An Iranian company affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has employed Afghan fighters from the Fatemiyoun group and other former Afghan military personnel.
In a thinly veiled reference to Iran’s engagement with the international community – and specifically the United States – Khamenei said Iran should not pin its hopes on such engagement, but that is no reason not to hold talks with the enemy.
This is the kind of green light that Pezeshkian needs to engage again with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western countries on Iran’s nuclear program, and to engage with international interlocutors over its heightened tensions with Israel.
This statement seems to signal a desire to walk back from the brink of an all-out war with Israel over the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July and revert back to the mutual deterrence that had defined their relationship for years.
This, however, may not be an option given how much the region has changed over the past year.
In April of this year, Israel targeted Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus, killing members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
This led to a carefully choreographed Iranian response. Iran could not ignore the Israeli attack, which the authorities condemned as an assault on Iranian sovereign territory, but did not wish to go into war with Israel. As a result, Iran reportedly gave advance warning of its impending response, which allowed Israel and its allies to shoot down most of the 300-odd missiles and drone fired from Iran.
This response was nonetheless seen as a victory in Iran, as it demonstrated its technological capacity to reach Israel. It also marked a departure from Iran’s default position of talking tough, but not getting involved in direct confrontation.
Iran clearly crossed a threshold in April, but seems very uneasy about the consequences.
Then, on July 31, Haniyeh was assassinated while on a visit to Iran. Although Israel has neither confirmed or denied responsibility, it is widely believed to have been behind it.
This has put the Iranian leadership in a bind. There have been calls from hardliners for retaliation to restore Iran’s image as a country that can defend itself and avenge the killing of a close ally. Khamenei has also insisted Israel will be punished for its action, but the time would be of Iran’s choosing.
It is clear the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak and risk damaging their standing among their allies and proxies in the region, which include Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Shi'a militant groups in Iraq and Syria. But there are also other considerations that weigh heavily on their mind.
A direct response to Israel could open a Pandora’s box. It would pave the way for further direct attacks by Israel, perhaps even targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.
This is a real possibility. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to respond to any threat with force under the rubric of self-defense. It has also demonstrated its ability to carry out precision attacks in Iran, such as its retaliatory strike on a radar system in the city of Isfahan after Iran’s missile and drone attack in April.
Furthermore, such escalation presents the real risk of drawing the United States into the conflict.
The Iranian leadership has made an art of brinksmanship. Anti-Americanism is ingrained in the political discourse of the political elite and frames Iranian foreign policy. But Iran has so far avoided war with the United States, because that could risk everything.
The reason: Iran’s leaders are already nervous about their political future, and conflict with Israel and the US could seriously exacerbate the situation.
There is a major disconnect between large segments of society and the ruling regime at the moment. Two years ago, Iran was rocked by spontaneous anti-regime mass protests under the banner of “Woman, Life, Freedom”. They started in response to the death of Mahsa Amini in custody for not wearing her hijab properly, but soon morphed into an anti-establishment revolt that called for the “fall of dictatorship” and an end to the Islamic regime. The revolt was put down by force, arbitrary detentions and executions.
The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May this year offered an opportunity for the ruling regime to seek a reconciliation with its reformist critics. Pezeshkian, a reformist parliamentarian, was vetted and approved to run in the election to replace Raisi with the intention of increasing voter turnout. Iran’s supreme leader has repeatedly pointed to the voter turnout rate as an indicator of the regime’s legitimacy.
Yet, the participation rate in the first round of the election was just 39.9% – the lowest in a presidential election in Iran’s history – and only reached 49.8% in the final round. This points to the depth of public disillusionment with the political system. Many reformists boycotted the election and dismissed the exercise as a sham and smokescreen for the ruling regime.
Iran’s crisis of legitimacy is at its highest point, making it ripe for another explosion. War with Israel or the United States can ignite this tinder box.
So the Iranian leadership faces a dilemma. It cannot walk back from its anti-Israel and anti-US rhetoric. Tehran has built its foreign policy and formed an extensive network, the so-called Axis of Resistance, based on it. It cannot betray this pillar of its identity.
But acting on it would risk the survival of the regime. So the leadership has been looking for an increasingly difficult-to-find balance.
Hezbollah’s recent exchange of fire with Israel may have been the answer. By supporting Hezbollah, Iran can claim to have inflicted pain on Israel without striking itself.
This is aimed at restoring the status quo that existed before April. This strategy outsources the fighting to Hezbollah and Iran’s other proxies to protect the ruling regime from a direct confrontation and ward off an existential threat to the leaders’ rule.
But this may be wishful thinking. This strategy could give Israel the justification it needs to strike Iranian targets again. And this, in turn, could serve as the spark for the public’s pent-up frustration aimed at the brutality of the ruling regime.
Unlike Cuba where classic cars are almost exclusively American-made imports before the country’s 1959 Revolution, there are around 7,000 classic American, British, and other cars in Iran most of which date back to the 1960s and as late as the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
To the enthusiasts, these cars and vintage imported home appliances such as fridges evoke nostalgic memories of the 1970s oil boom and huge imports of luxury items.
While Western exporters and manufacturers rushed to get a market share in the 1970s Iran with a booming economy and open-door economy, things drastically changed in 1979 when a coalition of Islamist clerics and anti-West leftists took over the country.
