IRGC to hold naval drills in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz
Iran’s IRGC Navy will launch a two day exercise on Thursday in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Oman Sea and around the country’s southern islands, state media said.
Iran’s IRGC Navy will launch a two day exercise on Thursday in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Oman Sea and around the country’s southern islands, state media said.
The Strait of Hormuz is a key waterway where Iranian officials have at times warned they could restrict traffic during periods of tension.
The IRGC Navy public relations office said the drill is named after Mohammad Nazeri, a commander and founder of the IRGC Navy’s special forces unit who was killed in 2016, and will run for two days.
File photo of Iranian taekwondo athlete Rozhan Goudarzi competing at a domestic tournament in Iran.
Earlier this week, Iran began Sahand-2025, a five-day Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) counter-terrorism drill led by IRGC Ground Forces around Shabestar near Tabriz in East Azarbaijan province.
Designed by Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff with input from the foreign ministry and the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, the exercise targets the bloc’s “Three Evils” – terrorism, separatism and extremism.
The United States has accused figures close to Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro of involvement in trafficking into the US.
Uncertainty spiked over the weekend after President Donald Trump declared Venezuela’s surrounding airspace “closed in its entirety,” though he later cautioned reporters not to “read anything into it” regarding immediate military action.
For Tehran, Venezuela is not just an ally but a principal hemispheric partner.
Over two decades, this “Axis of Necessity” has evolved into a channel through which each side supplies what the other lacks: technology, crude oil and refined fuel, political backing abroad and trade routes safe from sanctions.
Logistical artery
The partnership now functions as a dual-use logistical route linking Tehran and Caracas.
When Venezuela’s refineries faltered, Iran sent technical teams and arranged barter-based energy swaps; when Tehran needed additional outlets for crude, Venezuelan shipments helped maintain cash flow and reservoir management.
Western sanctions authorities say financial intermediaries on both sides have facilitated transactions designed to bypass traditional banking scrutiny.
Gold-for-fuel exchanges emerged as a way to secure hard assets where access to formal channels was limited. Cooperation has also extended into areas with potential military relevance.
Iran International reporting—based on internal documents and informed sources—indicated Iranian involvement in aspects of drone development inside Venezuela.
These arrangements provided Iran a degree of strategic depth: a distant space where technology, training and covert finance could operate with reduced visibility.
That space is now tightening. With carriers, bombers and surveillance platforms operating near Venezuelan shores, the risk of disruption to sensitive shipments has grown.
The Hezbollah factor
Iran’s regional strategy depends heavily on non-state partners, especially Hezbollah.
Tehran’s adversaries accuse the group of fundraising in South America through smuggling routes, financial intermediaries and more recently, digital-currency channels.
Hezbollah is now confronting one of its most serious setbacks in years; the killing of senior commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai in November 2025 was the latest blow.
As the group absorbs battlefield losses and financial strain, its reliance on overseas networks becomes more consequential.
Analysts of proxy finance argue that the Western Hemisphere offers strategic redundancy: if Middle-Eastern channels are disrupted, South American ones can help sustain the organization.
But those networks are themselves under renewed pressure.
Expanded US deployments near Venezuela increase exposure for facilitators who once operated with relative obscurity.
What was envisioned as a fallback corridor is now monitored by carrier strike groups, sanctions investigators and intelligence-sharing partners.
Legal reckoning?
If the Caribbean illustrates military deterrence, Buenos Aires represents a different form of constraint.
Argentine courts and prosecutors have advanced proceedings linked to the 1994 AMIA bombing, issuing findings that senior Iranian officials bear responsibility and designating the attack a crime against humanity.
Warrants and arrest-related measures have followed, some now proceeding in absentia so that non-cooperation no longer halts the process.
Tehran disputes these conclusions, but the judicial record being assembled carries growing diplomatic implications.
This legal trajectory erodes the old perception of Latin America as a permissive periphery. It raises personal risk for senior Iranian figures travelling abroad and increases potential financial exposure for entities linked to designated individuals.
Even without immediate enforcement, these foundations strengthen the prospect of future repercussions.
A less hospitable hemisphere
Three structural trends now converge: tightening maritime surveillance, expanding legal accountability and increased financial scrutiny through sanctions enforcement.
None of this suggests an imminent rupture. Oil can change flags; networks can adapt; facilitators can adopt new identities and routes. But the cost curve has shifted.
Iran has long viewed Latin America as a distant flank—a place where ideology, trade and covert influence could be pursued with limited friction.
That assumption is weakening. A hemisphere once defined by permissiveness is becoming a contested theatre shaped by US presence, judicial persistence and financial vigilance.
The logistical link between Caracas and Tehran still functions. It continues to serve both countries in their shared struggle against sanctions and isolation. But it now faces unprecedented pressure.
And if current trajectory hold, what was once adopted as an avenue of survival may, over time, become an axis of vulnerability.
