One of Iraq's few independent newspapers has warned that the country may share Syria's fate of prolonged conflict and upheaval if the government fails to distance itself from the Islamic Republic and undertake urgent reforms.
This news analysis comes after Bashar al-Assad in Syria lost his grip on power after support from Iran and its ally Hezbollah were sapped by over a year of conflict with Israel.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, whose tenure is supported in part by Iran-backed armed groups, may now face pressure to prioritize Iraq’s sovereignty over foreign influence according to the daily.
"Iraq remains internally divided over the repercussions of the situation in Syria, with some still supporting intervention at this point. Factions and some actors in the Shiite political scene align with this view, consistent with Tehran’s stance, which has announced the continuation of resistance," wrote Al-Mada.
The Committee to Protect Journalists has said Al-Mada "is seen as one of the only remaining critical newspapers in Iraq".
Operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), these groups wield considerable power over Iraq’s governance, military operations, and energy infrastructure.
Despite their original mandate to combat ISIS, many of the militias have since expanded their activities, frequently targeting US forces and installations in Iraq with rockets and drones, and exacerbating tensions between Tehran and Washington.
The paper also highlighted fears of broader regional destabilization following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a key ally of Iran.
"Political forces have started warning about scenarios similar to Syria’s situation if rapid internal reforms are not implemented," wrote Al-Mada, citing thinktanks advising Iraqi government to distance itself from the poor governance of the Shiite political forces that have held power since 2003.
Tehran’s armed affiliates in Iraq may be weakened by the developments in Syria. The Australian Arab Institute for Strategic Affairs recently warned that Baghdad faces a critical juncture: either curb the influence of Iran-backed militias or risk becoming a target for escalating Israeli and US military operations.
Adding to the uncertainty are concerns about the potential reactivation of ISIS sleeper cells given the security vacuum next door.
“Iraq is trying to maintain a somewhat balanced relationship with Washington and not align itself entirely with Tehran,” Rahim al-Aboudi, a senior official in the National Wisdom Movement, was quoted as saying.
Growing public discontent
Domestically, public anger toward Iran’s proxies has intensified in recent years, particularly after their violent suppression of 2019 anti-government protests which criticized Iranian influence.
Social media has amplified these frustrations, with posts encouraging attacks on the Iranian embassy and measures to end the activities of armed groups backed by Tehran.
“Numerous individuals or fake accounts have called for citizens to arm themselves in opposition to Iran-backed forces,” Truske Sadeghi, a former Iran International correspondent posted on X.
The warnings of instability echo fears of a repeat of Iraq’s tumultuous recent past.
Unlike the ISIS incursions of 2014 which originated from Syria, analysts warn that any future unrest could arise from within Iraq’s cities, fueled by the same grievances that sparked the 2019 protests but on a potentially larger scale.
While Baghdad has reiterated that its borders are secure, the government’s inability to effectively manage the influence of IRGC-backed militias has left the country vulnerable to both domestic upheaval and regional spillovers.
As Iraq navigates mounting international and domestic pressures, its leadership could face a critical choice: assert greater control over Tehran-backed forces or risk a deeper descent into instability.
On Monday, 18 provinces, including Tehran and Isfahan, were effectively shut down as authorities cited cold weather and energy consumption management for the disruptions.
However, ongoing gas and electricity shortages suggest systemic failures rather than mere seasonal challenges.
According to state media, government operations were fully suspended in provinces such as East and West Azarbaijan, Ardebil, Razavi Khorasan, Golestan, and Gilan. In regions including Khuzestan and Yazd, partial closures and delays in operations highlighted the varying severity of the crisis, leaving only four provinces unaffected.
Alongside freezing temperatures, pollution in provinces like Khuzestan added to the crisis, with six cities classified as hazardous.
Sadegh Ziaeian, head of Iran's Meteorological Organization, reported subzero temperatures at 480 of the country's 675 weather stations, with 28 provincial capitals experiencing freezing conditions. However, the closures have failed to prevent continued gas and electricity outages, exposing the vulnerability of the country’s energy infrastructure.
Hassan Mousavi, spokesperson for Iran’s National Gas Company, confirmed that 850 million cubic meters of gas were injected into the network on Saturday, with 71% allocated to households, small businesses, and industries.
“The gas consumption in the residential, commercial, and small industrial sectors has increased by 17% compared to the same period last year,” he added.
Officials have warned of gas pressure drops in the national network, reflecting the fragile state of the energy system.
Blackouts and power plant shutdowns
The crisis has forced shutdowns at gas power plants in provinces including Golestan and Lorestan. Mehran Amiri, head of Lorestan's Electricity Distribution Company, announced the closure of the Doroud power plant.
