Iranian mogul trades weapons for oil with Russia: Bloomberg
Iran's former Supreme National Security Council Chief Ali Shamkhani (left) and his son Hossein Shamkhani (right)
The son of a key figure in Iran's ruling establishment is at the heart of a sanctions-busting secret trade with Russia, in which Iran provides Moscow with weapons in exchange for oil, a report by Bloomberg said.
Independent human rights experts reporting to the United Nations expressed grave concern over the rise in the systematic targeting of women from the Baha’i religious minority in Iran in a joint letter published on Tuesday.
The experts including Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran Mai Sato highlighted reports of Baha’i women being subjected to arrests, interrogations, enforced disappearances, home raids, confiscation of personal belongings, travel restrictions and prolonged detentions without due process.
Noting that Baha’i women make up two-thirds of all Baha’i prisoners in Iran, the experts said many were being held incommunicado.
This increase in persecution, they warned, represents a worrying deterioration of gender discrimination and persecution of religious minorities in the country.
“In the larger context of the targeting of women in Iran and the challenges with gender equality, this dramatic rise in persecution against Baha’i women is an alarming escalation,” the experts said in a statement Monday.
“This is affecting a group of people who face intersectional discrimination and persecution: as women and as members of the Baha’i religious minority.”
The experts also pointed to the ongoing persecution faced by all Baha’is in Iran, including the denial of higher education, restrictions on economic and cultural participation, and bans on university attendance and public employment.
“We are concerned at the use of ambiguously formulated accusations such as ‘threat to national security’ or ‘propaganda against the State’ to systematically restrict the peaceful exercise of their rights,” they said.
“This may have a significant chilling effect on other members of the Baha’i religious minority and the exercise of their human rights and freedoms.”
The experts, part of the UN Human Rights Council's Special Procedures—a group of independent experts who monitor and investigate human rights issues worldwide—said they raised their concerns directly with the Iranian government.
The experts emphasized that the Iranian government's response contradicts the situation on the ground, where Baha’is continue to face significant challenges to their rights and freedoms.
The Baha’i International Community also warned on Monday that 71-year-old Mahvash Sabet, a Baha’i prisoner in Iran, had undergone open-heart surgery after being denied medical care for years. The BIC called for her immediate release, the cancellation of her sentence and assurances she would not be returned to jail.
Iran needs better dialogue with its neighbors, veteran negotiator Javad Zarif said in an op-ed for the Economist magazine, adding that Tehran erred in focusing too much on threats.
An architect of the 2015 deal over Iran's disputed nuclear program, Zarif is a cogent voice in English-speaking policy circles for greater engagement with Tehran.
"Like all nations, Iran has faced its share of challenges and missteps. The Iranian people, having endured significant sacrifices, are now prepared—with resilience and confidence—to take bold steps," Zarif, now vice-president for strategic affairs, wrote.
"This shift from a threat-centered perspective to an opportunity-driven one aligns with the vision outlined by President Pezeshkian (and myself) during last summer’s presidential campaign in Iran."
The Islamic Republic is now suffering some of the biggest military and economic setbacks in its nearly 50-year history with its armed allies and air defenses largely neutered by punishing Israeli attacks and Donald Trump due to levy harsher sanctions.
Western-educated Zarif and soft-spoken President Masoud Pezeshkian are seen as largely separate from strategic and military decisions which are ultimately in the hands of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
To enshrine dialogue, Zarif proposed in his op-ed a Muslim West Asian Dialogue Association (MWADA) spanning Muslim states as far as Egypt but excluding top military power and arch-nemesis Israel.
"A non-aggression pact among MWADA states, coupled with collective regional monitoring, will help institutionalize stability and protect the region from external interference as well as from internal strife."
Zarif cited "much improved relations between Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia today," saying better Tehran-Riyadh relations would tamp down sectarian tensions plaguing the region.
In another conciliatory gesture to Iran's erstwhile foes, the rebel groups now running Syria, Zarif said the country could rebuild with help from Iran and other neighbors.
"Governance reforms in Syria—as a basis for economic assistance—will promote accountability and lay the groundwork for a safe and stable country where women and minorities can thrive."
Iran's own treatment of women and minorities was recently criticized in a United Nations General Assembly Resolution and Tehran largely quelled a women's rights protest movement in 2022 with deadly force.
