US envoy Amos Hochstein will visit Beirut on Monday to continue efforts aimed at de-escalating the conflict across the Lebanese-Israeli border, a senior Lebanese official and a White House official said on Sunday.
The Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah and Israel have been locked in hostilities for months in parallel to the Gaza war. It has marked the worst conflict between the heavily armed adversaries since a 2006 war, fueling fears of an even bigger confrontation.
Lebanon deputy parliament speaker Elias Bou Saab, one of the officials due to meet Hochstein, told Reuters he believed the timing of his visit pointed to progress in efforts to secure a Gaza truce "within the next few hours or days."
"If this happens, I believe that Hochstein's visit this time will be of great importance to follow up on the truce on our southern borders and to discuss what is needed for stability," he said.
Washington has said a ceasefire deal in the Gaza war is close and is aiming to have it be in effect by the start of Ramadan, a week away.
Israel however boycotted talks in Cairo on Sunday after the Palestinian militant group Hamas rejected its demand for a complete list of hostages that are still alive, an Israeli newspaper reported.
Hezbollah has said it would halt its attacks on Israel when the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip stops, but that it was also ready to keep on fighting if Israel continued hostilities.
Hochstein, who visited Beirut in January, previously brokered a rare diplomatic deal between Lebanon and Israel in 2022 to delineate their maritime border.
Designated a terrorist group by the United States, Hezbollah has not been a direct party to his diplomatic efforts.
This is the first time a vessel sinks as a result of Houthi attacks. As of February 25, Houthis had attacked at least 57 commercial and military vessels.
The UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar is carrying “21,000 metric tons of ammonium phosphate sulphate fertilizer,” according to US military, which confirmed earlier reports about the fate of the vessel.
“The ship had been slowly taking on water since the unprovoked attack [on 18 February],” US Central Command posted on X. “The … fertilizer that the vessel was carrying presents an environmental risk in the Red Sea. As the ship sinks, it also presents a subsurface impact risk to other ships transiting the busy shipping lanes of the waterway.”
Rubymar was struck by two Houthi missiles. The crew left the ship that very same day. Attempts to keep it afloat and tow it to a safe port failed eventually, raising concerns about its cargo.
"The release of large quantities of fertilizers into the Red Sea could cause eutrophication, depleting water of oxygen and creating 'dead zones',” said Mohammed Albasha, a senior Analyst at the Navanti Group. “Marine life… will likely suffer due to the toxic effects and reduced oxygen levels. Fishing communities along Yemen's Red Sea coast in Hudaydah and Taiz will be impacted by the contamination".
Iran-backed Houthis have effectively closed off the Red Sea with their missile and drone strikes. They maintain that their attacks are solely in support of Palestinians and would cease if and when there's a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.
On Saturday, the US Department of State announced that the Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea are “doubling shipping costs to the United States”, as major operators re-route and go around the southern tip of Africa.
Commodities experts say grain transit through the Suez Canal has halved while grain ships bound for Iran navigate the Red Sea untroubled.
“The Iran-backed Houthis pose a heightened threat to global maritime activities,” CENTCOM posted on X earlier Sunday. “The United States and coalition partners remain committed to safeguarding freedom of navigation, striving to enhance the safety and security of international waters for merchant shipping.”
The United States and Britain dispatched warships to protect commercial vessels in the Red Sea, shortly after the start of the Houthi attack last November. Both countries then launched a series of airstrikes on Houthi sites in Yemen, hoping to “degrade” the group’s capabilities.
On Saturday, a few hours before Yemen sources declared Rubymar sunk, the head of Houthi supreme revolutionary committee said he held the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, responsible for the sinking of the UK-owned Rubymar.
In a post on his X account, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi wrote that Sunak still had a chance to recover the Rubymar by allowing aid trucks into Gaza –
an offer that was never meant to be taken and wasn’t.
The consequences of Rubymar’s sinking are unclear. There’s been no official statement, but it’s likely that it would trigger another round of airstrikes and even harsher response in the hope that some form of deterrence is restored.
Biden critics say his administration is to blame for emboldening the Houthis’ and –perhaps more importantly– Iran. US president Joe Biden has admitted that he didn’t think the airstrikes he authorized could end the Houthi attack, who, undeterred, have threatened to further “surprise” the “enemy.”
Iran and Russia have recently signed 19 contracts to strengthen their bilateral cooperation across various industries, as reported by the Shana News Agency, affiliated with the Iranian Oil Ministry. These agreements, reached during the 17th meeting of the joint economic cooperation committee in Tehran, encompass energy, health, trade, and education sectors. Talks are also underway to develop new gas and oil reserves, indicating the potential for further agreements soon.
Furthermore, the electrical companies of both nations have entered into a cooperative agreement aimed at advancing research and technology in power generation. This initiative seeks to enhance collaboration through digitalizing electrical networks, improving energy efficiency, and localizing equipment manufacturing. Additionally, a protocol has been adopted to modify the roadmap for scientific and technological collaboration in the oil and gas industry, emphasizing practical cooperation enhancement in 21 key areas.
Challenges and Opportunities
For the Iranian energy industry as well as the larger geopolitical environment, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on technological collaboration between Russia's Transneft and Iran's Ministry of Oil brings both chances and problems.
By possibly introducing Russian technology into Iran's oil industry, the MOU establishes a precedent for technical collaboration. This might improve the production and efficiency of Iran's oil and gas projects. The strengthening alliance between Russia and Iran has the potential to change local energy supply environments, which might affect global energy pricing and distribution networks.
The deal is a component of larger conversations on energy cooperation, which also include the development of gas reserves and the establishment of a gas hub in Iran. Iran's standing in the international energy market may be enhanced by this.
However, Iran and Russia have a history of broken agreements,which highlights how difficult it is to meet the promises of these MOUs. The contradiction between Russia's reluctance to convert memoranda into contracts and Iran's statements suggests that execution may be difficult. Both nations have lofty goals, but they also have economic difficulties. For example, Gazprom of Russia has experienced a sharp decline in earnings and a rise in debt, casting doubt on the viability of spending $40 billion in Iran's energy industry.
Russia and Iran are also potential competitors in the energy markets, while Western sanctions on both nations might make cooperation more difficult by impeding the execution of ambitious objectives. Although the MOU gives Iran a chance to alleviate its natural gas shortage, Iran's energy independence may be compromised if it becomes dependent on Russian gas through swaps or direct transfers.
Iran and Russia have recently solidified their bilateral cooperation by signing 19 contracts, marking an advancement across various sectors. This development follows the successful negotiations of agreements covering commerce, energy, health, and education at the 17th meeting of the Joint Economic Cooperation Committee in Tehran, Iran.
The MOU between Transneft and Iran's Ministry of Oil, which holds promise for enhancing collaboration within the oil industry, but intricacies of geopolitics and conflicting economic interests, uncertainties persist regarding its specific objectives and potential consequences.
Even with all the possible drawbacks—like dependency worries, financial restraints, and legal obstacles—one can't help but wonder what real intentions are driving these partnerships. It begs the question of whether Iran and Russia have other hidden goals at work, or if they are just looking to take advantage of these openings to increase their energy capabilities and influence globally. While building strong relationships, promoting innovation, and deftly managing global dynamics may seem appealing, it also raises the issue of what hidden agendas may be at play.
