The Israeli military is on high alert following a directive from IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, amid fears Iran may take extreme actions against the Jewish state, Israeli news outlet Walla reported.
Security officials warn that changes in the regional strategic situation could push Iran to act against Israel.
Along with the decline in the rial exchange rate and internal protests, Walla wrote that the Revolutionary Guards are transferring funds to Hezbollah via civilian aircraft, leading to the Chief of Staff ordering heightened vigilance.
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon are in the midst of a 60-day ceasefire but both sides have reported dozens of breaches amid the US-brokered truce.
The report's sources also highlighted uncertainty over Iran's stance ahead of Donald Trump's return to the White House later this month.
Details from Kpler, a commodity intelligence company, reveal that Iran, whose daily oil exports had fallen below 400,000 barrels in January 2021, at the start of the Biden Administration, exported 1.6 million barrels daily last year.
Similarly, the United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) organization, which also tracks oil tankers carrying Iranian oil, says “In 2024, Iran exported 587 million barrels of oil, an increase of 10.75% compared to 2023’s 530 million barrels. Over the four years since the start of the Biden Administration, with less than one month remaining in its term, Iran has exported a cumulative total of nearly 1.98 billion barrels of oil.”
Kpler's data indicates that Iran exported approximately 1.64 billion barrels of crude oil and gas condensates during the four years of the Biden administration. Furthermore, Iran's daily fuel oil (mazut) exports averaged around 230,000 barrels during this period, consistent with figures reported by UANI.
The total value of Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports during Joe Biden’s presidency, excluding the costs associated with bypassing sanctions, is estimated at around $135 billion. The value of Iran’s exported fuel oil during this period is approximately $25 billion.
Iran keeps the pricing of its oil exports to its primary customer, China, undisclosed. Estimates suggest discounts of $10 to $30 per barrel, which would substantially lower the $135 billion revenue estimate. Additionally, Tehran allocates funds to obscure the oil's origin before delivery to China, and it remains unclear how much of the payment is in actual cash versus barter arrangements.
Last year, China accounted for 91% of Iran’s total exports of crude oil, condensates, and fuel oil.
Although Iran’s oil exports continued to rise last year, the volume dropped to below 1.3 million barrels per day in the final two months of the year. This decline is partly attributed to recent US sanctions on 35 tankers carrying Iranian oil and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections, which has increased the likelihood of re-implementing the “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic.
Moreover, Iran’s only oil customers in China, small independent refineries, known as “teapots,” are under pressure from the Chinese government to either modernize or shut down due to high pollution levels and low efficiency. At least three Chinese teapots were decommissioned in recent months.
Over the past few years, alongside the Biden Administration’s leniency, Iran has used hundreds of oil tankers, known as the “ghost fleet,” to covertly sell oil. UANI identified 132 new vessels engaged in smuggling Iranian oil in 2024, bringing the total number of ghost fleet tankers tracked to 477 vessels: “In 2024, the organization’s intelligence led to over 330 flag revocations and contributed to the designation of 139 vessels by the US government.
Notably, out of the 139 tankers sanctioned this year, 110 were previously identified by UANI on its Ghost Armada list, showcasing UANI’s pivotal role in preemptive tracking.”
The decline in Iran’s daily oil exports to below 1.3 million barrels in November and December last year comes as President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has set a target of exporting 1.85 million barrels of crude oil and condensates daily in the next Iranian fiscal year, which begins on March 21.
One of the network's plots involved the assassination of prominent Iranian dissident singer and musician Shahin Najafi, which ultimately failed, a Western intelligence source and an IRGC insider told Iran International.
According to the sources, an assassin was scheduled to kill Shahin Najafi on September 17, 2023, coinciding with the anniversary of Iran’s Woman Life Freedom uprising against the Islamic Republic, at the Theater am Aegi in Hanover, Germany.
In response to Iran International's request for comment, Shahin Najafi said the concert that night had an unusual atmosphere, with significantly heightened police security measures.
The Criminal and Terrorism Affairs departments of the German Federal Police (BKA) told Iran International that "For data protection reasons, the BKA does not comment on personal data."
Najafi, a dissident activist and supporter of Iran’s exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, has been actively campaigning against the Islamic Republic over the past few years.
Twelve years ago, media outlets affiliated with the IRGC declared Najafi an apostate due to his song Naghi, which referenced the tenth Imam of Shia Islam. The IRGC’s Fars News Agency reported that a bounty had been placed on his head.
Mission aborted
According to Iran International's sources, the assassin approached the venue on the night of the concert but, upon noticing the sudden increase in security measures, received a phone call from Tehran instructing him to abort the mission. The plotters concluded that their plan had likely been compromised and chose to cancel the operation to prevent the exposure of the entire network.
Iran International has learned that the assassin received orders from Ramin Yektaparast, a 36-year-old Iranian-German gangster who was killed by individuals allegedly linked to Mossad in Tehran last April.