Despite a 20% surge in oil exports, Iran's GDP growth in the first half of the current Iranian calendar year starting March 21 significantly declined due to a recession in other sectors, such as agriculture, industries, and the service sector.
New data from the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) reveals that the country's GDP growth has slowed since the beginning of 2024. During the summer, GDP growth stood at 2.7%, which is half of the 2023 growth rate.
The GDP growth rate has fallen across all sectors except agriculture. However, calculations by Iran International indicate that the Central Bank's figures are overly optimistic and, in some cases, manipulated.
For instance, while Iran's Statistical Center and the Research Center of the Parliament reported a 1% decline in the industrial and mining sector's share of the GDP during the summer due to repeated power outages, the Central Bank claims a 1.7% economic growth in this sector during the same period.
The industrial sector is important for Iran’s economy, as part of it is based on or related to oil-related sectors and accounts for around 15% of Iran's GDP and employs around a third of the country's 25 million workers.
Source: Central Bank of Iran
Another example is the agriculture sector. According to the Statistical Center of Iran, this sector's output has been in decline since 2021 and the share of employment in the sector declined by 1% this summer, reaching 14.5%.
Yet, despite worsening droughts and widespread power outages, the Central Bank claims a 2.8% growth in agriculture during the summer.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) previously predicted that Iran's economic growth would decline from this year until 2028, eventually reaching 2%.
Oil: The driving force of economic growth In the last two years of Donald Trump's presidency (2018-2020), Iran faced negative economic growth due to US sanctions. However, with the Biden administration's policy of appeasement toward the Iranian government, Iran's economic growth turned positive again.
Details from the Central Bank's statistics show that the driving force behind Iran's economic growth over the past 3-4 years has been the oil sector. During this period, Iran's oil exports quintupled, reaching 1.6 million barrels per day in 2024 in average.
Iran exports 40% of its oil and gas condensate output, and the growth in this sector has had a significant impact on boosting the country’s economic growth.
It remains unclear how Iran’s economic growth will fare considering a sharp drop in oil exports this fall and the anticipated start of Donald Trump’s administration, which has promised to revive the "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran. Data from oil tracking companies such as Kpler and Vortexa indicate a 500,000-barrel-per-day decline in Iran's oil exports since October.
At the same time, the head of Iran's Agricultural Guilds Chamber recently reported a 30% reduction in autumn crop planting, and an official mentioned a 20% damage to poultry farms due to power outages in autumn.
A Look at key economic indicators for Iran in 2024 The year 2024 has brought significant challenges for Iran, including severe electricity and gas shortages, a sharp depreciation of the rial, two direct confrontations with Israel, weakening of its regional proxy groups and the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria as well as the end of Joe Biden's presidency.
This summer, Iran faced a 25% electricity deficit, which has been continuing in autumn due to gas shortage. In fall, the daily gas shortage peaked at 30% of the country's gas demand.This seriously impacts industries, particularly the steel sector, which has witnessed a 46% decline this year.
Since the beginning of 2024, the US dollar's value in Iran has surged by 60%, and inflation, even according to official estimates, has exceeded 32%. Over the past six years, Iran has consistently ranked among the ten countries with the highest inflation rates.
Official statistics show that despite the addition of 5 million people to Iran’s population since 2018, when US sanctions were reintroduced, the number of employed individuals has only increased by 300,000 to 25.1 million.
Poverty rates in Iran have also risen during this period. Even according to the Islamic Republic's official statistics, about 28% of Iran’s population was below the poverty line in 2018. Now, this figure has climbed to 33%, with some parliamentarians, experts, and domestic media outlets claiming the real number exceeds 50%.
One of the few positive aspects of Iran's economy is the increase in oil exports to China. Data from Kpler and Vortexa shows that Iran's average daily oil exports in 2024 stood at approximately 1.6 million barrels in average, 34% higher than in 2023 and almost double the 2022 levels, but the figure plunged to 1.3 mb/d in November.
Iran’s economic vows will worsen if Donald Trump acts upon his threats to reduce Tehran’s oil exports to China, which provided close to $40 billion in revenues until this fall.
Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace on announced Tuesday it would lift restrictions on some digital platforms like WhatsApp and Google Play while maintaining control on others as Iranians continue to face some of the world's toughest internet restrictions.
