Iran turns to Oman in bid to soften US stance in nuclear talks

The Trump administration has ruled out any Iranian uranium enrichment, calling it a red line in negotiations with the Islamic Republic — a condition Iran considers unacceptable.

Iran’s foreign ministry recently sent a message to Omani officials, urging them to implore Washington to soften its demands, the sources told Iran International on condition of anonymity.

“Given the dependency of Iran’s financial markets—currency, gold, and stocks—on the outcome of the negotiations, the message emphasized that a diplomatic compromise is possible if the United States moderates its position,” one source said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday that Tehran was reviewing the possibility of holding a new round of negotiations with Washington—an indication that Iran was awaiting a response from the US via Oman, the sources told Iran International.

Oman's foreign minister announced on Wednesday that Iran and the United States will hold the fifth round of nuclear talks in Rome on Friday, May 23.

No clear alternative

Iranian officials, the sources added, are concerned about the absence of a clear diplomatic alternative if talks collapse.

There is currently no alternative strategy to manage the crisis and govern the country in the event of the negotiations’ failure, they said, stressing that maintaining the diplomatic track remains a priority for Tehran.

Reuters reported on Wednesday, citing three unnamed Iranian sources, that the Iranian leadership has no clear contingency plan should the nuclear talks fail.

The sources suggested that while Iran might pivot toward China and Russia as an alternative strategy, such a path would be fraught with challenges. China is entangled in a trade war with the US, and Russia remains mired in its military conflict in Ukraine.

The alternative plan is simply to continue the pre-negotiation strategy, Reuters reported citing a senior Iranian official, suggesting that Iran would avoid escalating tensions while reinforcing ties with allies such as Russia and China

The UAE's state-owned The National reported on Monday citing two Iranian officials, that the negotiations between Washington and Tehran have stalled due to disagreements over uranium enrichment levels, and Tehran has not yet accepted Oman's invitation for a fifth round of talks with the US.

On Tuesday Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei dismissed US demands to halt uranium enrichment as “nonsense and excessive.” He also warned that the likelihood of successful negotiations remains low, signaling a toughening stance at the highest levels of the Islamic Republic.

Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian will visit Oman on May 27–28 at the invitation of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, the president's office announced on Wednesday.

While Oman is mediating nuclear talks between Iran and the United States, the nuclear issue is not currently on the official agenda for Pezeshkian's visit.

On messaging apps like Telegram, channels advertise “Islamic marriage services.”

The language is coded—halal sigheh, “marriage under sharia supervision,” or “regulated Islamic companionship” — but the business model is simple: pick, pay and meet.

Under Iran's Shi'ite Muslim legal code, men are legally permitted to enter into temporary marriages for a fixed period—ranging from minutes to years—without court approval or official registration.

These marriages automatically dissolve when the agreed-upon time expires.

Iran International encountered a functioning industry of religiously sanctioned pimping, one that exploits the legal ambiguity of sigheh to facilitate sex work. Many users are conned. But some are not.

While screenshots were translated from Farsi, no photos—even blurred ones—have been included in this report, as we could not verify whether the women pictured were genuinely behind the profiles used in these exchanges.

Iran International contacted several channels and in half the cases, different women responded from different numbers. One sent audio replies. Another agreed to meet in person—for a cash exchange, if a deposit was paid.

In another case, a woman offered options for a short-term arrangement and said she was working “with the support of a governmental office,” insisting that payment be made to their account first.

To obtain a woman’s contact information alone, clients are typically asked to pay between 3 million to 5 million rials (roughly $3.50 to $6 at current exchange rates). Full service arrangements labeled as “monthly sigheh contracts” range from 70 to 400 million rials ($83 to $476), with rates varying based on location, age or even height.

In one case in Iran International's investigation, a woman arranged to meet at a metro station in west Tehran after initial negotiations, with two rounds of fees—labeled as 'identification' and 'dowry'—required as conditions to be paid after the meeting.

