Mofid Hosseini Kouhsari, deputy for international affairs of Iran’s seminaries, has called on Iranian pilgrims traveling to Iraq for the upcoming Arbaeen pilgrimage to refrain from criticizing forces aligned with Tehran, including the Iran-backed Hashd al-Shaabi militia.
“Hashd al-Shaabi ensures the security of Arbaeen,” Kouhsari said. “We should not say anything that undermines the importance of our allies or the resistance forces. This is a shared position we must uphold.”
He cautioned against openly voicing political opinions about Iraqi factions, warning that doing so could trigger internal tensions. “There is no reason for our pilgrims to speak freely and recklessly about Iraq’s political currents. God forbid it leads to discord,” he added.
Since the 2003 US invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein, numerous militias have emerged in Iraq, many with ties to Iran. Following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023 and the recent Israel-Iran escalation, including US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, the pro-Iran factions have periodically targeted US bases in Iraq.
Groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella group of mostly Shia armed groups originally formed to fight the Islamic State and then integrated into Iraq's security forces, have been among those involved.
A focal point of US-Iraqi tensions lies in the future of the PMF. Though nominally under Iraqi military command since 2016, many PMF units maintain strong ties to Iran and operate with broad autonomy.
In a video published by the IRGC’s political affairs office, Brigadier General Yadollah Javani, the deputy for political affairs at Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), addressed recent public criticism about the limited support shown by Beijing and Moscow during the conflict, which saw multiple Israeli and US strikes against Iranian military and nuclear sites.
“Some people in society asked during the war why China and Russia, with whom we have 25-year and 20-year cooperation agreements, did not assist us,” Javani said. “The answer is that the nature of these agreements does not include mutual defense or obligations for either country to enter a war on the other’s behalf.”
Javani emphasized that Iran did not seek outside military support during the conflict. “The Islamic Republic did not request help from any country—not even from members of the Axis of Resistance,” he said, referring to Tehran-backed militia forces across the region.
Responding to suggestions that the long-term agreements with Beijing and Moscow implied mutual military backing, Javani said: “These are cooperation agreements that involve military collaboration, arms sales, and other areas. But unlike formal security pacts, they do not obligate the parties to come to each other’s defense in times of war.”
He offered an analogy: “For example, we have a military cooperation agreement with Moscow, but when Russia entered into a war with Ukraine, we were not obligated to support them, and likewise, they are not obligated to join us in any conflict.”
The comments come amid debate within Iranian media and political circles over what some perceive as tepid responses from Iran’s strategic partners.
During the conflict, Russia condemned USairstrikes on Iranian targets as “unjustifiable” and “aggressive,” while China called for restraint and dialogue. Both stopped short of offering any material or military assistance.
Iranian state media and officials have described the conflict, which lasted nearly two weeks, as a significant test of Iran’s defensive capabilities as well as its diplomatic alliances.
The Jomhouri-e Eslami daily recently criticized the Kremlin over the long-promised but undelivered S-400 air defense systems.
The same editorial questioned whether China would take concrete steps to address Iran’s defense vulnerabilities—or whether the 20-year strategic cooperation agreement would remain, in their words, “just a piece of paper.”
Despite this, Javani defended Russia’s role during the war. “President Vladimir Putin made notable diplomatic and political efforts in support of the Islamic Republic in international forums,” he said. “These are the types of actions we expect on the political level, and he delivered.”
“The Islamic Republic… is in a serious pickle,” The Economist wrote in its Friday report.
Flooding the Persian Gulf with fruit and veg is one of its ways to pay for foreign goods it so desperately needs, added the outlet, saying “Iran now supplies nine out of ten cauliflowers, tomatoes and watermelons imported by the UAE.”
The trade relies on large state subsidies that make water, fertilizers and energy almost free.
Iran’s greenhouse cultivation has more than tripled in area since the early 2010s, supported by imported technology from countries including China and the Netherlands. Much of the equipment, The Economist wrote, originates from Israel—“a leader in the field”—though routed indirectly.
But this export boom is exacerbating water scarcity across Iran. With agriculture consuming over 90% of available water, and government support concentrated on export-focused farms, residents in cities like Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and many others endure hours-long daily shutoffs. Officials have warned of a collapse of groundwater resources and irreversible environmental damage.
Across Iran, families are enduring days without running water. Many are stockpiling bottles, installing rooftop storage tanks, or relying on tanker deliveries—some of which provide unsafe supplies.
Satellite images obtained by Iran International show that Tehran’s main reservoirs—Amir Kabir, Lar, and Latyan—are at historic lows, holding less than 10% of their usable volume.
At the same time, the capital is physically sinking. Excessive extraction from depleted groundwater resources has caused sections of Tehran to subside by more than 25 centimeters per year.
Iran's produce in Sharjah port
The report by the Economist details how Iran’s produce reaches the UAE’s Sharjah port via small ships from Bandar Lengeh, south of the country.
From there, trailers carry shipments to Dubai’s Al Aweer market, the region’s largest wholesale food hub, where wholesalers blend Iranian goods with other imports or repackage them entirely.
Labels are swapped to hide origin—“We just put a sticker on the carton with a new origin: Azerbaijan, Turkey—anything but Iran,” one trader said.
The export trade operates through a parallel financial system. Formal banking channels are avoided due to US sanctions, so traders use the informal system to settle payments.
UAE-based middlemen collect dirhams from food buyers and channel them to Iranian exporters—often in exchange for vital machinery and appliances Tehran cannot otherwise import.
The Economist estimated the value of this clandestine export trade at $4bn to $5bn in 2024 alone.
Iran’s fruits often reach Persian Gulf supermarkets disguised and mispriced. Wholesalers inflate margins by mixing cheap Iranian tomatoes with Dutch imports and reselling the lot as premium goods.
“Instead of 4–5 dirhams, they sell the lot for 20–25 dirhams per kg,” said one insider. Some retail chains fly their staff business class and house them in luxury hotels—funded by “blended” produce profits, according to The Economist.
Despite occasional anti-dumping probes, Persian Gulf states appear to tolerate the flow. The report suggests some governments may see cheap Iranian food as a way to control inflation—or even preserve their own scarce groundwater by outsourcing farming to Iran.
But as water crisis deepens across Iran and key basins dry beyond recovery, Tehran’s strategy of exporting fruit may prove unsustainable. “However tempting,” The Economist warned, “bingeing on Iranian produce looks like a recipe for trouble.”
