Prominent Iranian cleric Kazem Sedighi's son and daughter-in-law have been arrested on corruption charges, Iranian state media reported on Sunday, more than a year after the hardline cleric himself was implicated in a land grab scandal.
The two were detained by the Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence Organization two weeks ago on charges of misconduct and collusion, the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported.
"The case of the accused is being pursued with great care and sensitivity, and the judiciary will handle the case in a fully professional and independent manner," the report said citing an informed source. "The violators will receive a firm response, and the final results will be officially announced after the completion of legal procedures."
Sedighi, known to critics as “the weeping sheikh,” was accused last year of illegally appropriating public land in northern Tehran.
Leaked documents indicated that he and his associates had seized a 4,200-square-meter garden originally owned by a seminary. The property, estimated to be worth $20 million, was reportedly transferred to an entity controlled by Sedighi and his family.
After initially denying the allegations and claiming that his signature on the documents had been forged, Sedighi’s defense unraveled as more evidence emerged.
Eventually, he issued a public apology addressed to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, revealing that the land had been returned to the seminary. Despite the scandal, Sedighi continued serving as the interim Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran.
In the case of Sedighi's son and daughter-in-law, "have the collusions taken place independently of their father's position as the Friday Prayer Leader appointed by the Supreme Leader and head of the Promotion of Virtue Headquarters"? asked BBC Persian journalist Hossein Bastani.
"What happened to Kazem Sedighi’s own 1,000-billion-toman land grab case?" Bastani added in a post on X.
Sedighi’s case has triggered widespread backlash, particularly on Iranian social media platforms. Many Iranians have expressed frustration over what they see as a lack of accountability and transparency among high-ranking officials and clerics.
Their accounts document a sprawling overseas network operating under direct orders from the Supreme Leader’s office and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence arm well out of step with common diplomatic practice.
“Every embassy has a list. People to watch. People to engage. People to silence,” an Iranian former diplomatic employee told Iran International.
“It’s not foreign policy—it’s field execution,” another told Iran International. “The people sent abroad are on assignment, not appointment.”
Their account outlines a foreign service shaped not by diplomacy but by ideology, surveillance and illicit finance.
According to these individuals—whose names are withheld for their safety—Iran’s diplomatic missions double as intelligence gathering hubs tasked with tracking dissidents, surveilling student communities and delivering cash and equipment under the protection of diplomatic immunity.
UK authorities detained eight men in May, including three charged under the National Security Act for surveilling Iran International journalists on behalf of Tehran between August 2024 and February 2025.
It was not clear whether the charges related in any way to the Iranian embassy in London.
Iran’s foreign ministry denounced the charges as politically motivated, but former officials say such actions are core to the Islamic Republic’s overseas agenda.
Iran’s embassies maintain the outward structure of any diplomatic mission—ambassadors, attachés and advisers—but according to the sources, the roles often serve as cover.
“A person listed as a translator might actually coordinate funds for proxy groups,” said one of the former diplomats. “Titles are just for appearances.”
In one high-profile case, Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi used his status to transport explosives intended for an opposition rally in Paris. His 2021 conviction in Belgium exposed how far such dual roles can go.
Another ex-staffer recalled colleagues arriving in Istanbul and Baku with briefcases of undeclared dollars. “They know no one will search their bags,” he said.
Cultural attachés, especially those linked to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization, are said to organize religious events abroad that double as screening grounds for potential recruits.
Germany shuttered the Islamic Center of Hamburg in July over its ties to Tehran and what the Interior Ministry called promotion of extremism and antisemitism.
The diplomatic corps itself, sources say, is dominated by the sons of clerics and system insiders.
“Your father is a Friday prayer leader? Your uncle is close to the Supreme Leader? You’re in,” said one.
Posts rarely align with professional background; language skills and experience are often secondary to loyalty.
Though often expelled or exposed, the structure endures. Loyal staff are rotated across continents with little interruption.
“Each post is a mission. If you complete it to the system’s satisfaction, you’re held in reserve for the next,” one former diplomat said.
The network’s reach is enhanced by front organizations. The Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation has been linked to Hezbollah financing. The Iranian Red Crescent has faced accusations of being used by Quds Force operatives for weapons transport. IRGC members have admitted posing as aid workers during the Bosnian war.
IRIB outlets—Press TV, Al-Alam, Hispan TV—have functioned as propaganda arms and intelligence fronts. France expelled one of their journalists in 2011 for spreading state messaging.
The Iranian Red Crescent and the IRGC officially denied these remarks, saying that any such actions were unauthorized and not representative of their organizations.
Despite the rhetoric of resistance, many live in luxury. One former ambassador’s Paris residence cost over €40,000 per month.
“They send their kids to secular schools while preaching Islamic values,” said another. Leaked records show senior envoys receiving up to $12,000 monthly, with generous stipends and ceremonial budgets.
“It’s both reward and insulation,” an ex-diplomatic employee said. “The system buys loyalty with luxury—and distances them from the reality of ordinary Iranians.”
What emerges is not a diplomatic corps, but a global extension of Iran’s security state—trained, titled, and deployed to safeguard the Islamic Republic, not represent it.
