Ethiopia and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in early May to enhance cooperation between their national police forces on intelligence sharing, cross-border crime, and security training—an effort analysts say bolsters Tehran’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa.
The agreement signals Iran’s intent to deepen political and security ties with African states through its military and intelligence apparatus, according to Eric Lob, associate professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University, writing for The Conversation.
Iran has previously supplied surveillance and combat drones to Ethiopia, aiding government forces during the 2020–2022 Tigray conflict.
The US State Department reported last year that Iran had breached a UN Security Council resolution by sending armed drones to Ethiopia in the summer of 2021.
Similar equipment has reportedly been provided to the Sudanese army in its fight against the Rapid Support Forces, underlining Tehran’s broader regional strategy.
For Addis Ababa, the pact comes amid rising domestic insecurity and follows recent talks with Iran’s Persian Gulf rival, the United Arab Emirates.
Ethiopia is currently facing armed unrest from ethnic militias, including factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Amhara Fano militia. It is also contending with economic challenges and renewed tensions with neighboring Eritrea.
The cooperation deal marks a continuation of a historically complex relationship. Ethiopia was the first sub-Saharan country to establish ties with Iran in the 1960s and resisted pressure to sever them in 2016 after Saudi Arabia and the UAE severed ties with Tehran.
“The agreement highlights Ethiopia’s pragmatic foreign policy, seeking support from both Iran and the UAE — rivals often on opposing sides of regional conflicts like those in Yemen and Sudan,” Lob wrote.
Business documents and emails obtained by Iran International reveal a layered network of shell companies used to mask the military links and channel the sanctioned oil through foreign intermediaries.
The firm, Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars, was incorporated in November 2022 in Tehran. Within months, two affiliated companies—Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan and Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars—were registered in the same building.
Corporate records identify Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars as the controlling shareholder in both. Registered firms in Iran are required to have four names.
Individuals central to the operation include Majid Azami, Elyas Niroumand Toumaj, Farshad Ghazi, Majid Rashidi, and Mojtaba Hosseini. The US Treasury added Azami and Niroumand to its sanctions list in November 2023. The others have not been designated.
In an appeal sent days after the sanctions were imposed, Azami and Niroumand denied any military affiliation, saying there was a misunderstanding based on similar naming.
They told the US Treasury their companies were involved in civil construction and trade and had been “experiencing harassment from both sides” since the designation.
However, Farsi-language draft contracts and internal memoranda contradict their argument. One agreement 2023 identifies Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars as acting on behalf of the Iranian armed forces' general staff in negotiations with Persian Gulf Star Oil Company.
Another set of shipping documents shows the same military body guaranteeing Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars’ obligations in chartering vessels from the National Iranian Tanker Company.
To obscure these links, the network appears to have operated through a proxy firm in Hong Kong. In April 2023, Xin Rui Ji was registered there, with a nominal Chinese executive listed in filings. Yet, communications from Xin Rui Ji were routinely copied to Niroumand and other Sepehr managers.
One August 2023 letter requested the National Iranian Tanker Company deliver crude to Xin Rui Ji without a bill of lading—critical for cargo tracking—via ship-to-ship transfer in Singapore.
The transfer of cargo from one ship to another is a method used by the Islamic Republic to obscure its role in the sale of oil and petroleum products in order to evade sanctions.
Often in Malaysian and Singaporean waters, it is relabeled as oil originating from Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman or particularly Malaysia.
The same contact information and domain used by Sepehr Energy appeared on Xin Rui Ji contracts, pointing to a unified operation.
Xin Rui Ji sought buyers across Europe, China, and the Persian Gulf. One such client was the Netherlands-based Gemini Group, which advertises global reach in oil and energy trading. In September 2023, Gemini delayed payment for a crude shipment citing banking concerns and “rumors online about sanctions.”
In one email dated 30 October 2023, Gemini representative Niek Tersteeg confronted his Iranian counterpart Elyas Niroumand about a delayed payment. While citing confusion over contract terms, Tersteeg made clear that the problem was not procedural.
“The only reply we are getting are your statements that your side is governmental,” he wrote.
Tersteeg added: “This morning I personally will call my contacts inside the Government in Tehran to check if they can assist finding a solution.”
The email indicated that Gemini had longstanding experience dealing with sanctioned Iranian entities.
“Let us not talk about the 'commission payments' behind the curtain. In short: please forgive my honesty and directness, we are the ones working, financing, taking all the risks while lots of people are waiting in their rocking chairs for their pockets to be filled,” added Tersteeg in his email.
Five days later, on 5 November, Tersteeg followed up in another message addressed to Niroumand and Majid Azami, both of whom were sanctioned by the US government. He expressed appreciation for their collaboration and emphasized the depth of their partnership: “We are not the enemy. We are true friends and brothers ready, willing and able to take any risk.”
Tersteeg then recounted his own arrest in the Netherlands for dealings with Iran. “I myself was in put jail in 2013 by the Dutch secret service for my trading activities with your beautiful country on special, urgent request of the USA Government.
"They didn’t break me. I kept my mouth shut. After several days the Dutch secret service and Dutch Government found out that I did nothing wrong and they released me from prison with written apologies. The USA Government did not apologize and placed me on certain lists. I am not allowed to travel and enter the USA and Israel. No problem for me.”
Contacted by Iran International, Tersteeg denied any contractual ties with Sepehr Energy. He said personal and commercial links with Iranian officials were confidential.
The documents depict a sanctions evasion structure that operated with strategic cover and foreign complicity, exposing vulnerabilities in enforcement mechanisms meant to isolate Iran’s military-linked commerce.
Most of Iran's floating oil is stored in Singaporean waters, awaiting brokers and buyers for shipment to China.
The drop in Iran's oil exports comes as the government, led by Masoud Pezeshkian, plans for daily exports of 1.85 million barrels this year.
Before US sanctions in 2018, Iran exported 2.5 million bpd. This figure plummeted to 350,000 bpd by the final months of Donald Trump's presidency in 2020. However, Iran’s oil exports gradually increased under his successor.
