Iran International
President Donald Trump has made one point clear: he is determined to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. However, he has yet to outline the specific conditions or steps he would require from Tehran to achieve that objective.
Will he demand a complete halt to uranium enrichment, or permit Iran to purify uranium to a low level, such as 3.65%? The JCPOA, signed during the Obama administration, set that exact limit.
Enrichment and centrifuges
Tehran is now rapidly enriching uranium to 60%, having accumulated 274.8 kilograms (605.8 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60% as of February 26. That’s an increase of 92.5 kilograms (203.9 pounds) since the IAEA’s last report in November. The current stockpile can easily be sufficient for further enrichment to produce six nuclear bombs.
Iran maintains that it has the right to enrich uranium as part of its civilian nuclear ambitions. While 3.65% enrichment is used for peaceful energy purposes, 60% has no credible civilian application and is just one step short of weapons-grade enrichment at 90%.
A closely related issue is the number and type of enrichment machines—Iran’s centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, Iran was limited to 6,104 first-generation centrifuges, with no use of advanced models. Today, it operates more than 8,000 centrifuges, including more advanced IR-6 machines, which were explicitly banned under the deal.
Key questions remain unanswered: How many centrifuges, if any, would the US allow Iran to keep? Would decommissioned machines be permitted to stay in the country under international monitoring? Would Washington demand that most, if not all, be dismantled? Could it ask Iran to transfer them to a third country, such as Russia?
These questions are central to understanding what Trump’s plan might be for denying Iran a path to nuclear weapons. So far, no clear answers have emerged.
Is Trump’s plan a total nuclear ban or verification?
If talks resume and the US agrees to let Iran retain some enrichment capacity, a new agreement may not look so different from the JCPOA that Trump abandoned in 2018, calling it a “bad deal.” The key distinction, however, could lie in permanence: a new deal might cap Iran’s enrichment capabilities indefinitely, unlike the JCPOA’s temporary restrictions under sunset clauses.
Still, there is at least a political difference between a permanent ban on all enrichment and formally recognizing Iran’s right to enrich—however limited that right may be.
There is also the issue of somewhat differing statements coming from the President and some of his top officials. According to Axios, Trump’s letter to Ali Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear agreement and warned of consequences if Iran expanded its nuclear program. The letter was described by sources as “tough” in tone.
However, Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, framed the message differently in an interview released Friday on The Tucker Carlson Show. Referring to the letter, he said: “It roughly said, I'm a president of peace. That's what I want. There's no reason for us to do this militarily. We should talk. We should clear up the misconceptions. We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization of your nuclear material.”
This tone stands in stark contrast to statements by the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, who have called for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program—not just verification.
Multilateral or bilateral talks?
The Obama administration, building on the approach of the Bush era, dealt with Iran in coordination with European allies while also involving Russia and China in the JCPOA negotiations. This multilateral strategy gave international legitimacy to the pressure on Tehran and, for a time, resulted in UN-imposed economic sanctions—until the 2015 agreement was signed and sanctions were subsequently lifted.
However, this approach also gave Iran some room to maneuver, as China and Russia provided support during the JCPOA negotiations. The temporary nature of the agreement and its allowance for Iran to retain its uranium enrichment capability may have stemmed from the fact that the US was not only negotiating with Tehran but also balancing the interests of Beijing and Moscow.
The question now is whether the Trump administration will face pressure to once again include Russia and China in any future talks—or whether it will insist on negotiating directly with Tehran, without outside involvement.
Iran held consultations with Russia and China earlier this month and would certainly prefer to have diplomatic backing in a multilateral setting.
Both Russia and China have signaled that any negotiations should focus solely on Iran’s nuclear program, excluding other US demands such as restrictions on ballistic missiles or curbing regional influence. Iran will almost certainly seek to involve both powers—especially Russia—believing that President Vladimir Putin may hold some sway with Trump.
Although bilateral talks may be preferable from the US perspective, the reality remains that if Washington seeks UN endorsement for any future agreement, it will need the backing of both Russia and China.
Another JCPOA?
Although the Trump administration has issued an ultimatum of “negotiations or else” to Tehran, it remains unclear whether it intends to impose strict demands for dismantling key elements of Iran’s nuclear program or enter into bargaining over critical issues such as the right to uranium enrichment, the level of enrichment, and the number and type of centrifuges.
In the latter case, and if Iran is able to salvage its right to enrichment, the resulting agreement will be somewhat similar to the 2015 JCPOA.