“Bring the balance in cash,” she instructed. “After we talk, if you’re satisfied, we go somewhere.” Her tone was direct and businesslike. The transaction mirrored sex work in every way—except it was presented as a religious contract.

'Virginity guaranteed'

The channels involved do not describe sigheh as a sexual service. Instead, they variously frame it as a “pious alternative to sinful behavior”—“a way to support chaste women,” one wrote.

Listings often include physical traits, education level and place of residence. Some promise “virginity guaranteed.” Longer-term packages come with varying price tags—often higher for women labeled as educated or Tehran-based.

“We only use women who are under the protection of the Islamic Republic. No funny business. Everything is legal under sharia,” wrote another channel.

Behind that language lies a structured operation. Clients are matched. Money is transferred through intermediary accounts—typically under male names.

Some users told Iran International that they had even received handwritten contracts and met women after paying.

Yet scams still exist. Some men are strung along with fake profiles and asked for repeated payments—dowries, insurance fees, “pregnancy contingencies”—only to have contact cut off once the money is sent.

One man in Karaj who spoke on condition of anonymity told Iran International: “I sent money three times. Each time there was a new excuse. The last time, they asked for an abortion deposit. Then she vanished.”

The online platforms are not licensed or regulated by the state but are not shut down either. Their visibility on domestic platforms points to at least a passive tolerance from authorities.

Even Fars News, which is close to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, wrote on the phenomenon on Wednesday but mostly sought to discredit the platforms as a scam aiming to defraud credulous men.

But it also implicitly acknowledged the existence of real actors within the system.

“Our field investigation shows that many of these pages lack any official or legal license and are mostly created for purposes such as fraud, extortion, and even the dissemination of users' personal information,” the outlet wrote.

The use of “many” rather than “all” leaves room for exceptions—an implicit admission that not every channel is fake and that some do involve actual individuals, transactions, and encounters.

An apparent official tolerance of sigheh as a moral buffer against paid sex appears to have opened the door to commodifying women under theological cover. Prostitution is criminalized and punished, yet sigheh remains legal and broadly interpreted—creating a religiously sanctioned loophole.

“Pimping is illegal,” said a Tehran-based legal expert who requested anonymity for security reasons. “But sigheh offers a loophole. If the woman agrees, there’s a contract, and it’s framed as religious—who’s going to prosecute it?”

The line between religiously permitted marriage and outright sexual commerce is not just blurred—it has become a business model. For the Islamic Republic, it is one that hides in plain sight, cloaked in doctrine and fueled by tanking standards of living and deepening poverty.

Far from being limited to scams, the sigheh economy has become a channel for monetizing sexual access under the guise of religious propriety.

Business documents and emails obtained by Iran International reveal a layered network of shell companies used to mask the military links and channel the sanctioned oil through foreign intermediaries.

The firm, Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars, was incorporated in November 2022 in Tehran. Within months, two affiliated companies—Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan and Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars—were registered in the same building.

Corporate records identify Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars as the controlling shareholder in both. Registered firms in Iran are required to have four names.

Individuals central to the operation include Majid Azami, Elyas Niroumand Toumaj, Farshad Ghazi, Majid Rashidi, and Mojtaba Hosseini. The US Treasury added Azami and Niroumand to its sanctions list in November 2023. The others have not been designated.

In an appeal sent days after the sanctions were imposed, Azami and Niroumand denied any military affiliation, saying there was a misunderstanding based on similar naming.

They told the US Treasury their companies were involved in civil construction and trade and had been “experiencing harassment from both sides” since the designation.

However, Farsi-language draft contracts and internal memoranda contradict their argument. One agreement 2023 identifies Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars as acting on behalf of the Iranian armed forces' general staff in negotiations with Persian Gulf Star Oil Company.

Another set of shipping documents shows the same military body guaranteeing Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars’ obligations in chartering vessels from the National Iranian Tanker Company.

To obscure these links, the network appears to have operated through a proxy firm in Hong Kong. In April 2023, Xin Rui Ji was registered there, with a nominal Chinese executive listed in filings. Yet, communications from Xin Rui Ji were routinely copied to Niroumand and other Sepehr managers.

