The flags of EU, Iran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom
Iran’s outreach to European powers has divided Tehran’s political commentators over whether engaging France, Germany and Britain serves any real purpose amid the Islamic Republic's talks with Washington.
Senior diplomats from Iran and the three European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal met in Istanbul on Friday in what appears to be Tehran’s attempt to prevent a "snapback" of the UN sanctions that were suspended for ten years as part of that deal.
But the initiative is being questioned—somewhat surprisingly—by voices long known for advocating diplomacy, such as former lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh.
“There is no point in holding talks with Europeans. Iran’s only solution is to continue negotiations with the United States,” he told the conservative Nameh News on Friday
“Europe’s influence will remain insignificant as long as Trump is the President of the United States.”
Missed chances
A former head of parliament’s foreign policy committee, Falahatpisheh argued that Iran’s recent diplomatic overtures to the signatories of the 2015 deal are little more than a symbolic attempt to break out of the political impasse created by Washington.
“Iran should have negotiated with (US President) Trump during his first term,” Falahatpisheh said. “Unfortunately, Iranian officials are known for their costly and untimely decisions.”
This critique of past decisions may be shared by many in Tehran’s commentariat, but the way forward is certainly not.
“Even if talks with the Americans are paused or entangled in new complexities, we should not stop our negotiations with the Europeans,” political analyst Ali Bigdeli told the moderate outlet Fararu.
“The truth is that the Europeans are holding a hostage called the ‘trigger mechanism,’ which they can use to pressure us. If they don’t agree to postpone its activation by a year, they can use it as leverage against us,” he added.
Fearing the trigger
The trigger clause in the 2015 nuclear deal allows any signatory to reimpose lifted UN sanctions on Iran. The United States effectively forfeited that prerogative when the first Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in 2018.
It remains unclear whether the so-called snapback of sanctions was discussed in the Istanbul roundtable on Friday.
European officials described the event as a broad discussion about Tehran’s relationship with the West. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi asserted that it had “nothing to do with negotiations with Washington.”
It did, as far as the media inside Iran are concerned. Whatever their view on the significance of the Istanbul meeting, most editorials linked it to the talks with the US.
“The position of the United States, which has initiated bilateral negotiations with Tehran, has somewhat sidelined Europe’s role,”Khabar Online wrote in an editorial on Friday.
“The nuclear negotiations are not merely a diplomatic engagement between Iran and Europe, but will more broadly affect the balance of power in the region,” it concluded.
Qatar's diplomatic prowess was lavished with praise by US President Donald Trump on his visit this week, suggesting the maverick mediator state may be set for more involvement on one of the region's trickiest dossiers: Iran.
Trump's remarks could herald a bigger role for Qatar as the US-Iran talks mediated by Oman appear headed for crunch time.
During a state dinner in Doha this week, Trump appeared to acknowledge Qatar’s crucial role in helping put off a US military strike on Iran amid high stakes talks over Tehran's disputed nuclear program.
Trump praised Qatar’s leadership, specifically Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, for resisting calls within Washington and its allies to deliver a “hard blow” to Iran.
“Iran should seriously thank the emir of Qatar, because there are others who want to deal a hard blow to Iran, unlike Qatar,” Trump said. “Iran is very lucky to have the emir because he’s actually fighting for them. He doesn’t want us to do a vicious blow to Iran.”
Hashem Ahelbarra, a correspondent for Qatar-owned Al-Jazeera, said the comments strongly indicate a potential larger role for Doha in mediating a settlement between Tehran and Washington.
“They played quite a crucial role in mediating between the Iranians and the Americans in the past.”
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visits to Riyadh and Doha earlier this month just ahead of the fourth round of nuclear talks held in Oman and Abu Dhabi highlight Tehran’s willingness to broaden the regional dialogue.
Perils of potential US-Iran military confrontation for Qatar
The gas-rich microstate has been key mediator for the United States in regional conflagrations from Afghanistan to Gaza.
Qatar, which has strong ties with the US and hosts Al Udeid Air Base—the largest US military base in the Middle East—opposes any US or Israeli military strike on Iran and its nuclear facilities, emphasizing the risk of regional destabilization, and seeks a diplomatic solution.
“We have no hostility toward our neighboring countries, and brotherhood prevails among us. However, US bases located in the region's countries will be considered targets by us in the event of an attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said.
