watch plan, where the Tehran municipality’s funding and involvement were quickly exposed despite claims of grassroots enforcement.
In this scenario, the law isn't entirely abandoned, keeping Sharia-oriented factions somewhat satisfied. Meanwhile, the president can claim, as others before him have, that "we don’t have enough power to stop it." This allows the Sharia believers to perceive Pezeshkian’s administration as sidelined on issues like internet filtering and hijab enforcement, despite its public stance.
The third strategy involves keeping the enforcement of the hijab law experimental rather than fully legal. Authorities may test the law in select provinces for a limited time, gauging societal reactions. If the law generates sufficient intimidation, it will be enforced; if not, it could be quietly abandoned, much like the satellite TV ban. If the majority comply and only a small group resists, the law would then be fully implemented.
This approach reflects a trial-and-error method, balancing power between the people and the government, and is aimed at preventing uprisings like the Mahsa Revolution. This perspective is reportedly supported by members of Khamenei's office and authoritarian factions. Notably, compulsory hijab wasn’t introduced by law—it was enforced in 1980, years before the hijab law was passed in 1985. Thus, the power struggle between the government and the people has always been the key factor.
Given society’s sensitivity and the sharp divide between authorities and the public—92% of whom are dissatisfied—this third strategy seems more likely. The regime understands that daily confrontations with ordinary citizens on the streets could threaten its survival.
Opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International