"Gas-fired power plants in the province, with a capacity of 130 megawatts, have been taken offline due to increased gas consumption by users," said Amiri.
"The province's power plants, including the Doroud power plant with a capacity of 90 megawatts, are currently out of operation."
Ahmad Mousavi from Golestan’s Electricity Distribution Company reported similar shutdowns in Aliabad Katoul and smaller plants.
Scheduled blackouts in Golestan now last up to two hours per day for each consumer.
The power sector is under immense strain, with many recalling the widespread blackouts of summer 2023 when the failing energy grid struggled to meet demand in extreme heat.
Now, winter has exposed similar deficiencies in gas supply, with citizens enduring heating shortages and intermittent power outages despite government claims of network stability.
In an attempt to manage the crisis, officials have called on citizens to conserve energy through campaigns like Two Degrees Less, urging households to reduce heating. The initiative has drawn widespread ridicule on social media, with critics dismissing it as an inadequate response to systemic infrastructure failures.
Iranian citizens, already burdened by rising energy costs, have expressed growing frustration with the government’s lack of transparency. Officials continue to attribute disruptions to cold weather while avoiding acknowledgment of the underlying issues in the nation’s energy infrastructure.
Only on Sunday, schools and government offices in Tehran and many other provinces were declared fully or partially closed due to factors such as snowfall, rainfall, temperature drops, energy management, air pollution, and dust storms.
Tehran was also shut down on Wednesday and Thursday last week.
Iran's energy problems are not new. Decades of underinvestment in the power and gas sectors have left the country ill-equipped to handle seasonal surges in demand, the closures, pollution, and blackouts this winter serving a reminder of the government’s inability to address long-standing weaknesses in the energy grid.
As temperatures drop and frustrations rise, the government's vague reassurances and temporary measures offer little comfort to citizens enduring yet another season of misery while at least one third of Iranians are now living below the poverty line amid the country's economic disaster.
Rezgar Beigzadeh Babamiri, who was arrested in April last year, now stands accused of a litany of charges, including moharebeh (enmity against God), espionage, and rebellion, in a case marked by torture and judicial misconduct.
If convicted, Beigzadeh could face the death penalty. According to his daughter, Zhino, her father has denied all charges except anonymously delivering medical supplies and purchasing a Starlink device for personal use.
“My only crime was the humanitarian act of providing medicine for the injured,’” here father said, she told Iran International.
Beigzadeh, 47, a farmer and father of three, was apprehended by intelligence officers in Bukan and transferred to Urmia, where his family says he endured months of torture during interrogations.
His daughter described how he suffered beatings that left him with bruises, open wounds, and a ruptured eardrum. Despite filing complaints and requesting medical examinations to document the abuse, no action has been taken.
Zhino contends that the accusations against her father are baseless and serve as a tool of political repression. “He was so certain of his innocence that he didn’t go into hiding, even when others involved in providing medical supplies were being arrested,” she said.
Iran has faced widespread condemnation from the likes of Amnesty International for its execution of political prisoners, forced confessions under torture, and sham trials, particularly in the aftermath of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising.
Following mass protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody, Iranian authorities have executed several protesters in what human rights organizations describe as grossly unfair legal proceedings.
Rights groups and the UN's office of the commissioner on human rights (UNOCHR) have found that detainees are often subjected to brutal torture to extract false confessions, denied access to independent lawyers, and prosecuted in trials lacking due process, with sentences handed down swiftly to warn against dissent.
These executions have been branded by the UNOCHR as a tool of state repression to silence opposition and instil fear among a population demanding justice and fundamental freedoms.
Legal experts speaking to rights group Hengaw, which focuses on Kurdish minority rights in Iran, have highlighted numerous irregularities in Beigzadeh's case.
"The sources emphasized that the charges against Beigzadeh Babamiri are fabricated, and the investigation process has been fraught with significant procedural flaws," the rights group said this week.
He and 13 other defendants were initially forced to rely on a single court-appointed attorney, a move criticized for undermining their defense. Court sessions were later held via video conference, with defendants and their lawyers isolated from each other, preventing effective legal representation.
In addition to political charges, Beigzadeh faces allegations in a separate criminal case involving the murder of a local resident, Mohammad Ali Mohammadi, in March 2023. Despite no evidence linking him to the crime, he is accused of orchestrating the killing.
Legal experts speaking with Iran International on condition of anonymity have criticized the lack of precedent for such a charge under Iranian criminal law, describing it as part of a broader effort to discredit him.
Beigzadeh’s case is just one of thousands caught up in the crackdown on those associated with the Mahsa uprising, particularly in Kurdish regions. Tens of thousands of dissidents have been arrested since 2022 and hundreds more executed each year in a bid to quash dissent.