In March 2025, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani warned that military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities could have catastrophic environmental consequences, such as contaminating the Persian Gulf’s waters.
This, he said, would imperil the water security of Qatar, along with other states like the UAE and Kuwait, all of which rely heavily on desalinated water from the Persian Gulf.
Good neighbors
Iran and Qatar, which share stewardship of South Pars, the world’s largest natural gas field, have maintained close economic and political relations over the years.
Iran played a crucial role in helping Qatar maintain economic stability and connectivity with the outside world when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar in 2017, partly due to its close ties with Iran.
Tehran offered Doha diplomatic support, opened its airspace to Qatari aircraft, sent dozens of cargo planes and ships loaded with food, and expanded maritime trade routes to Qatar through its southern ports.
Qatar also played a pivotal role in facilitating the release of five American citizens detained in Iran in September 2023, hosting multiple rounds of indirect negotiations between US and Iranian officials in Doha.
The unfrozen funds, stipulated to be used solely for humanitarian purposes, such as purchasing food and medicine, were transferred to Qatari banks and Qatar committed to overseeing the disbursement of these funds to ensure compliance with US sanctions.
The funds, however, have not been made available to Iran due to a quiet agreement between Washington and Doha.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed Washington for obstructing the release of the funds during his meeting with the Emir of Qatar in Tehran in February and said Iran expected Doha to resist US pressure.
US President Donald Trump said on Friday that Iran has received a formal American proposal for a nuclear agreement and warned Tehran to respond swiftly or face consequences.
“They have a proposal. More importantly, they know they have to move quickly or something bad—something bad's going to happen,” Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One after leaving the United Arab Emirates.
Axios reported Thursday that the written proposal was delivered during the fourth round of indirect talks between US and Iranian officials last Sunday in Muscat, Oman. It was the first formal offer made by the Trump administration since negotiations began in April, Axios cited US and diplomatic sources saying.
The document, handed over by White House envoy Steve Witkoff, outlines terms for a civilian nuclear program, with specific provisions for international monitoring and verification.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly took the proposal back to Tehran for review by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and other senior officials.
Witkoff described the proposal as “elegant” and “very big” in a recent briefing to the United Nations Security Council, according to Axios, but acknowledged that more work was needed. A fifth round of talks has not yet been scheduled.
Iran has responded positively in public statements. Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Khamenei told NBC News that Tehran is ready to stop enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels, reduce its stockpiles and accept inspections—if the United States lifts all sanctions.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking Thursday from Turkey, said the diplomatic window remains open but warned the decision ultimately rests with Iran’s leadership.
“In the end, the decision lies in the hands of one person, and that's the Supreme Leader in Iran, and I hope he chooses the path of peace and prosperity, not a destructive path,” Rubio told reporters.
Iran and the three European signatories to the 2015 nuclear deal held talks in Istanbul to discuss the state of nuclear and sanctions-lifting negotiations, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said on Friday.
Gharibabadi said he and fellow Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi hosted the political directors of the UK, France, and Germany for discussions aimed at advancing diplomatic efforts.
“Iran and the E3 are determined to sustain and make best use of diplomacy,” he wrote on X. “We will meet again, as appropriate, to continue our dialogue.”
A German diplomatic source told Iran International ahead of the meeting that discussions would focus on Iran’s nuclear program, but stressed, “These are not negotiations.” The source said Germany was represented by Dominik Mutter, Political Director at the Federal Foreign Office.
Earlier this week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran remained open to talks with Europe, “even if their own policies have led to some isolation in these negotiations.”
Few details have emerged from the meeting, and no major breakthroughs have been announced.
Under the UN resolution that endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, the three European signatories – Britain, France, and Germany – have the authority to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran through a mechanism known as the "snapback," if they determine that Tehran is not complying with the agreement.
Diplomats told Reuters that the E3 could move to trigger the snapback mechanism as early as August if no significant progress is made in negotiations. The deadline to do so under the resolution is October 18.
Separately, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Friday in Istanbul with the national security advisors of the UK, France, and Germany to discuss both Iran and the war in Ukraine, according to a US official and a Reuters witness.
