At Least 10 Porters Killed or Wounded at Iran-Iraq Border in June
A group of Iranian cross-border porters, known as Kolbars
At least 10 Iranian Kurdish Kolbars, or cross-border porters, were killed or injured on the Iraqi border in June, with 90% of the incidents resulting from direct fire by Iranian border guards.
Three Kolbars were killed and seven were injured as reported by the Hengaw Human Rights Organization on Sunday, with two of the deaths caused by direct fire from border patrol forces.
The majority of the incidents, 8 out of the 10 cases, were reported along the borders of Iran’s Kordestan Province.
Kolbars often carry smuggled goods on their backs across Iran’s borders, journeying long distances through mountainous regions into Iraq as an attempt to escape the dire conditions they live in. They carry household appliances and similar merchandise restricted by Iran's stringent import processes.
According to Kolbar News, from March 2023 to March 2024, 444 Kolbars were killed or injured along the border areas and interprovincial routes between West Azarbaijan, Kordestan, and Kermanshah provinces. Such incidents were caused by various factors, including direct shootings by military forces, avalanches, frostbite, stepping on mines, and falls from mountains and heights.
Direct shootings by military forces accounted for 373 of the 444 casualties. Often, Kolbars are involved in smuggling goods such as illegal fuel in some of Iran's poorest provinces, and many of them are under the age of 18.
The Iranian government's treatment of the laborers underscores the realities faced by those struggling to survive in one of the country's most marginalized communities.
Politicians close to Iran's 'reformists' have begun warning voters about hardliner presidential candidate Saeed Jalili, as they argue that his ideological rigidity will hurt the country.
Hamid Abutalebi, former advisor to ‘reformist’ Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani took to X to warn against Jalili labeling him as a ‘fanatical extremist’ who he has known for “more than 3 decades.” whose policies would increase chances of conflict with the West and intensified sanctions.
Reformists including Abutalebi insist that Jalili is a danger to the country with his hardline foreign policy and ideology.
"Trump has pledged to bring back the sanctions in a paralyzing form if he wins," Abutalebi stated, "Jalili has also said in the debates that if he wins, he wants to make the West regret the sanctions. Therefore, if Mr. Jalili and his faction are elected, not only will there be no negotiation to solve the people's problems,” Abutalebi warned.
Although Abutalebi says that he didn’t vote in the elections, he stated that he believes presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian’s commitment to his “reformist policies will not bring the country to the valley of destruction.”
A large majority of voters who boycotted the first round of the election on June 28, were not swayed by the mutual smearing campaigns of the reformists and hardliners.
Iran’s crude oil and gas condensate exports surged to 1.7 million barrels per day (mb/d) in May, hitting a 5-year high point, since the imposition of full US sanctions in May 2019.
The country’s oil and gas condensate exports reached 1.65 mb/d in the first five months of 2024, according to oil analytics firm Vortexa, as the Middle East experienced its worst violence in decades, triggered by the October 7 attack on Israel.
Iran’s custom statistics also indicate increasing oil revenues by 34.8% year-on-year to $12 billion during the first three months of current Iranian fiscal year, started March 21.
According to the data intelligence firm, Kpler, Iran exported 1.194 mb/d of crude oil and gas condensate in spring 2023. Therefore, the country’s oil export increased 30% in the second quarter of 2024, while oil prices in international markets also rose about 7% during the mentioned period.
Iran had also about 240,000 barrels per day of mazut exports, remained almost unchanged year-on-year.
Vortexa says that an increase in Iran’s crude production, higher demand from China and a net increase in the size of Islamic Republic’s dark fleet have helped facilitate its oil export growth.
The United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has identified 383 vessels suspected to be part of a clandestine “ghost fleet.” So-called ghost ships are vessels that disguise their ownership and movements in order to facilitate breaches of sanctions.
Considering Iran's export volumes of oil, gas condensate, and mazut, along with higher prices in the international oil markets, the country’s revenues should have exceeded $14.5 billion in spring 2024. However, it only garnered $12 billion.
