Chaos and divisions shake Iran's ultra-hardliner camp

A significant rift has emerged within Iran's ultra-hardliner faction following a prominent lawmaker’s unprecedented criticism of protests by radicals to pressure authorities into enforcing a tough hijab law.

The decision of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) not to enforce the controversial law could not have been made without the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has avoided discussing the issue in his speeches for months.

Enforcing the morality legislation—which imposes severe penalties, including heavy fines and prison sentences on women who violate strict hijab rules, as well as businesses that fail to comply—could be highly provocative under current conditions, potentially sparking widespread anti-government protests.

Internal clash over the enforcement of the hijab law

Mahmoud Nabavian, a senior member of the hardline Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, is facing backlash from his allies after condemning recent protests led by radical elements. His remarks have surprised many within his faction, where he was long regarded as a key figure and a strict enforcer of their agenda.

Despite playing a key role in drafting the hijab legislation, Nabavian now argues that preserving the Islamic Republic must take precedence over enforcing the law—implicitly acknowledging the risk of unrest. “If implementing the hijab law creates tensions and weakens the system, it should automatically be set aside,” he said last week.

According to the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini, preserving the system must take “utmost priority,” even if it requires temporarily setting aside religious obligations like prayer and fasting. By that logic, hijab would be no exception—a stance authorities now seem compelled to accept, much to the frustration of the hardline political and religious establishment.

Ultra-hardliners protesting outside the Iranian Parliament against delay in enforcing hijab law

Concerns over national stability

Nabavian justified the security council’s suspension of the hijab law by pointing to major geopolitical developments—the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. He argued that enforcing the law at this time could provide foreign adversaries with an opportunity to destabilize Iran.

“Given the country’s and the region’s current conditions, especially the situation in Yemen, and the need for national unity, we must all support the implementation of the law but polarizing the society, calling for illegal gatherings, and staging street protests—no matter the faction—are against the country’s interests,” Nabavian warned in an X post on Sunday. His remarks came after the US military launched massive airstrikes against Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen on Saturday.

Hasan Soleimani, editor-in-chief of the hardline Mashregh News, a publication believed to be linked to the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization (SAS), defended Nabavian’s position. In an X post, he accused radical hardliners of using the hijab issue as a pretext to disrupt the country’s stability. He went further, comparing them to the Forqan group—an Islamist faction that carried out assassinations against officials of the newly established Islamic Republic, including a failed attempt on Khamenei’s life in 1981.

Highlighting defiance of Khamenei’s decisions

Nabavian also accused ultra-hardliners—whom he refers to as “super-revolutionaries” or “radicals”—of openly defying Khamenei, citing their opposition to Covid vaccination. “I won’t even mention the disgraceful remarks they made [about Khamenei’s own vaccination],” he said last week. He also linked their defiance to more recent criticism over Iran’s two-month delay in 2024 before retaliating against Israel’s attack on Iranian military facilities—a decision ultimately made by Khamenei.

Similarly, if Khamenei decides to permit direct talks with the Trump administration in the coming weeks or months, ultra-hardliners’ reaction could pose a significant challenge. He ruled out the possibility of such talks in a recent speech and has so far not acknowledged the US President’s letter to him. Former President Hassan Rouhani suggested a few days ago that Khamenei’s stance could change depending on circumstances, as it did in 2013 when he allowed secret talks with the US.

Warnings of a fragile political climate

Citing the hardliners' protests in Mashhad against moderate conservative Hassan Rouhani’s government on December 28, 2017, some media outlets and analysts have warned that demonstrations organized by “super-revolutionaries” could similarly spiral out of control.

The Mashhad protests quickly spread nationwide, with demonstrators in several cities chanting against Khamenei. The weeklong unrest resulted in at least 25 deaths and thousands of arrests.

However, the current situation is fundamentally different from 2017, an article in the reformist Etemad daily warned on Sunday. It pointed to Trump's presence in the White House and heightened regional tensions, citing a statement from the Supreme National Security Council Secretariat that cautioned any provocation or political polarization could cause irreparable damage to the country.

Iran's President Pezeshkian loses role as 'good cop'

Mar 16, 2025, 13:45 GMT

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Behrouz Turani

During his June 2024 election campaign and his first six months in office, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian positioned himself as the "good cop" in the country's familiar good cop/bad cop dynamic between reformists and hardliners.

He embraced this role both domestically—advocating for civil rights, gender equality, and press freedom—and in foreign policy, where he emphasized maintaining good relations with all countries and resolving Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West as a path to economic recovery.

However, on February 7, Pezeshkian abruptly shifted from a pragmatic politician to a staunch hardliner with strong ideological overtones following a routine anti-US and anti-negotiation speech by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Just weeks later, in an uncharacteristically heated tone, he went so far as to declare that he had no desire to engage with US President Donald Trump.

Whether Pezeshkian's "good cop" role was genuine or not, it may have served Khamenei’s interests at a time when he faced pressure to engage with the Trump administration. However, as Pezeshkian loses credibility among Reformists, hardliners remain hesitant to fully embrace him. His occasional expressions of regret—admitting shame over unfulfilled promises in domestic politics—have only deepened his political isolation.

The Supreme Leader has found a new "good cop" in Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who was permitted to propose indirect negotiations with the United States in Muscat—despite Khamenei’s firm rejection of talks with Trump.

Recently, an Iranian commentator abroad half-jokingly categorized Iranian politicians into three groups based on their stance on nuclear negotiations with the United States. The first group consists of hardliners, led by ultraconservative Saeed Jalili, who oppose talks. The second includes moderates from centrist parties, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, who advocate for negotiations. The third group, he said, is led by President Pezeshkian—who, regardless of his stance, has no real influence over the nuclear issue.

Pezeshkian appears to lack clear solutions on other pressing issues as well. Addressing Iran’s soaring prices, he recently admitted, "I have no idea whom to blame for the uncontrolled rising prices." His remark drew sharp criticism on social media, where many reminded him that, as president, he is ultimately responsible for the government's handling of the crisis.

The Khabar Online website reported Friday that Pezeshkian has failed to deliver on four key promises, along with nearly all his other commitments. The report highlighted public dissatisfaction over continued social media censorship and his unresolved negotiations with hardliners on the strict compulsory hijab law. While enforcement has been temporarily suspended, the government has neither scrapped the bill nor convinced hardliners to stop harassing women and politicians.

The website also pointed to two major economic issues affecting Iranians' livelihoods that Pezeshkian has failed to address. He has been unable to persuade the Expediency Council to approve the FATF protocols, which could ease barriers to international trade and banking. More importantly, his promise to lift sanctions—seen as key to reviving the economy—remains unfulfilled. Now, he is not even willing to discuss the issue with the US, declaring, "Do whatever the hell you can do. I am not going to talk with you."

His critics—including ultraconservative Paydari Party members determined to unseat him, the so-called neocons aligned with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and hardline zealots who attack him at every turn for not enforcing strict Islamic hijab rules—are relentless in their pressure.

Pezeshkian’s vice president for legal affairs, Majid Ansari, blamed Paydari for the challenges the president is facing. "They have not shut down their campaigns and are still working to tarnish Pezeshkian's image," he told the media last week.

Pezeshkian is no longer the "good cop," yet no one sees him as the "bad cop" either. As one commentator put it on a Persian TV, perhaps he is no cop at all. Still, some Iranians believe in his good intentions. Despite his limited social backing, like the protagonist in the 1950s classic cartoon Deputy Dawg, he may have "a badge of tin," but he certainly has "a heart of gold."