Iran analyst
A lopsided war with Israel and the United States in June rattled Iran’s political order, but it survives through smarter coercion and the disarray of forces that might otherwise bring it down.
Internal contestation is harsher than at any time in recent memory, with competing factions trying to preserve or redefine their place in a system that has lost the capacity for reform or institutional expansion.
Yet Iran's nearly 50-year-old theocracy persists, compensating for poor governance with stiff security control and the careful redistribution of shrinking resources.
Just as authorities have slackened enforcement of Islamic social rules, allowing unveiled women and open-air concerts in public, it has stepped up a crackdown on political dissent and alleged spies.
Opposing this order are three forces whose interaction with the securitized state produces neither fundamental change nor imminent collapse, but something closer to endurance through erosion.
Those are: people inside Iran fighting localized economic and professional battles without organized networks, an exiled opposition adept at narrative and symbolism but detached from lived realities inside Iran and foreign actors committed to curbing Tehran’s nuclear and regional strength but not to toppling it.
One system, many channels
The Islamic Republic is structured around the Supreme Leader, whose authority ultimately resolves all major decisions. Around this axis sits an intricate constellation of parallel institutions, security councils, loyalty networks and overlapping hierarchies.
Policymaking is multi-layered. But decision-making is ultimately his sole prerogative.
President Masoud Pezeshkian recently issued a telling statement that unmanageable infighting would ensure should Ali Khamenei somehow exit the scene. It underscores a basic fear: without the Leader’s centrality, the power networks would drift apart.
Nothing illustrates this better than the way “system” is used interchangeably for both the political order and the leader himself.
Khamenei functions less as the manager of a unified apparatus than as the referee of internal conflicts. The state bureaucracy is not the engine of governance but one node among political, security and economic bodies each pursuing their own interests.
The 12-day war intensified these fissures. The removal of influential IRGC figures disrupted long-standing balances and sharpened factional sensitivities.
The Babak Zanjani affair illuminates the power politics at play.
Sprung with little explanation from a death sentence for corruption, the disgraced tycoon now not only walks free but weighs in regularly on politics, even appearing to threaten former President Hassan Rouhani with death in a tweet this week.
Such a rapid rehabilitation could not occur without powerful establishment backing.
Unorganized discontent
The war’s economic toll—passed on to society through inflationary policies—has deepened hardship and widened discontent. Iran’s society today is in ferment but unorganized: protests erupt across workplaces and cities, but without intermediary institutions they remain local and short-lived.
A recent nurses’ strike in Mashhad, much like the truck drivers’ strike before it this spring, showed the pattern clearly: strong anger, weak connective tissue.
The labor market’s collapse into unstable, platform-based work illustrates a society living in permanent emergency. Eight million rideshare drivers do not prove total collapse, but they reveal a mass shift toward insecure livelihoods.
Economic stress drains the psychological capacity for sustained organization; survival overrides solidarity.
Provincial centers skew toward economic protests, while peripheral regions experience conflict mainly through security confrontation.
The recurring demolition of homes in Baluchistan in southeastern Iran is one example of a strategy that provokes local resistance but rarely ratchets up because no networks link periphery grievances to central demands.
Inside Iran, opposition forces function like isolated islands. Outside, the opposition produces abundant media output but struggles to translate daily grievances into a shared political language.
The gap between “voice” abroad and “life” inside has produced an opposition that amplifies frustrations but does not alter the balance of power.
Survival on the edge
The Islamic Republic continues not as an effective state but as a mechanism that defers crises day by day. Security has replaced policy; the cost of maintaining power rises constantly as the quality of governance decays.
The system persists because no countervailing power with organizational depth has yet emerged.
European-triggered international sanctions and intermittent threats from the United States and Israel show that containment—not internal transformation—may be the ultimate priority from outside powers.
External pressure accelerates economic and infrastructural decay but cannot substitute for domestic political change.
For the West, Iran remains a security file, not a political project.
Foreign actors may accelerate or intensify pressure, but the indispensable condition for change is alignment between internal and external forces around a shared language and objective.
Until such convergence forms, the Islamic Republic will remain in a state of endurance through erosion—able to enforce the status quo even as it becomes less capable of maintaining stability or basic services.
MuddyWater, also known as Mango Sandstorm or TA450, has links to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and National Security and has targeted government and infrastructure in the Middle East and beyond since at least 2017.
Researchers said victims in Israel included technology, engineering, manufacturing, local government and education sectors. They said the group used new custom tools to improve its ability to hide and stay active inside networks, including a backdoor called MuddyViper that can gather system data, run commands, move files and steal Windows credentials and browser data.
The report said the attackers used Fooder, a loader that reflects malware into memory and at times imitates the classic Snake game, to deploy MuddyViper. It said the group also used several credential stealers and avoided interactive sessions to reduce detection.
Researchers said the campaign relied on spearphishing emails that sent victims to installers for remote monitoring tools hosted on free file sharing sites. They said the operators used a range of malware, including VAX One, which imitates products such as Veeam and AnyDesk.
Past MuddyWater operations include attacks in Saudi Arabia and campaigns that overlapped with Lyceum, suggesting the group may serve as an initial access broker for other Iran linked actors.