The 20% shortfall indicates Iran’s lower selling price to secure buyers who take a risk in the face of US sanctions. Chinese refineries are the main buyers of Iran’s illicit oil shipments that middlemen mix with cargos from other countries and unload in China as imports from Singapore and other sources.
Devaluation crisis
Despite 18.6% growth in oil and non-oil export revenues and only 1.4% increase in imports, Iran’s national currency, rial, has remained near its all-time lows after a 15-fold depreciation since 2018. The rial has been trading around 600,000 per US dollar for weeks, while in early 2018 it stood at around 40,000 to the dollar.
The ongoing presidential race had hurt the rial more. The prospect of Saeed Jalili, an ultra-hardliner winning the race in Iran's July 5 runoff, pushed Iranian currency down to around 620,000 per dollar since the result the first round of voting on June 28.
The snap election was called after former President Ebrahim Raisi and his entourage died in a mysterious helicopter crash in May.
During Raisi’s 3- year presidency, the rial has lost about 65% of its value despite ever-increasing oil exports. Inflation rose to almost 50% as prices of essential commodities such as food increased at even a faster pace. With every drop in the value of rial imports become more expensive and fuel higher inflation, and public dissatisfaction.
Already, market watchers in Iran complain of foreign currency shortages for importers of consumer and industrial goods. It is unclear why with more oil exports the country suffers from a lack of hard currencies. One explanation is that China does not necessarily pay cash for the oil and offers barter to Iran.
Iran’s elections are not 'free and fair,' the US State Department told Iran International on Sunday, in its first comments on the results of Friday's votes that led to a runoff between a moderate and a hardline candidate.
The June 28 presidential election marked the lowest voter turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic, with only 39.92 percent participation. This breaks the previous record set during the last election, in which the late President Ebrahim Raisi won with a turnout of 48 percent.
"The elections in Iran are not free and fair," a State Department spokesperson said.
"Unfortunately, we have no expectation that these elections, whatever the outcome, will lead to fundamental change in Iran’s direction or more respect by the Iranian regime for the human rights of Iran’s citizens," the spokesperson added, as the Iranian government prepares for a runoff presidential election slated for July 5.
Biden administration's Acting Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley said two days before the Iranian elections that and candidates are handpicked by the Guardian Council, and voters lack access to the “most basic freedoms; necessary features of any democracy."
"In the face of the authoritarian regime’s long history of harassing and intimidating journalists, suppressing election coverage, and denying freedom of peaceful of assembly, we support the Iranian people," he said on his X account.
Iranian candidates are vetted before they can stand for election. The 12-member Guardian Council, whose members are appointed or recommended by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, disqualifies anyone deemed insufficiently loyal to the system.
The vetting process leaves voters with no real choice. Many Iranians seem indifferent to the vetting process itself, having lost faith in the system’s willingness or ability to change through elections.
Activists and officials have highlighted that the low turnout in Iran's June 28 votes is a clear sign of the public's discontent with the ruling autocracy, demonstrated through the widespread boycott of the election.
In 2021, voter turnout was 48 percent, the lowest for any presidential election in Iran's history. This year, turnout has dropped further to less than 40 percent, marking an unprecedented trend since the Islamic Republic's establishment in 1979. Additionally, the 2021 election saw the highest percentage of void and blank votes ever recorded, accounting for 13 percent of all ballots cast.
The record-low voter turnout is a significant blow to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who had repeatedly called for a high turnout in the election.
“We place great importance on high participation because the most significant effect of high participation is the honor of the Islamic Republic,” Khamenei stated in a speech on Tuesday, calling high voter turnout "crucial" for the Islamic Republic's survival.
While the official voter turnout of 39.92% announced by Iran's Interior Ministry is already a stark indicator of voter apathy among the population, many Iranians are now expressing suspicions that the Islamic Republic might be inflating these already low turnout figures.
A recent analysis by United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) said that a covert arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has been rigging elections and manipulating Iran's political landscape through a clandestine network of cultural and political operations.
Known as the Baqiatallah Headquarters, this apparatus works closely with the Intelligence Ministry to strategically influence the current snap election to replace former President Ebrahim Raisi, the NGO reports.
