Iran's indirect approach to US talks is a weak point - Shargh daily

During a visit to Moscow Iran’s Oil Minister announced that Russia has agreed to export 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iran, claiming that this would turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Mohsen Paknejad said on April 25 that various routes were considered and it was finally agreed that the gas would be delivered via land through the Republic of Azerbaijan, with Russia’s gas handed over to Iran in Astara.

While the Mozdok–Baku pipeline can transfer Russian gas to Azerbaijan, and the Baku–Astara pipeline can transport it to Iran, the combined daily capacity of these pipelines is only about six million cubic meters per day (mcm/d).

By contrast, Iran faces a gas shortfall of approximately 150 mcm/d during warmer months—rising to double that amount in colder seasons.

This means that the proposed Russian gas deliveries to Iran would not even cover a small portion of the country’s gas deficit—let alone turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Paknejad has described this as the “first phase” of the gas deal, implying that new pipelines will be required to realize the full annual export volume of 55 bcm, which equals around 150 mcm/d.

The key issue here is that Gazprom, Russia’s state-run gas company meant to supply the gashas suffered massive losses of $18 billion over the past two years after losing its European markets following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Gazprom lacks the funds to complete an even more politically desirable “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline to China designed for the same annual capacity of 55 bcm.

Building a new pipeline connected to Russia’s main gas transmission network to deliver gas to Iran would require a stretch of at least 1,000 kilometers, demanding more than $10 billion in investment. If the pipeline were to cross the Caspian Sea, the cost could exceed $20 billion.

Another crucial point is that to become a regional gas hub, Iran must receive large volumes of gas from Russia and sell it to neighboring countries.

But Turkey already receives Russian gas directly via two pipelines, and most of Iran’s other northern and southern neighbors are gas producers or exporters themselves. Iran’s only potential customers would be Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Iraq plans to eliminate its need for gas imports within the next few years. Pakistan, despite a gas deal with Iran signed in 2009, has not built the pipeline due to sanctions.

Under the current contract, Iran would export only 7.5 bcm annually to Pakistan—raising questions about what Iran plans to do with the rest of the gas received from Russia.

Iran suffers from a gas deficit of 150 mcm/d in summer and 300 mcm/d in winter, and it could use Russian gas to meet its domestic needs.

However, 55 bcm of gas is worth around $15 billion, and Iran simply doesn’t have the money to pay for such a massive volume of gas. Even if it did, the government would need to provide enormous subsidies for its domestic use, given that gas prices in Iran’s domestic market are extremely low.

To illustrate, the Iranian government plans to sell 240 bcm of gas to the domestic market this year, earning only about 3,300 trillion rials in revenue—which, at the current exchange rate, amounts to less than $4 billion.

More Hollow Claims of New Oil Deals

Iran’s oil minister also announced that $4 billion in oil contracts have been signed with Russian companies.

Over the past two decades, Russian firms have signed more than a hundred contracts and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Iran, but almost none of the projects have ever gotten off the ground.

Paknejad provided few details, merely stating that “four contracts worth $4 billion have been signed with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields.”

However, three years ago, Mohsen Khojastehmehr, then-CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company, made a similar announcement, saying that “contracts with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields, worth $4 billion, have entered the operational phase.”

This strongly suggests that the contract Paknejad is referring to had already been signed years earlier—yet no action has been taken by the Russian side, contrary to Khojastehmehr’s assertions.

Back then, Iran and Gazprom had also signed 40 oil and gas memoranda of understanding, none of which led to any contracts or actual projects.

At the time, Iranian oil officials under President Ebrahim Raisi described the MoUs as being worth “$40 billion”, calling them “the largest deal in the history of the country’s oil and gas sector.”

Unlike formal contracts, MoUs do not carry any binding legal obligations, nor do they typically have a defined financial value—they are merely frameworks for studies and future negotiations aimed at signing actual contracts.

A senior Iranian international relations expert has outlined three possible scenarios for the outcome of ongoing diplomatic efforts between Iran and the United States, warning that talks remain clouded by mutual distrust and external interference.

In an op-ed published by Farhikhtegan newspaper, Alireza Mousapour, a professor at Tehran’s Shahid Beheshti University, said the negotiations could end in either failure, a temporary agreement, or an amended version of the 2015 nuclear deal.

