Mohammad Javad Asgari, the head of the Agriculture Committee of the Iranian Parliament, expressed concerns over Iran's diminishing agricultural exports to Iraq as regional competition sidelines the regime.
"Currently, Turkey is easily replacing Iran in Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia is seizing markets in agricultural production, which poses a serious threat," he told ILNA on Thursday.
Asgari also highlighted the urgency of creating better market conditions for agricultural production, stating that failure to do so could result in the loss of vital markets. He also noted a worrying trend of Iran losing market share, particularly in products like nuts and dried fruits.
Iran has long sought to expand its influence and economic interests in neighboring countries like Iraq and Syria. With cultural, historical, and religious ties, Iran views these countries as crucial markets for its goods and services. However, despite its aspirations, Iran has faced disappointment in its attempts to gain a significant share in their markets.
In Iraq, Iran's ambitions have been hampered by various factors, including political instability, competition from other regional powers, and the lingering effects of international sanctions. Additionally, Iran's involvement in Iraq's internal affairs has often sparked resentment among Iraqi citizens and fueled tensions with the Iraqi government.
Similarly, in Syria, Iran's efforts to establish a foothold in the market have been challenged by the ongoing civil war, which has devastated the country's economy and created a volatile business environment. Despite its strategic partnerships and support for the Syrian regime, Iran has struggled to capitalize on economic opportunities in both Iraq and Syria, leaving its wishes for a market share largely unfulfilled.
Dorosti admitted that due to economic challenges and sanctions, there has been a backlog in the subway in the last few years, saying the city has "a fleet that is largely worn out and the useful life of many wagons is coming to an end,” warning that there is still the possibility of occasional breakdowns without properly renovating the fleet.
According to the official, “In the last one or two years, at least 15 stations and 20 kilometers of tunnels have been added to the metro and after the Covid pandemic, we have witnessed an increase in passengers but our infrastructure has not been upgraded since five years ago.”
Jafar Tashakori Hashemi, the head of the Transportation Commission of the Tehran City Council, blamed the municipality for the increasing breakdowns in the capital’s aging metro network.
Despite the fact that the municipality has adequate funds, it has failed to adopt the necessary measures to repair the metro trains.
According to the official, failure rates in the Tehran subway are much higher than those of the subways of the developed countries where “preventive repairs” are regularly carried out on the wagons.
“We have time and again warned the municipality regarding the necessity of conducting periodic inspections and repairs of metro wagons as well as their fundamental renovation or overhaul,” he pointed out.
Last month, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, responsible for pushing the deal through, announced several contracts were signed with Chinese companies to revamp the capital’s infrastructure, including transportation and construction projects.
According to Zakani, China will also start building housing units in the capital soon. The announcement was met with many negative reactions in Iran. Ahmad Khorram, former Roads and Transportation Minister, lambasted the deal as an "insult to Iran's engineering community" while the local economy is in freefall.
Economic ties between the two nations have once again been rocky in recent months as Iran becomes increasingly dependent on China amidst global sanctions against it for its nuclear program, support for Russia's war on Ukraine and human rights violations.
China's oil trade with Iran stalled in January as Tehran withheld shipments and demanded higher prices from its top client, tightening cheap supply for the world's biggest crude importer.
However, while China remains Iran's largest trade partner, the strategic partnership announced in 2016 is unlikely to bear the fruits Tehran hoped. The two nations announced they would increase trade to $600bn by 2026 but last year, according to the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics data, the volume of trade reached just $12.5bn.
The Iran-backed Houthi blockade of the Red Sea has also harmed Tehran’s relations with Beijing, no less affected by the critical trade and logistics route’s maritime tensions. How the relationship continues is yet to be seen but with projects in the pipeline, Iran is using its construction and infrastructure projects with China to solidify ties, at least for now.
As Iran's supreme leader, 84-year-old Ali Khamenei ages, the newly elected Assembly of Experts will likely confront the task of selecting his successor.
Khamenei’s cautionary words on Thursday against potential conflicts among newly elected and re-elected members highlight the importance of preserving the assembly's primary responsibilities. He emphasized the need for the elected members to avoid internal strife, ensuring the assembly can effectively carry out its duties.
The orchestrated electoral process by the Guardian Council and the Interior Ministry aimed to select candidates aligned with the security apparatus and the IRGC, in accordance with Khamenei's preferences. This strategic maneuvering ensured the desired outcome without explicit directives from Khamenei himself.
The words of Khamenei, who told the Assembly’s three-member candidate review board to exclude his son Mojtaba, were interpreted in the media as Khamenei's decision not to put Mojtaba in his seat, but Khamenei's remarks were also interpreted as a directive to pave the way for his unimpeded ascension, bypassing vetting procedures. When after the 2005 elections, top politician Mehdi Karroubi criticized Mojtaba for his alleged interference as “a master’s son,” Khamenei responded that Mojtaba “is a master himself, not a master’s son."
Key individuals with a lot of insider information and intelligence data were disqualified from running in the assembly election. Former President Hassan Rouhani, and three former intelligence ministers, Ali Fallahian, Haider Moslehi, and Mahmoud Alavi, were disqualified. These individuals with a throve of potentially sensitive and damaging information on members of the assembly could influence a vote on succession. The Guardian Council also disqualified 366 out of 510 clerical candidates from a diverse spectrum and left only 144 candidates for 88 seats, which was not even twice the number of seats. In the previous round, 635 people were disqualified out of 801 candidates.
The manipulation of voting dynamics in various provinces favored certain candidates, indicating a strategic effort to influence the outcome in favor of preferred individuals. This calculated approach ensured that candidates aligned with Khamenei's vision secured significant support.
The election results across different provinces signify a noticeable shift towards younger clerics loyal to Khamenei, marking a departure from the previous assembly's composition. This generational change reflects Khamenei's strategic efforts to shape the assembly according to his long-term objectives. For example, long-standing clerics such as Hashem Hashemzadeh Harisi (East Azarbaijan province) and Kazem Nour Mofidi (Golestan province), members of the Fifth Expert Assembly who were close to Rafsanjani, did not run for office to avoid the humiliation of being disqualified.
Some approved candidates whose loyalty was not to the House of Khamenei, such as Javad Mojtahed Shabestri from West Azarbaijan Province, were eliminated in the voting stage. This was achieved because of very low turnout; the votes of the sixth Experts Assembly members are about a third of those in the previous term.
The absence of influential figures aligned with reformist factions, or more independent, suggests minimal opposition within the assembly to Mojtaba's candidacy. This lack of dissenting voices further strengthens Mojtaba's position as the favored candidate to succeed Khamenei.
Candidates associated with existing Shia authorities in Qom or Grand Ayatollah Sistani's disciples were sidelined, diminishing the possibility of alternative factions challenging Mojtaba's candidacy. This strategic maneuvering ensures that Mojtaba's candidacy remains unchallenged within the assembly.
Hassan Khomeini's disqualification in the previous term also reflected efforts to preempt any attempts by reformists to challenge Mojtaba's candidacy. This calculated move underscores the regime's determination to consolidate power and maintain control over the succession process.
