Trump's Persian Gulf tour puts Iran on defensive, analyst says

Before traveling to Saudi Arabia on May 12, Trump reaffirmed his opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, while praising Iranian negotiators for being, in his words, very reasonable and very intelligent.

Despite pillorying Tehran at length in a speech in Saudi Arabia the next day, the comments suggested an openness to continued dialogue—even amid mounting pressure from within his own ranks.

Trump’s position reflects a carrot-and-stick strategy: applying sanctions while keeping the door open for a potential deal. Yet, internal divisions are growing.

Middle East envoy and chief negotiator Steven Witkoff told Breitbart last week that no level of uranium enrichment should take place in Iran—opposing the allowances made under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Witkoff’s remarks echo those of hawkish Republicans who reject even limited enrichment under international monitoring. Witkoff once again aligned himself with that position, signaling that any new deal could be more restrictive than the 2015 deal.

In the same interview, however, Witkoff distanced himself from advocates of military action, accusing them of a “bias toward war.” He emphasized that Trump prioritizes diplomacy, arguing that critics underestimate the risks of armed confrontation.

The messaging—hardline on enrichment, moderate on military force—underscores the absence of a unified Republican policy.

Trump himself has sent conflicting signals. In an interview with Hugh Hewitt on 7 May, he reaffirmed his desire to end Iran’s uranium enrichment but also indicated a willingness to hear justification for maintaining some nuclear infrastructure.

Elusive positions

A week—and one more round of talks—later, we are none the wiser about the Trump administration’s red lines.

US vice president J.D. Vance has taken a more flexible position, suggesting a tightly monitored, limited centrifuge program could be acceptable. His stance diverges from that of US secretary of state Marco Rubio and Witkoff’s latest, betraying disagreement at the very top.

In Tehran, the message has been more consistent—in public at least. The right to enrich uranium is non-negotiable, foreign minister Abbas Araghchi posted on X on the eve of the fourth round of talks.

Enrichment, in reality, is what gives supreme leader Ali Khamenei the leverage he has always sought to face his western ‘enemies.’

Khamenei’s strategy, as far as can be surmised from his decisions in the last two decades, is to remain close to the nuclear threshold without crossing it, standing on the brink without falling into the abyss of war.

Despite this impasse, both sides agreed to extend the negotiations, signaling a desire to avoid blame for their collapse. Still, the fundamental disagreement over enrichment remains unresolved.

Witkoff has also called for the talks to address Iran’s regional conduct, particularly its support for armed groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis. He argues any deal should reduce the Islamic Republic’s hostile actions against the US and Israel.

These positions are yet to be formalized, but the rulers in Tehran appear to have used whatever influence they have with the Houthis to calm the Red Sea and ease pressure on Iran’s negotiators.

But the link between nuclear diplomacy and regional security remains tenuous.

Fraught issue

Historically, the US strategy on Iran’s nuclear program has fluctuated. The Bush administration failed to enforce a zero-enrichment model; the Obama administration accepted a 3.67% cap to delay Iran’s breakout capacity. Trump’s second-term ambitions appear to aim higher—but face the same practical limits.

UN nuclear chief Rafael Grossi asserted recently that completely eliminating Iran’s program may no longer be achievable.

Also significant is public opinion in the US. In a recent poll by the University of Maryland, more than two-thirds of respondents said they preferred a negotiated deal to curb Iran’s nuclear activities, with only 14% backing military action.

On this point at least, and for now, President Trump appears to be reflecting the popular will, letting diplomacy run its course while pursuing his maximum pressure campaign of sanctions, hoping to force Iranians to blink first.

Unclear to nearly all watching the talks—and perhaps even to those involved in it—is how far and how long he is willing to go without visible results.

US President Donald Trump’s tour of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar reflects Washington’s recalibrated strategy in the Middle East, prioritizing economic diplomacy over security, according to an analysis by Nour News, a media outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

The absence of Israel from Trump’s itinerary, despite the ongoing war in Gaza, is interpreted as a tactical move to avoid inflaming tensions while quietly pursuing economic deals and regional realignment, read thearticle.

The report suggests Trump aims to defuse regional anger over US support for Israel without publicly confronting America’s traditional ally.

According to Nour News, Trump’s primary goal is to secure large-scale investments from Persian Gulf nations—highlighting pledges of $600 billion from Saudi Arabia and $1.4 trillion over ten years from the UAE—as part of his economic diplomacy. Security and human rights, the outlet said, are lower on the agenda.

Despite Trump's push, the report points to skepticism in US media, including NPR, which described Trump’s ambitions—ending the Gaza war, curbing Iran’s nuclear program, and pushing Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords—as “unlikely” given current regional dynamics.

The analysis also suggests Trump is seeking to rebuild America’s global image, using Persian Gulf partnerships to project stability and contain China’s growing influence in the region.

Iran's insistence on indirect negotiations with the United States remains a weakness given the sensitive circumstances surrounding the nuclear talks, reformist Shargh daily wrote on Tuesday.

The newspaper acknowledged that an agreement could potentially be reached through text exchanges, but argued this approach is disproportionate to the high stakes of the discussions.