The first scenario involves a collapse of talks, which Mousapour said could stem from excessive demands by the US, such as calls for dismantling Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle or pressure from Israel. Such a breakdown, he warned, could significantly increase the risk of military confrontation between Tehran and Washington.

The second scenario, deemed the most likely, envisions a short-term agreement similar to the 2015 framework. This interim deal could lay the groundwork for a broader accord, possibly involving what the writer called a “less for less” approach where Iran seeks reciprocal, verifiable steps from the US

The third scenario involves an amended Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with new provisions attached via a United Nations Security Council resolution. This would preserve the original deal's structure while integrating updated commitments.

"Despite ongoing challenges and disputes in the current negotiations between Tehran and Washington, both sides appear to be making mutual concessions in pursuit of a deal," Iranian political analyst Alireza Namvar Haghighi told Iran International.

"Ultimately, because both sides are aiming for an agreement, they would meet each other halfway," Namvar Haghighi said.

He suggested that the United States may have agreed to accept Iran’s uranium enrichment—either in a frozen state or at a limited level—while, in return, Iran is prepared to accept stricter verification measures.

According to Namvar Haghighi, this compromise could serve as the basis for a potential agreement between the two sides.

Delays in ongoing nuclear negotiations are inflicting damage on Iran’s economy, wrote Iran's Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper warning that the country's "imbalance-ridden economy is facing a severe liquidity crunch, with depreciation outpacing capital formation, leaving industries parched for investment."

Inflation continues to surge, with rising input costs failing to attract new domestic or foreign capital, the paper noted. Without fresh investment, it added, Iran’s GDP will remain stagnant.

The paper’s “Economists’ Club” section argued that policymakers must pair negotiation planning with domestic reforms, adding that economic security and a stable business environment are key to drawing investment.

The most forthright caution, curiously, has come from Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who—without referring to the current negotiations—reminded his hardline base that deals with foes are permissible if temporary.

The ultimate foe in Khamenei’s mind, of course, is America: presented more as an evil being than a country - the centerpiece of a narrative that manufactures, and is sustained by, hostility.

This narrative is, in many ways, reciprocated. Successive US administrations have portrayed Iran not just as a rival state, but the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism—a rogue actor bent on disrupting the global order.

Like Tehran’s view of America, this framing is not just rhetoric; it underpins policy, shapes alliances and narrows the space for diplomacy.

As talks resume, staunch anti-Americans in Iran warn against trusting “the Great Satan”, while the so-called hawks in the US decry any compromise with “the Mad Mullahs.”

Ingrained enmity

Despite gestures suggesting de-escalation—like the quiet removal of American flags from Iranian street protests—the hostile rhetoric has not faded. That’s because the tension is embedded not just in language, but in military posture.

The Trump administration has deployed two new warships to the region and deepened defense ties with Israel and Iran’s Arab neighbors.

Meanwhile the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen managed to strike deep into Israel with a ballistic missile landing near its main airport on Saturday.

Both sides are redrawing lines of confrontation. Diplomacy is conducted under a constant shadow of war.

"I’m issuing a serious warning: if you make one wrong move, we will open up the gates of hell on you," Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps chief Hossein Salami said on Thursday, referring to the United States and Israel.

"Sit down and stay in your place ... we have made extensive preparations."

The US government is not far off in tone. President Trump has framed the talks as a binary choice: agreement or war. “There are only two alternatives there," he told a conservative podcast on Wednesday. "Blow them up nicely or blow them up viciously."

Israel’s open threats to strike Iranian nuclear facilities and its insistence on the right to preemptive action only heighten the pressure.

In this climate, negotiations serve less to resolve conflict than to manage it. As long as each side sees the other as an irredeemable enemy—and enters talks prepared for battle—diplomacy becomes an extension of confrontation by other means.

Khamenei’s message about temporary deals may have been cryptic. But it had a clear implication: that diplomacy is a tool for crisis management, not conflict resolution.

Tehran and Washington may speak of de-escalation, but their dominant narratives remain unchanged—and the structures that sustain enmity show no signs of retreat.

Seen in this light, the ongoing talks appear to be more of a phase in a familiar cycle than an auspicious breakthrough.

Even if a deal is reached, without structural change, the hostility will likely endure—and should it unravel, military confrontation may appear a legitimate course more then ever.