Related Articles
Iran has asked Oman to intervene and help persuade the United States to ease its hardline position in the ongoing nuclear negotiations, two diplomatic sources in Tehran told Iran International.
Iran’s foreign ministry recently sent a message to Omani officials, urging them to implore Washington to soften its demands, the sources told Iran International on condition of anonymity.
“Given the dependency of Iran’s financial markets—currency, gold, and stocks—on the outcome of the negotiations, the message emphasized that a diplomatic compromise is possible if the United States moderates its position,” one source said.
On messaging apps like Telegram, channels advertise “Islamic marriage services.”
The language is coded—halal sigheh, “marriage under sharia supervision,” or “regulated Islamic companionship” — but the business model is simple: pick, pay and meet.
Under Iran's Shi'ite Muslim legal code, men are legally permitted to enter into temporary marriages for a fixed period—ranging from minutes to years—without court approval or official registration.
These marriages automatically dissolve when the agreed-upon time expires.
Iran International encountered a functioning industry of religiously sanctioned pimping, one that exploits the legal ambiguity of sigheh to facilitate sex work. Many users are conned. But some are not.
While screenshots were translated from Farsi, no photos—even blurred ones—have been included in this report, as we could not verify whether the women pictured were genuinely behind the profiles used in these exchanges.
Iran International contacted several channels and in half the cases, different women responded from different numbers. One sent audio replies. Another agreed to meet in person—for a cash exchange, if a deposit was paid.
In another case, a woman offered options for a short-term arrangement and said she was working “with the support of a governmental office,” insisting that payment be made to their account first.
To obtain a woman’s contact information alone, clients are typically asked to pay between 3 million to 5 million rials (roughly $3.50 to $6 at current exchange rates). Full service arrangements labeled as “monthly sigheh contracts” range from 70 to 400 million rials ($83 to $476), with rates varying based on location, age or even height.
In one case in Iran International's investigation, a woman arranged to meet at a metro station in west Tehran after initial negotiations, with two rounds of fees—labeled as 'identification' and 'dowry'—required as conditions to be paid after the meeting.
“Bring the balance in cash,” she instructed. “After we talk, if you’re satisfied, we go somewhere.” Her tone was direct and businesslike. The transaction mirrored sex work in every way—except it was presented as a religious contract.
'Virginity guaranteed'
The channels involved do not describe sigheh as a sexual service. Instead, they variously frame it as a “pious alternative to sinful behavior”—“a way to support chaste women,” one wrote.
Listings often include physical traits, education level and place of residence. Some promise “virginity guaranteed.” Longer-term packages come with varying price tags—often higher for women labeled as educated or Tehran-based.
“We only use women who are under the protection of the Islamic Republic. No funny business. Everything is legal under sharia,” wrote another channel.
Behind that language lies a structured operation. Clients are matched. Money is transferred through intermediary accounts—typically under male names.
Some users told Iran International that they had even received handwritten contracts and met women after paying.
Yet scams still exist. Some men are strung along with fake profiles and asked for repeated payments—dowries, insurance fees, “pregnancy contingencies”—only to have contact cut off once the money is sent.
One man in Karaj who spoke on condition of anonymity told Iran International: “I sent money three times. Each time there was a new excuse. The last time, they asked for an abortion deposit. Then she vanished.”
The online platforms are not licensed or regulated by the state but are not shut down either. Their visibility on domestic platforms points to at least a passive tolerance from authorities.
Even Fars News, which is close to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, wrote on the phenomenon on Wednesday but mostly sought to discredit the platforms as a scam aiming to defraud credulous men.
But it also implicitly acknowledged the existence of real actors within the system.
“Our field investigation shows that many of these pages lack any official or legal license and are mostly created for purposes such as fraud, extortion, and even the dissemination of users' personal information,” the outlet wrote.
The use of “many” rather than “all” leaves room for exceptions—an implicit admission that not every channel is fake and that some do involve actual individuals, transactions, and encounters.
An apparent official tolerance of sigheh as a moral buffer against paid sex appears to have opened the door to commodifying women under theological cover. Prostitution is criminalized and punished, yet sigheh remains legal and broadly interpreted—creating a religiously sanctioned loophole.
“Pimping is illegal,” said a Tehran-based legal expert who requested anonymity for security reasons. “But sigheh offers a loophole. If the woman agrees, there’s a contract, and it’s framed as religious—who’s going to prosecute it?”
The line between religiously permitted marriage and outright sexual commerce is not just blurred—it has become a business model. For the Islamic Republic, it is one that hides in plain sight, cloaked in doctrine and fueled by tanking standards of living and deepening poverty.
Far from being limited to scams, the sigheh economy has become a channel for monetizing sexual access under the guise of religious propriety.