The United States and Iran have held four rounds of indirect nuclear negotiations mediated by Oman since April. Both sides have described the talks as “constructive,” though no formal agreement has been reached.
Meanwhile, during his visit to Persian Gulf states this week, US President Donald Trump said Iran had “sort of agreed” to American terms and declared, “We’re getting very close to a deal.” Trump reiterated that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon and warned Tehran faces either “a very, very nice step” or “a violent step — the violence like people haven’t seen before.”
On Friday, Trump added that Iran has received a formal US proposal and must act quickly. Axios reported that the written proposal was handed to Iranian negotiators during the fourth round of talks in Oman and taken back to Tehran for consultation with senior officials.
Iranian officials and media have welcomed a piece of legislation required for compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), though the path to removal from the watchdog’s black list remains uncertain.
On Wednesday, the Expediency Council gave final approval to the bill that enables Iran to join the Palermo Convention, formally known as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. However, the legislation includes several conditions that could raise concerns for the FATF.
Officials say the Expediency Council is expected to review the second remaining bill, required for joining the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) Convention, next week.
Ratifying these two conventions is considered a final and necessary step in aligning Iran with FATF standards and can facilitate its removal from the global anti-money laundering body’s black list.
The breakthrough followed a green light given in December by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei which allowed the Expediency Council to re-examine both bills after years amid political infighting.
Official and media optimism
“The conditional approval of the Palermo bill by the Expediency Council is an important step towards constructive engagement with the world,” government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said in a post on X on Wednesday.
“The government welcomes the Assembly’s decision and hopes that national interests, economic benefits, and international considerations will guide the review of the CFT (bill) as well,” she added.
Iran's moderate and reformist media have also widely welcomed the move with optimistic headlines and commentaries.
“This can facilitate Iran’s return to the international financial system and its effective presence in global markets,” Donya-ye Eghtesad economic daily wrote.
“This important development has occurred while signs of progress in negotiations between Iran and the United States are also visible, and optimism about the future of Iran’s economy has increased."
Conditional ratification and FATF concerns
Despite the positive tone, the conditions attached to Iran’s ratification of the Palermo Convention—and the reservations included in the CFT bill—pose serious challenges to the country's full compliance with FATF standards.
The FATF has clearly said that Iran must ratify and implement the Palermo and CFT conventions “without undue reservations”, saying broad or vague reservations can undermine the conventions’ effectiveness and create loopholes for financing terrorism.
Speaking to IRNA after the Council’s decision, Deputy Economy Minister Hadi Khani downplayed the importance of the conditions.
“Many countries have set conditions for accepting these two conventions. Our country’s parliament, too, introduced conditions for certain articles of the conventions,” he said, adding that most of these were based on the principle that Iran would implement the conventions within the framework of its own Constitution.
Some FATF members including the United States, China, and India have ratified the Palermo Convention with the reservation that they do not consider themselves bound by Article 35(2), which involves mandatory dispute resolution by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Iran's Palermo legislation includes similar language, excluding ICJ jurisdiction while asserting that decisions on extradition and mutual legal assistance will be made on a case-by-case basis.
Iran has also declared that provisions incompatible with its national laws—many of which are rooted in Islamic Sharia—will not be binding. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have accepted the Convention with similar reservations.
Moreover, Iran’s legislation explicitly states that accession to the required conventions does not imply recognition of Israel, a FATF member.
The CTF bill also includes language affirming the “legitimate and recognized right” of peoples under occupation to resist and pursue self-determination in apparent reference to the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.
FATF’s concerns are particularly related to the reservations included in the CFT bill. Iran's CTF bill does not accept the definitions of terrorism provided by other countries or international bodies if they conflict with its national laws and support for groups that it views as legitimate resistance movements.
Remaining on FATF black list
Iran was on FATF black lists from 2008 to 2016. In February 2020 it was black-listed again and has remained so to date.
While approval of the Palermo Convention and the CFT Convention bills is a critical step, removal from the FATF black list depends on effective implementation, not just legal ratification, and may take several years.
In January, former Central Bank official Asghar Fakhriyeh-Kashani revealed that some Chinese banks had closed Iranian accounts to avoid FATF penalties and geopolitical analyst Abdolreza Faraji-Rad told Ham-Mihan daily at the time that Iran’s oil trade with China had to bypass the formal banking system, avoiding cash payments and relying on alternative mechanisms for the same reason.
