Aday after three European states triggered a UN mechanism that reimposes international sanctions on Iran, the move appeared to wrongfoot Tehran's establishment despite months of warnings.
Iran's new Security Chief, Ali Larijani, seemed to misread the immediacy of the threat in an interview days before the diplomatic setback.
In an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's official website on August 22, Larijani insisted that China and Russia could shield Iran against the snapback threat.
"This issue is currently under review domestically, and as far as I know, some countries are making efforts to negotiate in order to prevent it from happening. Russia and China also hold a different position. They're acting as obstacles."

A day after three European states triggered a UN mechanism that reimposes international sanctions on Iran, the move appeared to wrongfoot Tehran's establishment despite months of warnings.
Iran's new Security Chief, Ali Larijani, seemed to misread the immediacy of the threat in an interview days before the diplomatic setback.
In an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's official website on August 22, Larijani insisted that China and Russia could shield Iran against the snapback threat.
"This issue is currently under review domestically, and as far as I know, some countries are making efforts to negotiate in order to prevent it from happening. Russia and China also hold a different position. They're acting as obstacles."
Larijani is a seasoned politician, but less savvy figures, including state-appointed Friday prayer leaders, also contributed to the confusion with their remarks.
In Shiraz, Friday Prayers imam Lotfollah Dejkam offered a revisionist take on world history, saying: "Europeans have been defeated by Iran several times, and they are likely to experience an even bigger defeat as a result of the snapback."
Ahmad Alamolhoda, the Friday Prayers Imam of Mashhad, appeared to downplay the seriousness of the likely economic pain due to be wrought by sanctions.
Iranians, he said, who rushed to capital markets to buy gold and foreign currency in anticipation of further devaluation of the Iranian rial were "simpletons."
Many commentators questioned the leadership's broader understanding of the nuclear deal and the international frameworks governing it.
Among the critics was Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, former head of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, who condemned fellow politicians for their impulsive reactions.
In a post on X, he specifically addressed members of parliament who had tabled a triple-urgency motion calling on the Islamic Republic to exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ironically, despite attaching the highest urgency label to the bill, lawmakers postponed its discussion until Saturday, as Friday is a public holiday in Iran.
"Exiting NPT, closing Strait of Hormuz and producing an atomic bomb! For years, the nation has been paying the price for the nonsense you still repeat on (state TV)," Falahatpisheh wrote.
"You believed your own nonsense, which has prevented any rationality and initiative to get out of the deadlocks," he added.
Meanwhile, the promise of diplomatic roads not taken was examined anew.
In an interview with the Entekhab website, Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former President Hassan Rouhani, revealed that during Rouhani's final days in office, he had asked his successor, President Ebrahim Raisi, to allow him to broker a deal with the United States to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement.
According to Vaezi, Raisi insisted on reviving the agreement under his own administration. Rouhani argued that even if his government signed the deal, the revenue from oil sales would benefit the incoming government.
Nonetheless, Raisi rejected the proposal, and negotiations with the United States ran aground.
"Triggering snapback at this juncture is the right decision. Iran remains far out of compliance with its JCPOA and safeguards obligations and there is no near term prospect of any nuclear deal, especially given that Iran refuses to meet with the U.S." former US National Security Council director for counterproliferation Eric Brewer said.
"It is not a decision to be celebrated. One can catalog the list of policy failures that led us to this place, not least of which is the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Nor is snapback some panacea that will cause Iranian capitulation," Brewer, also a former deputy national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction, wrote on X.
"Indeed, there will likely be a major gap between the sanctions that exist on paper and their implementation by key players in practice," added Brewer, who is currently vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
"Snapback, should it happen, is more about avoiding loss rather than trying to secure immediate strategic gain. It’s a least worst option."
Wall Street Journal reporter and veteran nuclear diplomacy watcher Laurence Norman wrote on Thursday that Iran's reaction to a European move to renew UN sanctions was measured but that diplomatic confrontation looms.
"Iran tells E3 to back a Russian plan to extend 2231 with no SnapBack provision and no real Iranian steps to meet conditions," he wrote on X. "If they were gonna do that, they wouldn’t have triggered SnapBack. That suggests diplomatic confrontation."
"Iran SnapBack statement full of attacks on E3 and reiteration of what Tehran says is illegal and baseless move by Europeans. But relatively light on specific threats. Says will “seriously undermine” talks with IAEA, though that’s vaguer than @Gharibabadi comments earlier," he added, referring to Iran's deputy foreign minister.
"And (Iran) warns of an “appropriate” response. So all options remain open. But it’s not closing off any immediate diplomatic paths. Which is worth at least noting."