Many classic and vintage cars have been meticulously restored and are often displayed in various cities at special events organized by enthusiasts’ clubs. Almost none, however, are in active use because of a 2007 pollution ban and fuel restrictions resulting from fuel rationing.
Owners of a few hundred of these cars have managed to obtain “historical” plate numbers that allow them to drive them at special events or to sell them on but many can neither be used nor sold.
The Islamic Republic also has a Classic Car Museum where the luxury and several truly one-of-a-kind cars belonging to the former royal family are on display. These include a gilded Pierce Arrow A built for the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah, and a gilded Chrysler K-300 made for his son Mohammad-Reza Shah.
In the 1970s, the streets of major Iranian cities were lined with Cadillacs, Chevrolets, Mercedes, Jaguars, Alfa Romeos, and other luxury cars, while ordinary citizens drove their affordable, locally assembled Paykans (Hillman Hunters), purchased on credit with small monthly payments.
Many luxury foreign cars pre-dating the Islamic Revolution were shipped to the country during the oil boom of the 1970s by students studying abroad and government officials. These people were allowed to ship a car home tax-free when they returned home, for personal use or to sell at a good profit. In the late 1970s, those who traveled to Europe could also buy a car and drive back to avoid full import taxes.
In May 2022, Iran's Motorcycle and Automobile Federation became the 30th country to register its vintage cars with the Federation International des Vehicules Anciens (FIVA), a partner of UNESCO with consultative status, making it possible for the owners to use the federation’s international identification facilities for global registration of vintage cars in Iran.
But when it came to American cars, besides imports, several models of Cadillacs, Buicks, and Chevrolets were assembled in Iran by Iranian manufacturers in the 70s.
Buick Sky Lark sedan, for instance, was assembled by General Motors Iran (now Pars Khodro) between 1975 and 1979. The same company also rolled out its first Chevrolet Nova in 1976.
It was nearly two decades and a revolution later that Japanese, German, Korean, and French companies began producing Nissan, Mazda, Mercedes Benz, Kia, Hyundai, Peugeot, and Renault in Iran.
The UN sanctions imposed on Iran since 2005 brought these to a standstill. Despite the lifting of these sanctions in 2016, European and East Asian manufacturers have avoided investment in Iran and only Chinese car manufacturers have been active in the country.
The Fatemiyoun Brigade, operating under the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, is composed of Afghan immigrants living in Iran and has been actively involved in the Syrian conflict in recent years. Iran's recruitment tactics have faced criticism, with observers and human rights activists condemning the exploitation of Afghan refugees to draw them into regional conflicts, including the ongoing war in Syria.
According to a report by the Haalvash, a human rights organization that focuses on Sistan-Baluchestan province, the Arshin Kooh company, under the control of the IRGC Aerospace Organization, is engaged in producing precast concrete walls and constructing roads in the Beris area of Chabahar, a strategic port on the Sea of Oman.
“The company has hired Afghan militants, including those from the Fatemiyoun militia, to work on these projects,” wrote Haalvash.
The report reveals that after the exposure of these practices, senior IRGC officials ordered the transfer of many of these Afghan workers from Chabahar to Negur, a nearby region.
The Afghan forces' supervisor, identified as Hekmat, a member of the Fatemiyoun group, has reportedly signed a lucrative monthly contract worth 10 billion rials (over 16,000$) with Arshin Kooh for the maintenance and repair of machinery, employing at least 20 workers under his command.
In addition to the machinery contract, Hekmat is said to oversee at least 50 workers in the concrete wall section, earning 600 million rials (1,000$) per day.
This figure contrasts with the meager wages paid to local Baluch workers, who face discrimination in both hiring and pay. According to the report, Baluch truck drivers earn just 240 million rials ($400) for 24 days of work, while non-local drivers receive 360 million rials ($600) for the same period.
According to this report, in addition to Afghan Shiites who have been directly or indirectly recruited into the Fatemiyoun group or its subsidiaries, Afghan Sunni military migrants have also been employed by the Basij militia after receiving special identification cards.
The IRGC's recruitment of Afghan Fatemiyoun militants comes at a time when the Islamic Republic has declared the presence of Afghan migrants in Sistan-Baluchestan province illegal, routinely arresting and deporting dozens of Afghan migrants from the region daily.
The use of Afghan fighters is part of the Iranian government's broader strategy to entrench its proxy militias within Iran's economic and educational sectors. This policy is not limited to Afghan militants; Tehran has also increased the admission of members Hashd al-Shaabi, another Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq, into Tehran University without requiring entrance exams.
The Hashd al-Shaabi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), was established in 2014 following a religious decree (fatwa) issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to combat ISIS. At the time, ISIS had taken control of four Iraqi governorates and posed a significant threat to Baghdad. The PMF was formed as an umbrella organization for various militia groups, primarily Shia, to support the Iraqi government in its fight against ISIS.
The admissions by the Tehran University, promoted under the guise of academic education, further embed the Islamic Republic's foreign militias into Iranian society while denying local citizens equal opportunities.
The President of the University of Tehran, speaking about the "doubling" of foreign student admissions, particularly Iraqi students, stated that the members of Hashd al-Shaabi include the children of living, deceased, and injured forces of the "resistance front."
Moghimi described the members of Hashd al-Shaabi as deserving individuals due to their efforts to "promote Islamic ideals" and said, "We do not provide military training. At this university, we offer them academic education in the field of management so that they can later play a role in managing their own country."
