Israeli security experts have cast doubt on Tehran’s recent claims of obtaining sensitive Israeli intelligence as exaggerated or psychological warfare while Iran’s intelligence minister says the documents will soon be made public.
Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB reported on Saturday that Iranian intelligence services had obtained a large volume of sensitive material from Israel, including documents related to the Jewish state's nuclear and strategic facilities.
Asher Ben-Artzi, a former head of Israel’s Interpol, told Iran International, “I know that the relevant information is well-guarded in Israel and it does not seem to me that hackers can access it."
He warned that the intelligence may not be as significant as claimed. “Iran wants to tell the world that their intelligence personnel are professionals, but they probably think that their use of disinformation will increase their achievements,” he said.
Intelligence analyst Ronen Solomon also said, “We don’t know if it’s something scientific or operational, and it could possibly be something like details of the supply chain. Nobody in Israel has confirmed this officially so it could also be a psychological operation.”
"Iran is attempting to replicate what Israel did to Tehran’s nuclear archives in 2018," he said, referring to the Israeli intelligence operation that allegedly seized Iranian nuclear files from a warehouse in Tehran.
In 2018, Israel said it had stolen Iran's nuclear documents including 55,000 pages and 55,000 digital files from a warehouse in Tehran's Shourabad area through an intelligence operation.
Iran has since been accusing the UN nuclear watchdog of using those documents in its reports about the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities.
Iran says it will release documents soon
Iran’s Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib said on Sunday that Tehran had obtained “a vast collection of strategic and sensitive documents, including plans and data on the nuclear facilities of the Zionist regime,” referring to Israel. He added that the documents would be published soon.
According to Iran’s state news agency ISNA, Khatib said the material would enhance Iran’s “offensive power” and added that the documents also contained data about the United States, European countries, and others.
“Complete nuclear documents have been obtained and transferred,” he said.
He described the operation as broad, multi-dimensional, and complex, involving infiltration, recruitment, and increased access to Israeli sources.
“The transfer method is just as important as the documents themselves. We ensured the documents reached us securely, and we are protecting the methods as well,” Khatib said, adding that the transfer process itself would remain classified for now.
Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB had earlier reported that the documents were already outside Israeli territory and under review, but provided no evidence.
The reports come as Israeli authorities investigate the arrest of Roy Mizrahi and Almog Atias, two Israelis accused of conducting surveillance for Iran, allegedly in the town of Kfar Ahim, home to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz.
Iran’s media linked their arrest to the intelligence haul, saying it happened after the data had been exfiltrated.
Israeli officials have accused the two of cooperating knowingly with Iranian handlers, and that they carried out tasks including the transfer of a suspected explosive device.
A report by Microsoft last year that Israel had surpassed the United States as the primary target of Iranian state-backed cyberattacks following the war in Gaza.
Their accounts document a sprawling overseas network operating under direct orders from the Supreme Leader’s office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence arm well out of step with common diplomatic practice.
“Every embassy has a list. People to watch. People to engage. People to silence,” an Iranian former diplomatic employee told Iran International.
“It’s not foreign policy—it’s field execution,” another told Iran International. “The people sent abroad are on assignment, not appointment.”
Their account outlines a foreign service shaped not by diplomacy but by ideology, surveillance and illicit finance.
According to these individuals—whose names are withheld for their safety—Iran’s diplomatic missions double as intelligence gathering hubs tasked with tracking dissidents, surveilling student communities and delivering cash and equipment under the protection of diplomatic immunity.
UK authorities detained eight men in May, including three charged under the National Security Act for surveilling Iran International journalists on behalf of Tehran between August 2024 and February 2025.
It was not clear whether the charges related in any way to the Iranian embassy in London.
Iran’s foreign ministry denounced the charges as politically motivated, but former officials say such actions are core to the Islamic Republic’s overseas agenda.
Iran’s embassies maintain the outward structure of any diplomatic mission—ambassadors, attachés and advisers—but according to the sources, the roles often serve as cover.
“A person listed as a translator might actually coordinate funds for proxy groups,” said one of the former diplomats. “Titles are just for appearances.”
In one high-profile case, Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi used his status to transport explosives intended for an opposition rally in Paris. His 2021 conviction in Belgium exposed how far such dual roles can go.
Another ex-staffer recalled colleagues arriving in Istanbul and Baku with briefcases of undeclared dollars. “They know no one will search their bags,” he said.
Cultural attachés, especially those linked to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization, are said to organize religious events abroad that double as screening grounds for potential recruits.
Germany shuttered the Islamic Center of Hamburg in July over its ties to Tehran and what the Interior Ministry called promotion of extremism and antisemitism.
The diplomatic corps itself, sources say, is dominated by the sons of clerics and system insiders.
“Your father is a Friday prayer leader? Your uncle is close to the Supreme Leader? You’re in,” said one.
Posts rarely align with professional background; language skills and experience are often secondary to loyalty.
Though often expelled or exposed, the structure endures. Loyal staff are rotated across continents with little interruption.
“Each post is a mission. If you complete it to the system’s satisfaction, you’re held in reserve for the next,” one former diplomat said.
The network’s reach is enhanced by front organizations. The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation has been linked to Hezbollah financing. The Iranian Red Crescent has faced accusations of being used by Quds Force operatives for weapons transport. IRGC members have admitted posing as aid workers during the Bosnian war.
IRIB outlets—Press TV, Al-Alam, Hispan TV—have functioned as propaganda arms and intelligence fronts. France expelled one of their journalists in 2011 for spreading state messaging.
The Iranian Red Crescent and the IRGC officially denied these remarks, saying that any such actions were unauthorized and not representative of their organizations.
Despite the rhetoric of resistance, many live in luxury. One former ambassador’s Paris residence cost over €40,000 per month.
“They send their kids to secular schools while preaching Islamic values,” said another. Leaked records show senior envoys receiving up to $12,000 monthly, with generous stipends and ceremonial budgets.
“It’s both reward and insulation,” an ex-diplomatic employee said. “The system buys loyalty with luxury—and distances them from the reality of ordinary Iranians.”
What emerges is not a diplomatic corps, but a global extension of Iran’s security state—trained, titled, and deployed to safeguard the Islamic Republic, not represent it.