Given Iran's insistence on maintaining domestic enrichment, the newspaper expressed concern that the talks might not achieve progress under such conditions.

During a visit to Moscow Iran’s Oil Minister announced that Russia has agreed to export 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iran, claiming that this would turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Mohsen Paknejad said on April 25 that various routes were considered and it was finally agreed that the gas would be delivered via land through the Republic of Azerbaijan, with Russia’s gas handed over to Iran in Astara.

While the Mozdok–Baku pipeline can transfer Russian gas to Azerbaijan, and the Baku–Astara pipeline can transport it to Iran, the combined daily capacity of these pipelines is only about six million cubic meters per day (mcm/d).

By contrast, Iran faces a gas shortfall of approximately 150 mcm/d during warmer months—rising to double that amount in colder seasons.

This means that the proposed Russian gas deliveries to Iran would not even cover a small portion of the country’s gas deficit—let alone turn Iran into a regional gas hub.

Paknejad has described this as the “first phase” of the gas deal, implying that new pipelines will be required to realize the full annual export volume of 55 bcm, which equals around 150 mcm/d.

The key issue here is that Gazprom, Russia’s state-run gas company meant to supply the gashas suffered massive losses of $18 billion over the past two years after losing its European markets following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Gazprom lacks the funds to complete an even more politically desirable “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline to China designed for the same annual capacity of 55 bcm.

Building a new pipeline connected to Russia’s main gas transmission network to deliver gas to Iran would require a stretch of at least 1,000 kilometers, demanding more than $10 billion in investment. If the pipeline were to cross the Caspian Sea, the cost could exceed $20 billion.

Another crucial point is that to become a regional gas hub, Iran must receive large volumes of gas from Russia and sell it to neighboring countries.

But Turkey already receives Russian gas directly via two pipelines, and most of Iran’s other northern and southern neighbors are gas producers or exporters themselves. Iran’s only potential customers would be Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Iraq plans to eliminate its need for gas imports within the next few years. Pakistan, despite a gas deal with Iran signed in 2009, has not built the pipeline due to sanctions.

Under the current contract, Iran would export only 7.5 bcm annually to Pakistan—raising questions about what Iran plans to do with the rest of the gas received from Russia.

Iran suffers from a gas deficit of 150 mcm/d in summer and 300 mcm/d in winter, and it could use Russian gas to meet its domestic needs.

However, 55 bcm of gas is worth around $15 billion, and Iran simply doesn’t have the money to pay for such a massive volume of gas. Even if it did, the government would need to provide enormous subsidies for its domestic use, given that gas prices in Iran’s domestic market are extremely low.

To illustrate, the Iranian government plans to sell 240 bcm of gas to the domestic market this year, earning only about 3,300 trillion rials in revenue—which, at the current exchange rate, amounts to less than $4 billion.

More Hollow Claims of New Oil Deals

Iran’s oil minister also announced that $4 billion in oil contracts have been signed with Russian companies.

Over the past two decades, Russian firms have signed more than a hundred contracts and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Iran, but almost none of the projects have ever gotten off the ground.

Paknejad provided few details, merely stating that “four contracts worth $4 billion have been signed with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields.”

However, three years ago, Mohsen Khojastehmehr, then-CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company, made a similar announcement, saying that “contracts with Russian companies for the development of seven oil fields, worth $4 billion, have entered the operational phase.”

This strongly suggests that the contract Paknejad is referring to had already been signed years earlier—yet no action has been taken by the Russian side, contrary to Khojastehmehr’s assertions.

Back then, Iran and Gazprom had also signed 40 oil and gas memoranda of understanding, none of which led to any contracts or actual projects.

At the time, Iranian oil officials under President Ebrahim Raisi described the MoUs as being worth “$40 billion”, calling them “the largest deal in the history of the country’s oil and gas sector.”

Unlike formal contracts, MoUs do not carry any binding legal obligations, nor do they typically have a defined financial value—they are merely frameworks for studies and future negotiations aimed at signing actual contracts.

A senior Iranian international relations expert has outlined three possible scenarios for the outcome of ongoing diplomatic efforts between Iran and the United States, warning that talks remain clouded by mutual distrust and external interference.

In an op-ed published by Farhikhtegan newspaper, Alireza Mousapour, a professor at Tehran’s Shahid Beheshti University, said the negotiations could end in either failure, a temporary agreement, or an amended version of the 2015 nuclear deal.

The first scenario involves a collapse of talks, which Mousapour said could stem from excessive demands by the US, such as calls for dismantling Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle or pressure from Israel. Such a breakdown, he warned, could significantly increase the risk of military confrontation between Tehran and Washington.

The second scenario, deemed the most likely, envisions a short-term agreement similar to the 2015 framework. This interim deal could lay the groundwork for a broader accord, possibly involving what the writer called a “less for less” approach where Iran seeks reciprocal, verifiable steps from the US

The third scenario involves an amended Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with new provisions attached via a United Nations Security Council resolution. This would preserve the original deal's structure while integrating updated commitments.