At that time, a European source told Iran International that Yektaparast, along with another IRGC member, was targeted in Tehran, likely as part of a Mossad operation.
In March 2023, The Washington Post reported, citing five German security officials and two Western intelligence sources, that Yektaparast was the main suspect in organizing an attack on a Jewish center in Essen, Germany.
Unit 840's operatives in Europe
The Western intelligence source told Iran International that Najafi's failed assassination plan was one of the covert projects of Unit 840, a secretive division of Quds Force responsible for overseas assassinations targeting Westerners, Israelis, and Iranian dissidents.
Unit 840 is led by Yazdan Mir. One of their most notorious failed operations involved planning to assassinate an Israeli who worked at the Jewish state’s consulate in Istanbul, an American general in Germany, and a French journalist. This plot was foiled when Mossad interrogated Mansour Rasouli, a smuggler collaborating with the IRGC, inside Iran. Shortly thereafter, Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, a senior Unit 840 official, was assassinated in Tehran, reportedly by Israel. Less than a month later, Hossein Taeb was removed from his position as head of the IRGC's Intelligence Organization.
However, two sources told Iran International that a senior Unit 840 official is currently overseeing new operations in Europe. In November, the Daily Mail, citing a Western intelligence source, identified him as Mohsen Bozorg.
According to exclusive information obtained by Iran International, this senior IRGC operative's real name is Mohsen Alinajad Kari Bozorg. He is married with two children and resides in the Narmak neighborhood of Tehran. Bozorgi is in charge of the so-called German Network.
Bozorg selects targets and approves operational plans. He collaborates with a wide array of Iranian and foreign operatives, known within the IRGC as "Bozorg's soldiers."
The network's key members
Hamed Asghari, the head of security for Mohsen Fakhrizadeh—the prominent figure in Iran's nuclear program who was assassinated by Mossad four years ago—is another member of Bozorg's network within Unit 840, two sources told Iran International.
Asghari is a veteran and well-known bodyguard for Iranian officials, having been responsible for the security of former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, First Vice President Es'haq Jahangiri, and later, Fakhrizadeh.
During Fakhrizadeh's assassination, Asghari reportedly threw himself over Fakhrizadeh and sustained four gunshot wounds. Despite this, he underwent extensive interrogation and lost his position.
However, in March 2022, under late President Ebrahim Raisi's administration, he was appointed as the acting director of sports and health management for the Qeshm Free Zone Organization. According to Iran International's sources, Asghari had close ties with Ramin Yektaparast and was active in the so-called German Network. He was also involved in planning another assassination attempt against Shahin Najafi.
Bozorg's network comprises four key members: Khalil, who splits his time between Germany and Iran and was responsible for organizing Yektaparast's plans; Mehdi Aziz Bonakdar, tasked with gathering intelligence for the group; Rouzbeh Alizadeh, linked to a money-laundering network that financed terrorist operations, though he was not directly involved in the activities; and Pashan Fasha, a German company owner who supported the network’s operations.
Sub-networks: Pakistanis and Poles
The German Network extends beyond Iranian operatives. A European and an IRGC source disclosed the existence of a "Pakistani Network" under Bozorg’s control. Two years ago, this network planned assassinations of Jewish and American targets in Congo.
Bozorg was also supported by Ali Tanhaei and Hamid Zeraati, who are connected to the Al-Mustafa International University, an IRGC front for exporting Shia Islam and conducting covert operations globally. They recruited operatives, including three Pakistanis who received training in Iran and Syria before being deployed to Congo.
Additionally, the German Network collaborates with a Polish mafia group specializing in bomb-laden drones. Two Polish members, known as Robert and Michael, visited Iran for operational planning. Their mission to assassinate an Israeli target in Warsaw failed.
Yektaparast: from gangster to IRGC operative
Yektaparast was the most influential figure in the German Network. His recruits carried out attacks against Jewish targets in Germany, including a failed shooting at a synagogue in Essen and an attempted attack in Bochum.
Following the Bochum attack, German police arrested Babak J., a 35-year-old Iranian, and traced his orders back to Yektaparast. German security officials concluded that the IRGC had formed a network targeting Jewish centers, with Yektaparast as the mastermind.
He fled to Iran after the synagogue attacks and mocked German police on Instagram, highlighting the lack of an extradition treaty between Iran and Germany.
He was also implicated in a brutal murder in Germany and had ties to criminal gangs, including the Hells Angels. Accused of killing a fellow gang member, Yektaparast fled to Iran in 2010 to escape prosecution.
On May 9, 2023, Yektaparast was shot dead in Tehran. While IRGC-linked media denied his affiliation with the force, his obituary referred to his death as martyrdom, and he was buried in the Section 19 of Behesht Zahra Cemetery, reserved for IRGC and Basij members.