“In this system, even humanity is a crime,” his daughter Zhino said, emphasizing her father’s innocence and calling on the international community to intervene before it is too late.
The appointee, Abdulrahman Fattahi—an Iranian-born Sunni cleric and former imam—brings a history of Salafi activism and ideological influence that could help shape HTS’s strategy toward Iran and the Kurdish regions.
Sources close to Fattahi, who withheld their identity for security reasons, told Iran International that his early influence drew criticism from Iranian authorities and eventually led to multiple arrests, culminating in his imprisonment before his departure to Syria in 2015.
Shaped by Salafi teachings
Fattahi’s religious education began in mosques in Mahabad, where he studied Islamic theology under Kurdish clerics. His leanings toward Salafi ideology deepened after he traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992 to study under Abdulqader Tawhidi, a leading figure in the Tawhid Movement for Iranian Sunnis. Tawhidi’s teachings, rooted in emulating the practices of Salafism, shaped Fattahi’s doctrinal beliefs.
Fattahi, also known as Abu Safiya al-Kurdi, has spent decades advocating Salafi-jihadi ideology. Born in Sulgheh, a village near Mahabad in Iran’s Kordestan Province, his early life and religious studies set the foundation for a trajectory that led from local leadership to regional prominence.
After completing his studies in 1996, Fattahi joined the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, which maintained ties with Iran’s government. He returned to Iran in the late 1990s, where he became the imam of Ziveh, a village near Mahabad. His Salafi views gained him followers but also drew scrutiny, with Iranian authorities repeatedly detaining him. His last arrest in 2011 resulted in a three-year sentence in Rajaei Shahr Prison near Tehran.
Rise in Syria’s jihadist networks
After his release in 2014, Fattahi left Iran and joined jihadist groups in Syria, where he became a prominent figure in the Movement of Sunni Migrants of Iran. This HTS-aligned faction, formed in 2019, consists of Iranian Sunni jihadists who pledged allegiance to HTS’s predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra.
In HTS-controlled Idlib, Fattahi rose to senior positions, serving as a Sharia judge and Mufti. Video footage shows him delivering fiery sermons in Kurdish, praising figures like Osama bin Laden and denouncing Iran’s Shia rulers as “Rawafid” (rejectors). In these speeches, he vowed to “liberate Iran’s Sunnis from occupation.”
The source who spoke to Iran International detailed Fattahi’s ability to inspire Kurdish jihadists. His rhetoric, the source said, “combines religious authority with political strategy, making him a key figure in HTS’s evolving regional plans.”
Fattahi’s reported appointment as deputy for Iranian affairs to HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani signals a potential shift in the group’s regional strategy.
Al-Joulani recently described Iran’s presence in Syria as a significant threat. He said: “We were able to end the Iranian presence in Syria, but we are not enemies of the Iranian people.”
Fattahi’s Kurdish roots and ideological stance position him to influence HTS’s approach to both Iran and the Kurdish regions. His prominence suggests that HTS is leveraging Iranian Sunni dissidents to consolidate its control in Idlib while countering Tehran’s influence in Syria.
For Tehran, Fattahi’s role represents a direct ideological and strategic challenge. His leadership highlights the enduring influence of transnational Sunni jihadist networks and highlights the vulnerabilities posed by Iranian Sunni dissidents.
As HTS seeks to balance its Salafi roots with pragmatic goals in Syria’s fragmented conflict, figures like Fattahi demonstrate the group’s adaptability.
His ascent could also further complicate Iran’s efforts to maintain its foothold in Syria - a key smuggling route to its military allies in the region and trade route amidst sanctions - while countering the resurgence of Sunni militancy on its borders.
Salafis, an ultraconservative branch of Sunni Islam, emphasize a return to the practices and beliefs of the early Muslim community (the Salaf Salih or pious predecessors) and often view later interpretations of Islamic teachings as deviations.
Their rigid adherence to this ideology has historically put them at odds with Shia Muslims, whom they label as Rawafid (rejectors) for not recognizing the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and for their veneration of Imams. Salafis accuse Shias of deviating from the core principles of Islam, regarding many of their rituals and beliefs as innovations (bid’ah) forbidden in Islam.
This animosity has fueled sectarian tensions in regions where Salafis seek influence, often leading to violent clashes. Militant Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, have taken this opposition to an extreme, targeting Shias in their campaigns, excommunicating them (takfir), and justifying violence against them as part of their broader ideological and political objectives. This sectarian divide continues to play a significant role in the dynamics of conflicts across the Middle East.
