Iran International
Iranian politicians and commentators have been making conflicting comments on Russia's stated preparedness to mediate between Iran and the United States regarding Tehran's controversial nuclear program.
While the deputy chairman of the Iranian parliament's national security committee appears to be adamant that Russia will consider Iran's interests in its negotiations with America, the committee's former chairman has once again expressed concern that "Russia might sacrifice Iran for its own interests."
The remarks of Abbas Moghtadaei, deputy chairman of the Majles national security committee, suggested that Iran's interests factor into Russia’s calculations. "In its negotiations with the United States, Russia also considers Iran's interests," he said.
He argued that Russia would take Iran’s interests into account, citing the recently signed strategic cooperation agreement between the two countries and asserting that Moscow will "consider its ally's interests in its foreign relations." However, Russia has repeatedly stated in the past that Iran is not a strategic ally.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other officials have repeatedly referred to Iran as a partner, distinguishing their relationship from Russia’s formal alliances, such as with China or members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In August 2022, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged the strength of Russia-Iran relations but stopped short of calling Iran a strategic ally.
The hardline Raja News, the pro-reform Fararu website, and the pro-Pezeshkian Etemad newspaper have also rejected the notion of Iran being a strategic ally of Russia. However, Moscow is still likely to back Tehran when it serves its interests, using Iran as regional and international leverage in its dealings with the West.
Meanwhile, in an interview with Etemad, Heshamatollah Falahatpisheh, former chief of the Iranian Parliament's national security and foreign relations committee, stated, "The revival of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers was sacrificed for Russia's war in Ukraine. I fear Iran may now be sacrificed for Russia’s peace with Ukraine."
He was referring to the West’s reluctance to negotiate with Iran following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which led to the suspension of nuclear talks in March 2022. Since then, Tehran has supported Russia’s war effort, supplying weapons used against Ukraine.
Asked about the likelihood of Iran's interests being compromised in talks between Moscow and Washington, Falahatpisheh said, "Political developments since 2021 have shown that international variables directly affect Iran's nuclear diplomacy and its position in global affairs."
He recalled that three years ago, when Iran and the West were close to reaching a nuclear deal, Russia formally urged the United States to exempt Iran-Russia trade from US sanctions on both countries. However, Washington rejected the request, viewing it as an attempt by Moscow to exploit the nuclear negotiations for its own benefit.
The politician accused Russia of deceiving Iran and obstructing the revival of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal at the time. Expressing concern over Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent visit to Iran, he warned, "Once again, the Russians might use Iran as leverage in their dealings with Washington."
Meanwhile, Iranian foreign policy analyst Qasem Mohebali told the conservative Nameh News website that "Russia's mediation between Iran and the United States is unlikely to benefit Iran."
"It appears that the Americans have promised certain concessions to Russia regarding the Ukraine war, and in return, Russia has agreed to offer some concessions to Washington concerning Iran," Mohebali said.
However, he argued that this arrangement is not in Iran’s best interest, as "Russia is likely to use Iran as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the United States over Ukraine." He also questioned the effectiveness of mediation by a country that is itself engaged in negotiations to resolve its own challenges.
"Iran is in an ambiguous international position," Mohebali concluded. "However, the disputes between Europe and the Arab states on one side and the United States on the other, along with the divide between Russia and America, provide Iran with an opportunity to extract some concessions. Still, Moscow's mediation is unlikely to serve Tehran’s interests."
Moscow's entrance onto the scene either flips an Iranian ally against its nuclear ambitions or provides a spoiler which drags out talks and buys the Islamic Republic a breather from looming Israeli strikes.
The initiative follows a direct request from US President Donald Trump during a phone call on February 12, 2025, with subsequent discussions taking place between top officials from both administrations in Saudi Arabia.
The Kremlin has expressed its commitment to facilitating peaceful negotiations between Washington and Tehran. This positions Russia as a key intermediary, leveraging its established relationships with both nations.
Historically, Switzerland has been acting as a diplomatic conduit between Tehran and Washington since the early 1980s. Several Arab states have also offered their mediation services on various occasions, including the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, and, more recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Russia’s diplomatic involvement, however, presents a different dynamic.
Deep state access
As a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has cultivated a strong security partnership with Iran, particularly since the onset of the Ukraine war in February 2022.
Russia’s unique access to Iran’s deep state provides President Putin with significant leverage to pressure Iranian decision-makers into making nuclear concessions—an essential step in preventing military escalation in the coming months.
From Iran’s perspective, Russian involvement in resolving the “Iranian nuclear problem,” as Russian officials term it, presents both an opportunity and a challenge.
Under Russian diplomatic oversight, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may find it more difficult to maintain his strategy of nuclear escalation vis-à-vis the Trump Administration, including rhetorical threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and outright rejection of negotiations.
Tehran might become more open to indirect and discreet dialogue with Washington if Moscow encourages it to do so.
Unlikely boon
Beyond the potential impact on Iran’s nuclear strategy, Russia’s mediating role offers the Iranian political establishment a means to achieve its primary goal: avoiding both war and substantive nuclear or regional negotiations with Washington during Trump’s second term (2025-2029).
A Russian diplomatic intermediary could help ensure the security and survival of the Islamic Republic, deterring a potential US-backed Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But the shifting balance of power following a US-Russia rapprochement means Iran could once again become a bargaining chip in renewed US-Russian diplomatic negotiations at the presidential level.
In other words, a closer Trump-Putin relationship could reduce Tehran’s strategic relevance in Moscow’s eyes. This short-term marginalization of Iran does not signify the end of its pragmatic partnership with Russia but rather the potential reemergence of US influence over Iranian decision-making through Russian mediation.
Since the early 2020s, Iran has advanced its uranium enrichment activities, prompting international concerns over possible nuclear weapon development—claims that Tehran consistently denies despite growing internal political debate on potential nuclear militarization.
The US remains steadfast in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, working closely with allies like Israel to address these concerns. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designed to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief, has been under strain, especially following the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.
This led Iran to deviate from its commitments. A potential future Russian mediating role could temper the Trump Administration’s inclination to align with Israel’s hardline approach against Iran’s nuclear advancements, potentially reducing the likelihood of an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Mideast: Russian returns
Beyond the Iranian nuclear issue and regional policy, Russia’s recent diplomatic manoeuvres underscore its ambitions to reassert its role in Middle Eastern affairs in the post-October 7 era.
This potential return is facilitated by its ongoing rapprochement with Washington and the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025.
The proposal to restore direct air links between the US and Russia, discussed during negotiations in Istanbul, signifies a potential thaw in relations. Talks also addressed the normalization of embassy operations, reflecting a mutual interest in improving diplomatic and economic ties.
However, Russia’s deepening ties with Iran add complexity to its role as a mediator, especially in the context of rising military tensions between Iran and Israel, the US’s primary ally in the region.
In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive 20-year strategic partnership agreement covering defense, technology, energy, and trade sectors. While this partnership strengthens bilateral relations, it may also compromise Russia’s impartiality in mediating US-Iran tensions.
Looking ahead, Russian mediation could lead to renewed negotiations aimed at reviving or restructuring a nuclear agreement that addresses the shortcomings of the JCPOA.
Such an agreement could ease some economic sanctions on Iran while implementing stricter nuclear oversight. However, the success of these efforts will depend on the willingness of both the US and Iran to engage in constructive dialogue and make necessary concessions.
Russia's strategic interests and geopolitical priorities—particularly in the event of a ceasefire in Ukraine—will play a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of these diplomatic initiatives in the coming months.
