Iran International
Iran’s new security chief Ali Larijani has appointed a longtime rival as his deputy at the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), in a sign of potential shifting power dynamics at the apex of power at a delicate moment.
Rasekhoon, a youth-focused online outlet promoting Islamic values, seethed about the trend in a column last week as an inversion of the hijab's purported main purpose: modesty.
"(The bloggers) appear to observe the basic requirements of Islamic hijab, yet simultaneously seek attention and align themselves with global beauty standards," read an editorial on the outlet.
"They do so with bright colors, modern cuts, heavy makeup and a wide array of accessories.”
The publication argued that this emphasis on attractiveness erodes the spiritual purpose of the hijab and encourages visibility over modesty.
Internet-friendly modeling, it added, undermines the spiritual purpose of the hijab with its emphasis on attractiveness and drawing attention and visibility.
“Hijab-style influencers are the front-line soldiers of the cultural war, pushing religious and spiritual practices toward decadence,” Razieh Jabbari, a hijab activist, told the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim News Agency last week.
“Behind these individuals stand think tanks seeking to alter religious lifestyles and appearances, trivialize our cultural and spiritual values, and promote a version of ‘American-approved Islam’,” she said.
Historically, the Islamic Republic has promoted the chador—a long black veil covering the entire body—as the ideal dress code for women.
Not popular
While officials often claim widespread support for Islamic veiling, only a minority, perhaps around 15 percent, wear the chador consistently.
According to a 2022 survey by independent research group GAMAAN, over 70 percent of men and women opposed mandatory hijab laws.
“The professionalized style promoted by hijab bloggers has even managed to influence the tastes of part of the population who is religious and believes in hijab, encouraging them to replace the traditional chador with long, modest manteaus,” the Jam-e Jam newspaper wrote.
This year, during the Arbaeen Walk to the shrines of Shia Imams in Iraq, hijab-style bloggers produced a flood of content. According to critics, “Their aim is to reduce grand ceremonies from a ‘spiritual and revolutionary event’ to a mere ‘spectacle—shallow and superficial,” Jabbari told Tasnim.
In Iran, the hijab functions not only as a religious observance but also as a political symbol tied to the state’s identity. Since 1979, the legally required hijab has been presented as a marker of revolutionary authenticity and resistance to Western influence.
For hardliners, enforcing the hijab validates the Islamic system, while opposition is framed as a challenge to state authority.
Women’s clothing has thus become a recurring political battleground, where debates over morality, freedom and national sovereignty converge.
Since the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, Iranian women have persistently defied the state's compulsory hijab laws, transforming personal acts of resistance into a powerful political statements.
In Tehran and other urban centers, going unveiled has become more common, although most women still carry scarves for public offices, banks or transport to avoid confrontation. Few dress entirely as they wish; most compromise with long sleeves and modest skirts while avoiding sleeveless tops, shorts or short skirts.
In May, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council shelved a new hardline bill mandating stricter hijab rules, likely to avoid a public backlash.
While enforcement has not disappeared, but reports of women facing harassment, including fines and impounding of their vehicles, are not as common as before.
The August 31 appointment of Ali Bagheri Kani carries implications for factional rivalries, the role of Iran’s powerful clerical families and the looming question of succession to supreme leader Ali Khamenei.
Some observers, including former parliament security committee chair Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, see the decision as an effort to placate hardliners—a view echoed by the conservative outlet Nameh News.
Others, such as commentators on Khabar Online, a platform close to Larijani, argue it reflects a coordinated bid by influential clerical clans to consolidate power.
Both outlets avoided linking the maneuver to 86-year-old Khamenei’s eventual exit, though many analysts consider succession the unavoidable backdrop.
‘A silent figure’
Bagheri Kani is best remembered as deputy to ultraconservative Saeed Jalili at the SNSC in the late 2000s, when the pair became known for their hardline stance in nuclear talks.
US negotiator William Burns, in his book The Back Channel: American Diplomacy in a Disordered World, described Jalili as a battle-scarred ideologue who had “learned the hard way in the trenches (of the Iran-Iraq war) that Iran could trust no one.”
Bagheri, Burns recalled, was “a silent figure” — a presence, but not yet a voice. The duo took over nuclear talks after Larijani stepped down following disputes with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration.
Now Larijani, Bagheri and Jalili must work together again, as Jalili also sits on the SNSC as Khamenei’s representative.
Tensions are already evident: last week, hardliners in the Majles pressed Larijani to explain why he ignored legislation demanding Iran’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Revolutionary or not?
Bagheri himself has shown signs of shifting.
In 2024, the hardline daily Sobh-e Now noted that he had grown critical of those “disguised as defenders of revolutionary values” who cast negotiations as betrayal.
Etemad Daily highlighted the contrast with Jalili, citing Khamenei’s rebuke of Jalili for holding unauthorized bilateral talks with Burns.
Bagheri, by contrast, said he would never conduct technical negotiations with US experts but still defended diplomacy as a vital tool: “Those who attack negotiations as counter-revolutionary behavior wish to rob the Islamic Republic of negotiations as an effective tool. Politics is the arena of beliefs, rationality and intelligence.”
Criticism from the hardline Paydari Party's deputies has reinforced the perception that Bagheri has moved away from his earlier ultraconservative line.
His remarks on Europe also suggested pragmatism: “The potentials of the East do not mean we should ignore other potentials. Europe has never been on our blacklist. We will welcome their cooperation as much as they wish to play a role in Iran’s development.”
Establishment and succession
The appointment also underscores the weight of Iran’s clerical dynasties.
Bagheri is part of the powerful Kani clan, son of former Expediency Council member Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani, with a brother married into Khamenei’s family.
Larijani, meanwhile, belongs to another dynasty: the sons of the late Ayatollah Mirza Hashem Larijani, with brothers tied by marriage to Grand Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani and Ayatollah Morteza Motahari.
These families, wealthy and deeply embedded in clerical life, form a dominant bloc within the Islamic Republic.
Against this backdrop, Larijani’s choice to elevate Bagheri looks less like conciliation and more like strategic positioning in a system bracing for transition.
With succession looming and clerical clans maneuvering for influence, even a deputy appointment at the SNSC reverberates beyond the bureaucracy—into the struggle over who will shape the post-Khamenei order.