Business documents and emails obtained by Iran International reveal a layered network of shell companies used to mask the military links and channel the sanctioned oil through foreign intermediaries.
The firm, Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars, was incorporated in November 2022 in Tehran. Within months, two affiliated companies—Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan and Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars—were registered in the same building.
Corporate records identify Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars as the controlling shareholder in both. Registered firms in Iran are required to have four names.
Individuals central to the operation include Majid Azami, Elyas Niroumand Toumaj, Farshad Ghazi, Majid Rashidi, and Mojtaba Hosseini. The US Treasury added Azami and Niroumand to its sanctions list in November 2023. The others have not been designated.
In an appeal sent days after the sanctions were imposed, Azami and Niroumand denied any military affiliation, saying there was a misunderstanding based on similar naming.
They told the US Treasury their companies were involved in civil construction and trade and had been “experiencing harassment from both sides” since the designation.
However, Farsi-language draft contracts and internal memoranda contradict their argument. One agreement 2023 identifies Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars as acting on behalf of the Iranian armed forces' general staff in negotiations with Persian Gulf Star Oil Company.
Another set of shipping documents shows the same military body guaranteeing Sepehr Energy Jahannama Pars’ obligations in chartering vessels from the National Iranian Tanker Company.
To obscure these links, the network appears to have operated through a proxy firm in Hong Kong. In April 2023, Xin Rui Ji was registered there, with a nominal Chinese executive listed in filings. Yet, communications from Xin Rui Ji were routinely copied to Niroumand and other Sepehr managers.
One August 2023 letter requested the National Iranian Tanker Company deliver crude to Xin Rui Ji without a bill of lading—critical for cargo tracking—via ship-to-ship transfer in Singapore.
The transfer of cargo from one ship to another is a method used by the Islamic Republic to obscure its role in the sale of oil and petroleum products in order to evade sanctions.
Often in Malaysian and Singaporean waters, it is relabeled as oil originating from Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman or particularly Malaysia.
The same contact information and domain used by Sepehr Energy appeared on Xin Rui Ji contracts, pointing to a unified operation.
Xin Rui Ji sought buyers across Europe, China, and the Persian Gulf. One such client was the Netherlands-based Gemini Group, which advertises global reach in oil and energy trading. In September 2023, Gemini delayed payment for a crude shipment citing banking concerns and “rumors online about sanctions.”
In one email dated 30 October 2023, Gemini representative Niek Tersteeg confronted his Iranian counterpart Elyas Niroumand about a delayed payment. While citing confusion over contract terms, Tersteeg made clear that the problem was not procedural.
“The only reply we are getting are your statements that your side is governmental,” he wrote.
Tersteeg added: “This morning I personally will call my contacts inside the Government in Tehran to check if they can assist finding a solution.”
The email indicated that Gemini had longstanding experience dealing with sanctioned Iranian entities.
“Let us not talk about the 'commission payments' behind the curtain. In short: please forgive my honesty and directness, we are the ones working, financing, taking all the risks while lots of people are waiting in their rocking chairs for their pockets to be filled,” added Tersteeg in his email.
Five days later, on 5 November, Tersteeg followed up in another message addressed to Niroumand and Majid Azami, both of whom were sanctioned by the US government. He expressed appreciation for their collaboration and emphasized the depth of their partnership: “We are not the enemy. We are true friends and brothers ready, willing and able to take any risk.”
Tersteeg then recounted his own arrest in the Netherlands for dealings with Iran. “I myself was in put jail in 2013 by the Dutch secret service for my trading activities with your beautiful country on special, urgent request of the USA Government.
"They didn’t break me. I kept my mouth shut. After several days the Dutch secret service and Dutch Government found out that I did nothing wrong and they released me from prison with written apologies. The USA Government did not apologize and placed me on certain lists. I am not allowed to travel and enter the USA and Israel. No problem for me.”
Contacted by Iran International, Tersteeg denied any contractual ties with Sepehr Energy. He said personal and commercial links with Iranian officials were confidential.
The documents depict a sanctions evasion structure that operated with strategic cover and foreign complicity, exposing vulnerabilities in enforcement mechanisms meant to isolate Iran’s military-linked commerce.
Most of Iran's floating oil is stored in Singaporean waters, awaiting brokers and buyers for shipment to China.
The drop in Iran's oil exports comes as the government, led by Masoud Pezeshkian, plans for daily exports of 1.85 million barrels this year.
Before US sanctions in 2018, Iran exported 2.5 million bpd. This figure plummeted to 350,000 bpd by the final months of Donald Trump's presidency in 2020. However, Iran’s oil exports gradually increased under his successor.