On his tour of Iran’s Arab neighbors, US president Donald Trump lashed out at Tehran while hinting a deal was close—warning and wooing at once, and raising as many questions as he answered about the prospects of his transactional diplomacy.
President Trump arrived in Saudi Arabia on May 13 on the first leg of a four-day, three-country trip to the Middle East that included stops in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
The choice of Saudi Arabia for the first state visit of Trump’s second term mirrored that of his first, except this time he did not go to Israel, signaling that the administration is doubling down on its Arabian peninsula partners as key supporters of US regional interests.
Iran was naturally not on the itinerary but ever-present in Trump’s public statements, with the president using a characteristic blend of carrot-and-stick which urged Iranian leaders to take a “new and better path” and warned of “massive maximum pressure” if Tehran “rejects this olive branch.”
Trump expressed his desire to reach a deal with Iran on many occasions, even hinting that a deal was almost agreed. For that to happen, however, Tehran "must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease its pursuit of nuclear weapons,” he added.
Later, aboard Air Force One, Trump told reporters that Iran had to “make the right decision” about its nuclear program because “something’s going to happen one way or the other” and "we’ll either do it friendly or we’ll do it very unfriendly.”
Arab, Iranian audiences
There are various takeaways for leaders in Iran as well as in its neighboring Arab countries, from Trump’s commentary.
For the latter, Trump’s demand that Iran end its sponsorship of terror and involvement in proxy wars will be welcomed as a signal that any agreement with Tehran might not be narrowly confined to its nuclear program alone, as was the case with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.
Former US and Iran foreign ministers John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif speaking in the lead up to the 2015 nuclear deal
For leaders in Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi - not to mention in Tel Aviv -it was Iran’s regional activities that were as much a priority as its nuclear program, and their exclusion from the negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal caused alarm in the region.
However, any such optimism in regional corridors of power may be tempered by concern that the president’s unconventional approach to deal-making may create openings for an agreement that gives Trump the optics he desires at the expense of nuts-and-bolts details on specific Iranian commitments.
Deals, details and differences
Comments by Steve Witkoff, Trump’s chief negotiator and one of his closest confidants, in podcast and other appearances, have not given the impression of a details-focused approach to diplomacy, whether in terms of Russia and Ukraine or Iran.
Witkoff and other members of the Trump administration have also sent mixed messages about whether Iran would be able to enrich uranium in any agreement, reinforcing concerns by domestic and regional critics of US engagement with Iran that a new deal may be worse than no deal.
For the leadership in Tehran, beset by economic challenges, energy shortages and geopolitical setbacks that left its regional "Axis of Resistance" weakened, the optics of Trump’s regional procession offer glimpses of opportunity.
The fact that Trump met with Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh and declared that sanctions on Syria would be lifted was further illustration that Trump is transactional rather than ideological, and willing to take decisions that break the mold of conventional American policy thinking.
This was underscored in Trump’s remarks in Riyadh on May 13 when he slammed the failures of generations of western interventionists and neocons in the Middle East who “told you how to do it, but they had no idea how to do it themselves” and, he argued, did far more damage than good.
In making these comments and receiving al-Sharaa, Trump has shown himself willing to break free of traditional constraints on US policymaking in the region, at least on the surface, and this may yet extend to Iran.
Unclear outlook
There are nevertheless multiple uncertainties for Iranian officials as they begin to digest the outcomes of Trump’s visit to the Middle East and assess the implications, both short- and long-term, for Tehran.
The plethora of major deals signed in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have cemented these countries’ deep and longstanding ties with the US across the defense and security, economic, and energy spectrum.
Any concerns in the region of US disengagement from the Middle East may be dissipated by the sight of Trump bestowing such significance on the region, in stark contrast to the disdain with which the administration has treated its formal allies in Europe and North America.
And yet, if Trump is to reap the benefits of the hundreds of billions of dollars of planned investments into the US, he will likely return from his trip with a conviction that the pledges, and the returns, require stability and would be jeopardized by any conflict with Iran.
This not only plays into the de-risking and de-escalatory approach that Iran's energy-rich Arab neighbors have taken since 2020 but may also fortify Trump’s desire to burnish his credentials as a peacemaker in the explosive region.