Members of Iran's Reform Front attempt to portray Masoud Pezeshkian as a moderate presidential candidate compared to his rival Saeed Jalili. But does he genuinely embody moderation as a regime insider?
Hardliners such as Jalili more openly prioritize Islamic Republic values above all else, while Pezeshkian's supporters are trying to morph him into the already existent duality of reformists vs fundamentalists in the system.
This may be an effort to fabricate a sense of competition and address historically low voter turnout, in successive elections since 2020.
However, so far it has failed, as Friday's first round of the presidential election saw a turnout of under 40%, the lowest since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Nevertheless, their efforts persist ahead of the upcoming runoff on Friday: to instill fear of the competitor, Saeed Jalili, portraying him as the very monster people dread, thereby rallying voters to flock to the polling stations supporting Pezeshkian.
On Saturday, Pezeshkian emphasized, "We must secure ourselves and avert disaster. Let us awaken to the realization that what could transpire is no laughing matter; untrustworthy, inexperienced, and potentially dangerous individuals could transform Iran into a colossal laboratory of bizarre ideas."
Following protests in Iran since 2017, which significantly intensified in 2022 with the "Woman Life Freedom" movement, the popular mood has become clear. Many feel the current establishment falls short of meeting their needs, prompting calls for a new political system.
Against this backdrop, three key political arenas loom large: human rights, particularly women's freedom; the unchecked power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); and the economy, deeply entwined with tensions involving the West and Israel.
'Reformists' are endeavoring to portray Pezeshkian as a champion of women's rights, critical of the system's oppression of women, and advocating the lifting of sanctions and fostering better international relations, including a shift in foreign policy. Ultimately, they aim to depict him as a politician opposed to the IRGC rather than a supporter.
A retrospective examination of Pezeshkian’s parliamentary career, which started in 2008 and continues to this day, starkly contrasts with the reformist faction's portrayal, particularly regarding his positions in these critical arenas.
Let's juxtapose the image projected by the reformists who endorse Pezeshkian by examining his historical record and political stance on the ground.
Masoud Pezeshkian
Stance on women's rights:
In May 2010, Pezeshkian was among those lawmakers who supported a bill in Parliament promoting the Islamic principle of publicly shaming women who defy the mandatory hijab. Vigilantes sometimes use this principle to confront others, occasionally resorting to violence in the name of religious duty.
During the 2022 Women's Life Freedom event, Pezeshkian remarked, "This situation only benefits the hypocrites and enemies of the Iranian people, who seek to sow turmoil and unrest and widen the gap between the people and the government."
He also denounced the protests as orchestrated acts of aggression, attributing Iran's most significant uprising since the inception of the Islamic Republic to the influence of the US and Europe.
At the same time, security forces' crackdown on protesters, which led to the deaths of at least 550 protesters, was denounced as a crime against humanity by a UN fact-finding mission.
The bill allowed citizens to be sentenced to financial fines, imprisonment, and exile, which underpins the current violent clashes involving women on the streets of the Islamic Republic.
Despite benefiting from the reformists' current support, Pezeshkian echoes their narrative only partially and consistently references Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's principles as the basis of his plans. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is the leading proponent advancing this constructed reformist narrative. Zarif, who once claimed to have 'zero' power during his tenure, now claims that the presidential administration can have a major role in shaping people's lives.
On Saturday, during a presidential campaign event endorsing Pezeshkian, Zarif remarked, “They [the conservatives] are the architects behind all the oppressive laws, internet restrictions, the Nour Plan, etc."
The Nour Plan is an initiative introduced in Iran in April, focusing on enforcing strict hijab regulations for women; it came into effect following a directive by Supreme Leader Khamenei. This policy has resulted in the violent arrest of hundreds of women across various cities in Iran and has been referred to as "gender apartheid" by the United Nations.
Masoud Pezeshkian in IRGC uniform at parliament
Stance on IRGC:
In 2019, when then-US President Donald Trump designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization, Pezeshkian and his parliamentary peers pushed Iran to escalate tensions with the US. They introduced legislation that became law under the title "Strengthening the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against the United States."