One August 2023 letter requested the National Iranian Tanker Company deliver crude to Xin Rui Ji without a bill of lading—critical for cargo tracking—via ship-to-ship transfer in Singapore.

The transfer of cargo from one ship to another is a method used by the Islamic Republic to obscure its role in the sale of oil and petroleum products in order to evade sanctions.

Often in Malaysian and Singaporean waters, it is relabeled as oil originating from Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman or particularly Malaysia.

The same contact information and domain used by Sepehr Energy appeared on Xin Rui Ji contracts, pointing to a unified operation.

Xin Rui Ji sought buyers across Europe, China, and the Persian Gulf. One such client was the Netherlands-based Gemini Group, which advertises global reach in oil and energy trading. In September 2023, Gemini delayed payment for a crude shipment citing banking concerns and “rumors online about sanctions.”

In one email dated 30 October 2023, Gemini representative Niek Tersteeg confronted his Iranian counterpart Elyas Niroumand about a delayed payment. While citing confusion over contract terms, Tersteeg made clear that the problem was not procedural.

“The only reply we are getting are your statements that your side is governmental,” he wrote.

Tersteeg added: “This morning I personally will call my contacts inside the Government in Tehran to check if they can assist finding a solution.”

The email indicated that Gemini had longstanding experience dealing with sanctioned Iranian entities.

“Let us not talk about the 'commission payments' behind the curtain. In short: please forgive my honesty and directness, we are the ones working, financing, taking all the risks while lots of people are waiting in their rocking chairs for their pockets to be filled,” added Tersteeg in his email.

Five days later, on 5 November, Tersteeg followed up in another message addressed to Niroumand and Majid Azami, both of whom were sanctioned by the US government. He expressed appreciation for their collaboration and emphasized the depth of their partnership: “We are not the enemy. We are true friends and brothers ready, willing and able to take any risk.”

Tersteeg then recounted his own arrest in the Netherlands for dealings with Iran. “I myself was in put jail in 2013 by the Dutch secret service for my trading activities with your beautiful country on special, urgent request of the USA Government.

"They didn’t break me. I kept my mouth shut. After several days the Dutch secret service and Dutch Government found out that I did nothing wrong and they released me from prison with written apologies. The USA Government did not apologize and placed me on certain lists. I am not allowed to travel and enter the USA and Israel. No problem for me.”

Contacted by Iran International, Tersteeg denied any contractual ties with Sepehr Energy. He said personal and commercial links with Iranian officials were confidential.

The documents depict a sanctions evasion structure that operated with strategic cover and foreign complicity, exposing vulnerabilities in enforcement mechanisms meant to isolate Iran’s military-linked commerce.

Most of Iran's floating oil is stored in Singaporean waters, awaiting brokers and buyers for shipment to China.

The drop in Iran's oil exports comes as the government, led by Masoud Pezeshkian, plans for daily exports of 1.85 million barrels this year.

Before US sanctions in 2018, Iran exported 2.5 million bpd. This figure plummeted to 350,000 bpd by the final months of Donald Trump's presidency in 2020. However, Iran’s oil exports gradually increased under his successor.

Despite Tehran agreeing to expanded inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the dispute over enrichment has cast doubt over the timing and direction of the next round of negotiations, originally scheduled to resume this week after being delayed in Oman.

“Iran has accepted strict and intensive inspections by IAEA inspectors, and the two sides have reached an understanding on verification and control mechanisms,” an Iranian diplomatic source familiar with the talks said on condition of anonymity.

“The key disagreement is over Iran’s right to enrich uranium domestically—something the American side opposes,” the source said, adding that the US team's shifting goals were complicating the negotiations.

“In every round, the Americans bring up new topics—missiles, proxies—without a consistent framework.”

A second diplomatic source confirmed that Iran had agreed to restrain its regional allies, including by asking the Houthis to temporarily halt attacks, partly to deny Israel what he called a "pretext" to obstruct diplomacy.

