Tepid support from the hardline establishment and deepening economic woes defined his first year, in which the Iranian currency lost a full half of its value.
Now after an Israeli-American military drubbing dealt the Islamic Republic its greatest ever challenge, his problems may only deepen.
His election was celebrated by Iran’s moderates, but rejected by some hardliners and many dissidents who had boycotted the election.
Pezeshkian narrowly secured victory in an election that saw the lowest voter turnout in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history. Yet, the series of crises that unfolded over the following year may have rendered him the unluckiest president Iran has seen.
The night after his inauguration, senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in a strike attributed to Israel.
The attack, which took place at an Revolutionary Guards-provided residence, deeply unnerved Tehran. A year on, the details remain murky.
The year that followed was dominated by an escalating cycle of threats, counter-threats, and the direct attacks traded between Iran and Israel.
Simultaneously, Pezeshkian faced relentless efforts by ultraconservatives to unseat him. Discussions about impeaching his cabinet ministers and ousting his vice presidents persisted throughout the year.
Enemies within and without
So far, his rivals have successfully removed Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif—the former foreign minister whose experience and charisma were key assets in forming Pezeshkian’s cabinet.
Pezeshkian's Economy Minister, Abdolnasser Hemmati, was impeached and removed, leaving his post vacant for nearly four months.
Eventually, one of Pezeshkian’s candidates, Ali Madanizadeh, was approved by the parliament—perhaps thanks to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who spoke against intra-regime infighting during the war with Israel.
Throughout the year, voices from across the political divide—including many ordinary citizens—insisted that Pezeshkian honor the promises he made during his campaign.
Chief among them was a pledge to improve Iran’s worsening economic conditions, marked by rampant inflation, high unemployment, and widespread financial hardship.
These crises were deeply entrenched well before the war with Israel, and following the conflict, the administration seems poised to use the war as justification for its failures.
Campaign rhetoric meets wartime reality
Another key promise—especially significant to women—was to dismantle the compulsory hijab patrols. This was not achieved, though a draconian new enforcement law lapsed amid broad public objections.
The patrols returned to the streets weeks before the war, once again harassing women. Their more recent absence owes more to women’s defiance and the outbreak of war than to any government action. Pezeshkian can claim little—if any—credit here.
A third major demand was the removal of censorship on social media platforms essential to the livelihoods of some 400,000 online businesses, according to government and Chamber of Commerce figures.
Despite an extensive publicity campaign, only WhatsApp saw its ban lifted. Yet as the war erupted, the state once again clamped down on digital freedoms, including renewed restrictions on WhatsApp.
The government blamed social media for enabling Israel’s apparent access to sensitive information about Iranian officials, sparking widespread ridicule from the public.
Roughly a week after the Tehran–Tel Aviv ceasefire, a slight easing of media restrictions allowed pro-reform outlets such as Etemad to resurface. They warned that ignoring campaign promises would only deepen public discontent.
“Dissent may return to the streets with renewed momentum,” an Etemad editorial cautioned, “especially as economic pressures mount.”
“For now, both the streets and skies are quiet. But neither calm is likely to hold—and Pezeshkian may be in for a rougher ride than the year he just survived.”