"Following extensive deliberations, the members reached a unanimous consensus to lift restrictions on access to select widely utilized foreign platforms, including WhatsApp and Google Play, while underscoring the paramount importance of maintaining lawful governance in cyberspace," state-controlled IRNA news wrote.
The decision follows President Masoud Pezeshkian’s election pledge to improve access to foreign platforms, many of which are commercially critical for Iranians, especially those with small businesses.
However, while WhatsApp and Google Play restrictions are being lifted, Instagram, YouTube, and Telegram remain in limbo amid hardliner resistance.
The decision to unblock WhatsApp and Google Play still requires ratification by the office of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, according to Abolhassan Firouzabadi, the former head of Iran's Supreme Council of Cyberspace, who spoke to state TV on Tuesday.
Iran's ruling clerical and military establishment have been wary of social media platforms as a vehicle for organizing protests, which have played out more on X and Telegram than the apps unshackled by the latest move.
Google Play would enable android phone users to download VPN apps to bypass government internet filtering.
The details of the lifting of restrictions have yet to be published, but the Mehr News agency which is close to the conservative establishment reported on a possible four-stage plan that might represent the actual framework discussed by the Council.
Stage one: Short-term measures
The outlet wrote that the first stage proposes immediate steps to ease access, such as providing more infrastructure to domestic platforms, offering advertising funds to support local messaging apps, and reopening Google Play and WhatsApp.
Stage two: Controlled expansion
The government also proposes a controlled opening for platforms such as YouTube through governance-compliant portals, drafting anti-fake news legislation, and encouraging domestic content creation. Additionally, government agencies would be banned from officially using foreign platforms.
Stage three: Quality improvement
Addressing the need to improve domestic platform quality, Mehr says the government would make certain essential government services like subsidies, legal services, and fuel cards exclusively available through domestic apps. A proposal has, it says, been made to reopen Telegram under strict conditions, or alternatively, integrate it with domestic infrastructure if negotiations fail.
Stage four: Enforcement
The final stage introduces stricter rules and enforcement measures, including criminalizing tools that bypass filtering, taxing foreign platforms, and escalating judicial actions against unauthorized platform use. Proposals include negotiating the reopening of additional platforms, but only if they comply with strict regulatory conditions.
Who decides?
The Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established in 2012 by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, controls Iran’s internet policy. Its members include the President, the Speaker of Parliament, the Judiciary Chief, and several key ministers.
However, its jurisdiction often overlaps with Parliament and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, leading to conflicts amid blurred lines of authority.
Resistance from MPs and political maneuvering
Student News Network (SNN) wrote Tuesday that 136 members of Parliament had sent a letter to the Council, urging it to retain the restrictions.
According to Khabar Online, MP Reza Taghipour, a former Minister of ICT, has been gathering signatures from other MPs to oppose lifting restrictions.
His efforts have gained support from the Paydari Front, an ultra-conservative political faction, including figures such as Hamid Rasaee and Ghasem Ravanbakhsh.
However, Taghipour’s actions reveal inconsistency, as he previously criticized internet filtering on television, calling it a “business tool.”
In this year's latest Freedom House report on internet freedom, the watchdog ranked Iran the world's third worst country, amid a host of measures to limit open internet usage.
One hundred thirty-six members of Iran's parliament have warned the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), a government body responsible for overseeing the country’s internet governance, that a proposal to lift internet filtering would be a gift to the enemies in the soft war.
"Raising such an issue, especially in these critical times for the region and the world, is deeply concerning and amounts to a surprise gift to the enemies in the soft war against Iran," the lawmakers said, adding that Iran’s adversaries seek to incite unrest and social turmoil in the country.
They urged the council not to be swayed by emotional and sensationalist rhetoric in making its decision.
Iran has one of the world’s worst internet censorships with tens of thousands of websites blocked since the early 2000s and most major social media platforms banned.
Critics of Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian have recently said that the ongoing deadlock over enforcing the new hijab law and lifting censorship on the Internet has effectively paralyzed his administration.
Hossein Shamkhani, son of ex-security chief Ali Shamkhani, oversees a network of companies central to facilitating weapons shipments across the Caspian Sea to Moscow amid its ongoing war in Ukraine, the report said.