US officials contacted by Iran International declined to comment on the specifics of the talks but acknowledged the urgency and fragility of the moment.

“Time is short and we need to make progress quickly. To make that happen, the Iranians need to negotiate in good faith and sincerely desire to reach a deal,” a State Department spokesperson told Iran International.

Internal Divisions in Tehran

Meanwhile Iran too has fissures of its own on the talks dossier, with hardliners continuing to criticize the talks but negotiators still appearing determined to clinch a fair deal to avoid war.

“There’s a difference between building media credibility and childish competition for scoops,” Mohammad Hossein Ranjbaran, an adviser to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, posted on X on Tuesday.

“Agencies and esteemed officials who receive classified reports must protect them. Leaking information to favored outlets undermines national interests,” he added, in an apparent reference to a report published the day before by Nour News, a site close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s adviser Ali Shamkhani.

The outlet cited an anonymous source saying the fourth round of talks would focus on “humanitarian and security concerns," without elaborating, suggesting that the negotiations had expanded beyond the nuclear dossier—something never mentioned by officials involved in the talks.

A diplomatic source told Iran International that unauthorized disclosures could undermine the Iranian negotiating team.

The updated legislation, signed into effect on Tuesday by President Masoud Pezeshkian, imposes harsher sentences for unlicensed gun possession and criminalizes the use of digital platforms to promote or sell weapons.

But Telegram remains awash in posts advertising weapons for prices between 200 million and 1.8 billion rials—roughly $240 to $2,200 at the current exchange rate of 820,000 rials per US dollar.

In one 17,000-member channel, a vendor offered a Glock 17 pistol for 280 million rials ($340), a Makarov for 240 million ($290), and a Turkish-made Colt .45 for 360 million ($440). For higher-end buyers, a Kalashnikov was listed at 1.7 billion rials ($2,070), including a video showing it wrapped in cloth beside two full magazines.

“Payment is in Tether,” said one seller when contacted anonymously via Telegram, referring to a cryptocurrency. “Once confirmed, you’ll receive a location—usually a locker in a shopping mall. You have two hours to retrieve it.”

Posing as a buyer we messaged five sellers across different channels. All insisted on cryptocurrency, none offered verification and two responded with identical language and price lists—raising doubts about authenticity.

But sources in Tehran familiar with the illicit trade said the market is not entirely fake. “There are scams, yes,” one source said. “But there are many real vendors. People share experiences, and some of these sellers have been delivering for years.”

Iran’s newly amended firearms law significantly broadens the scope of punishable offenses. Beyond illegal possession, it targets sellers, repairers and those who promote or advertise firearms online.

Penalties range from three to fifteen years in prison depending on the type of weapon, with automatic firearms, heavy arms, and military-grade munitions drawing the harshest sentences.

A clause in the law also authorizes authorities to seize properties, vehicles, or storage facilities used in connection with arms crimes.

According to the text, any digital promotion, sale, or training activity linked to firearms is subject to prosecution.

The law also tightens control over airguns, mandating that those in possession of PCP rifles over 40 joules must surrender them within three months or face penalties equivalent to those for illegal hunting rifles. Owners of PCPs under the threshold must apply for a license.

Still, on Telegram, enforcement appears limited. Sellers openly post weapons and use emojis of guns, bombs, and fire to attract attention.

Sources say these weapons are often smuggled in from Turkey, Iraq, or via the Persian Gulf and may be resold multiple times through local intermediaries. “The dealers who actually deliver have networks,” said a source in Tehran. “They use trusted people. Some even have police protection.”

Iran’s black market extends far beyond guns. Unlicensed alcohol, sex work under the guise of massage services, and a growing narcotics scene—from cocaine to synthetic pills—share the same digital infrastructure, relying on anonymity, encrypted platforms, and rapid logistics.

While authorities promise firm implementation of the new law, Telegram channels remain easy to find and quick to rebrand. For buyers, the market is a gamble. But according to those familiar with Tehran’s illicit economy, enough vendors deliver to keep demand alive.