This, in turn, consolidated more power for the IRGC in political and economic spheres, tightening its grip on the Iranian government and other institutions within the Islamic Republic. This also intensified repression, escalated violence against citizens, and heightened insecurity and conflicts with neighboring countries.
Pezeshkian also wore the Revolutionary Guard uniform alongside fellow parliamentarians in solidarity with the IRGC one day after Trump's decision.
During a university lecture in December 2022, he responded to a student criticizing his choice to wear the IRGC uniform, stating, "Without the IRGC, this country would have been divided, and our work would have ended."
Also, even during the current presidential election debates, he openly expressed unconditional and uncritical support for the IRGC, describing their missiles and drones as "a source of pride."
This sharply contrasts with how reformists, led by Zarif, try to portray themselves as opponents of the IRGC.
Zarif had accused IRGC Quds Force commander Soleimani of meddling in diplomatic efforts, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015. He also labeled two prominent IRGC figures as "corrupt and liars."
In an audio file released by Iran Wire on the 2024 parliamentary election, Zarif discussed the ongoing rivalry between reformists and IRGC-affiliated individuals, specifically mentioning figures like Hossein Taeb, former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and Mohammad Ali Jafari, former IRGC commander-in-chief.
Stance on foreign policy:
The third area underpinning many of Iran's current economic and international crises is the ongoing tensions between the Islamic Republic and the West and particularly their ally Israel.
In December 2008, during his tenure in parliament, Pezeshkian and 39 other members proposed a bill, turned into law, titled "Obliging the government to provide all-round support to Palestine," which called for significant Iranian intervention in Gaza.
This plan demanded the Iranian government reassess its political and economic relations with countries supporting Israel, effectively promoting confrontation with a large group of powerful nations. It also sought to prevent Israeli goods from entering Iran and prohibited contracts with companies whose principal shareholders were Israeli entities.
Implementing this plan intensified Iran's political confrontation with Western countries, leading to significant economic costs due to disrupted trade.
Now, as they campaign for the presidency, Pezeshkian and his team steer clear of this anti-Western history. They promote de-escalation and global peace to attract support from many Iranians who despise the government's confrontational foreign policy. In recent economic and political debates, Pezeshkian has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of having good relations with other countries, stating that "we must have relations with the world" and advocating for stronger ties with all nations except Israel.
Eight detainees from Iran's 2022 nationwide uprising following Mahsa Amini's death in police custody were tried in a Revolutionary Court on Sunday, with some facing charges punishable by death.
The individuals—Nasim Gholami Simiyari, Hamidreza Sahlabadi, Amin Sokhanvar, Ali Harati Mokhtari, Hossein Mohammad Hosseini, Amir Shah-Velayati, Ehsan Ravazjian, and Hossein Ardestani—were tried by Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.
Among them, Gholami Simiyari and Sahlabadi faced charges of "armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic," which can lead to harsh sentences including the death penalty.
During the court session, Gholami Simiyari denied all charges, stating that her confessions were coerced through pressure and torture by security officers, and prolonged solitary confinement.
Sources close to the families of the protesters revealed that the six other defendants face various charges, including "membership in a rebel group, assembly and collusion to commit crimes against national security, propaganda against the Islamic Republic, disturbing public order, security, and public peace."
At the end of the court session, the judge informed the defendants and their lawyers that the trial had concluded, and a verdict would be issued soon.
Four individuals—Harati Mokhtari, Mohammad Hosseini, Shah-Velayati, and Ardestani—have been released on bail. However, Gholami Simiyari, Sahlabadi, Sokhanvar, and Ravazjian remain detained in Evin Prison for over a year after their arrest.
The Islamic Republic has repeatedly coerced detainees into testifying against themselves by recording and broadcasting forced confessions. Three other individuals—Shahin Zahmatkesh, Siamak Taddayon, and Siamak Golshani—also face charges but remain at large.
At least eight people were hanged over trumped-up charges related to the nationwide protests of 2022, with several more protesters currently on death row.