Through his Dubai-based company Crios Shipping LLC, the younger Shamkhani began moving missiles, drone components, and dual-use goods last year, relying on at least two ships.
The Bloomberg report cited information provided by more than a dozen unnamed US, UK, and European officials, along with others familiar with the transactions.
These shipments, according to sources cited by Bloomberg, are part of a barter arrangement in which Moscow pays Tehran with oil cargoes in order to bypass sanctions restricting both nations’ access to international financial systems.
“My understanding is the Shamkhani network ties into the drone contracts for use in Ukraine,” said John Bolton, former US National Security Advisor, now a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Security and Freedom.
Shamkhani’s trading prowess highlights Iran's broader use of a vast network of companies spanning commodities trading and hedge funds.
A family legacy of influence and controversy
Hossein Shamkhani’s ascent in global commerce and politics is intertwined with his father Ali Shamkhani’s legacy. As a long-serving Iranian defense minister and national security advisor, Ali Shamkhani has remained close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, leveraging his influence even after stepping down from the Supreme National Security Council in 2023.
The Shamkhani family has faced repeated allegations of corruption and abuse of power. Iran International’s investigative journalist Mojtaba Pourmohsen has reported extensively on family members’ involvement in high-profile scandals, including accusations of illicit business dealings, ownership of extravagant properties and bank accounts abroad.
One particularly contentious episode involved their role in the collapse of a building in Khuzestan province in 2022, a tragedy that left dozens dead. The building’s owner, a businessman linked to the family, was found to have violated multiple construction regulations.
Hossein Shamkhani has denied any wrongdoing and rejected claims of involvement in illegal arms shipments or sanction-busting oil trades.
A lawyer representing him told Bloomberg that the allegations are baseless and lack supporting evidence. Similarly, Mohamed Al Hashmi, managing director of Dubai-based Milavous Group Ltd—another firm tied to Shamkhani—dismissed allegations of involvement in Iranian or Russian oil trading.
Complexities of sanctions and enforcement
The cross-Caspian shipments highlight challenges in enforcing Western sanctions. Ships linked to Shamkhani’s network, including the Sea Castle and Sea Anchor, have completed multiple trips between Iranian ports and Russia’s Astrakhan in the past year.
These vessels, though modest in size by global shipping standards, are believed to have been sufficient for transporting weaponry on the short Caspian routes.
Bloomberg’s analysis of ship tracking data suggests these voyages accelerated in 2023, coinciding with Russia’s increased reliance on Iranian arms for its operations in Ukraine.
Shamkhani’s maritime network extends beyond these two vessels. Bloomberg cited sources describing an extensive fleet of tankers and cargo ships controlled through entities such as Oceanlink Maritime DMCC and Koban Shipping LLC.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for almost a decade, during a meeting in Tehran.
While the US Treasury has sanctioned several of these ships and their associated companies, enforcement has been complicated by frequent changes in ownership and the lack of direct links to Shamkhani in official records.
“Sanctions enforcement against these barter networks is a lot harder, particularly when you consider Russia’s historic dominance in the region,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
He emphasized the importance of transparency and international cooperation to expose these networks and curb their activities.
Expanding business empire and diplomatic implications
Beyond shipping, Shamkhani’s network includes a hedge fund operating in financial hubs such as London, Geneva, and Singapore, and a Dubai-based commodities trading firm dealing with Western oil companies.
Despite these connections, he has not been personally sanctioned by the US or European governments. This lack of direct penalties has fueled concerns about loopholes in current sanctions regimes, particularly as entities within Shamkhani’s network continue to conduct significant business with Chinese buyers using yuan transactions, avoiding the US financial system.
Both Iran and Russia have acknowledged their growing military cooperation without detailing specific arms deals.
While their collaboration appears not to inherently violate international law, it exposes participants to potential sanctions.
A State Department spokesperson warned of the broader security implications, saying, “This partnership threatens European security and illustrates how Iran’s destabilizing influence reaches beyond the Middle East and around the world.”
The allegations against Hossein Shamkhani, if substantiated, underscore the resilience of global sanctions evasion networks and the complexities of monitoring illicit trade.
With limited transparency and persistent geopolitical rivalries, success in curtailing Iran's sanctioned trade has eluded the West and its allies.