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Belarus this week, a heavily sanctioned Russian ally, in a trip that highlighted how Tehran’s “Look East” strategy ties it more closely to Moscow and Beijing and their sanctioned partners.
Tehran has framed the August 20 visit as part of a concerted move against Western pressure.
Iran newspaper, the administration’s mouthpiece, wrote that the president’s decision to visit Minsk was a logical continuation of Tehran’s foreign policy—a policy emphasizing a multipolar world, national sovereignty, independence, and resistance to coercion.”
Similarly, Nour News, close to Ali Khamenei's top advisor Ali Shamkhani, described the trip as a “clear message against global unilateralism and sanctions.”
Consolidating the 'Look East' strategy
For many observers, the choice of Belarus as one of Pezeshkian’s first foreign destinations after the 12-day war with Israel was a deliberate statement of intent.
Esfandiar Khodaee, a foreign relations commentator, wrote in Khabar Online that the visit showed the “Looking East” policy was no longer just a legacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Ebrahim Raisi, but “a standing pillar of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.”
The approach traces back to Ahmadinejad’s presidency, when Tehran expanded ties with China, Russia, India, and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed the policy in 2018 with the slogan “Looking East,” emphasizing reliance on non-Western partners as sanctions mounted.
Analysts note that Europe’s hardened stance on Iran’s nuclear file—coupled with escalating US sanctions—has pushed Tehran further into Russia’s orbit.
As a commentary published by Moj News Agency put it, “Tehran’s choice of Belarus at this moment highlights its prioritization of ties with anti-Western, pro-Russian states—especially as Europe in recent months has shown no flexibility in its dealings with Iran.”
"Those who say we shouldn’t work with China and Russia — do they mean we should stand alone?" Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council said in an interview with Khamenei's website published on Friday.
"Well, when the Westerners don’t work with us, we work with China, we work with other countries," he added.
A message of resilience
Belarus, like Iran, is heavily sanctioned and has faced sharp international isolation since aligning with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. Both states thus share an interest in showcasing resilience against sanctions.
Alireza Salimi, a member of parliament’s presiding board, told ISNA that the president’s visits to Armenia and Belarus sent a message that Iran is “sanctions-proof”.
The rhetoric was reinforced by the agreements signed in Minsk. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that Tehran and Minsk were upgrading their Comprehensive Cooperation Roadmap for 2023–2026 into a strategic partnership agreement.
The two sides also discussed closer alignment within the Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Military and security undertones
Though economic cooperation was highlighted, the military dimension loomed large. Tehran and Minsk have quietly expanded security ties in recent years: an August 2023 defense memorandum paved the way for Belarusian forces to join Iranian drills in 2024, and Iran opened its first military attaché office in Minsk in 2025.
Belarusian officials have recently discussed ramping up missile production, including exploring nuclear-capable options for their Polonez rocket systems. Iran’s expertise in missile development makes it a potential partner and could raise concerns in Western capitals.
Both governments also maintain open support for Moscow’s war effort, a stance that has drawn sharp condemnation from Ukraine and NATO states. Kyiv in particular has repeatedly denounced Tehran’s supply of drones to Russia.
Trade remains modest but symbolic
Despite official optimism, trade between the two countries remains limited. Araghchi said bilateral exchanges totaled $140 million in the first half of 2025—a 14 percent increase from last year, but quite modest.
Even if current volumes are low, both sides see such arrangements as politically symbolic and vital to their shared sanctions-circumvention strategies.
Both governments also see potential in expanding connectivity. Reza Masroor, head of Iran’s Supreme Council of Free and Special Economic Zones, noted that Belarus could gain access to open waters via Iran’s free zones through the Makhachkala–Caspian Port route.
This, he argued, would allow Minsk to bypass Baltic restrictions and connect to the North–South Corridor, enabling exports of potash, agricultural goods, and industrial products to markets in the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.

A reformist call to suspend uranium enrichment, release political prisoners, and curb the Revolutionary Guards’ power has intensified debate over Iran’s future at a moment of heightened pressure.
The Reformist Front’s 11-point statement, released just weeks after the 12-day war with Israel, demanded sweeping shifts in both foreign and domestic policy, including reconciliation with the West and curbs on the IRGC’s role in politics and the economy.
The appeal was the boldest in years from a faction once central to Iranian politics but now largely marginalized.
Hardline outlets responded with fury.
Kayhan daily branded the proposals “capitulation,” while IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency warned of a “Gorbachev moment” that could unravel the state. The backlash underscored how sensitive the demands were, cutting at the very pillars of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s power structure.
Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute says that reformists are testing the waters precisely because they sense the Islamic Republic is battered by sanctions and the war with Israel.
“The Islamic Republic is under strain like never before,” he told Iran International, “but reformists don’t have the street behind them.”
The moderates are laying the groundwork for further challenges if ignored, Vatanka said, insisting the letter should not be read as mere symbolism but as a signal of intent.
“This is just the beginning,” he added, cautioning that without broad public support, their leverage remains limited.
Others place the statement in the context of succession politics.
Historian and author Arash Azizi described it as part of a “post-Khamenei world,” with rival factions already maneuvering for influence after the 85-year-old leader.
By openly calling for suspending enrichment and curbing the Revolutionary Guards, he argued, reformists are staking out ground in anticipation of change at the top.
They are not naïve,” Azizi said. “They know these demands won’t be met tomorrow. But they want to shape what comes next.”
But the gulf between elite politics and public sentiment remains wide.
Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) cautioned that while such statements attract attention in Washington, they resonate little inside Iran.
“This is politically significant in the sense of who said it, but it won’t have impact,” he said.
For many Iranians, he added, the reformist project has lost credibility after years of unmet promises.
A vision beyond hardline rule
The Reformist Front’s roadmap also included calls to end the house arrests of Green Movement leaders Mir-Hossein Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahnavard.
Whether such demands gain traction will depend on whether they can move beyond closed-door debates and find resonance in a weary society.
Meanwhile, pressure on Tehran is mounting.
European governments have threatened to trigger the UN’s snapback sanctions if nuclear talks stall, a move that could plunge Iran deeper into recession.
Inflation and power and water shortages are already hitting daily life, while the war with Israel exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s defenses and weakened its standing abroad.
Despite the boldness of their demands, few expect Iran’s ruling elite to bend.
The Supreme Leader has shown little tolerance for compromise, and the Revolutionary Guards remain entrenched across politics and the economy.
Yet Azizi argues the statement with its sweeping demands should not be dismissed as irrelevant.
“It is a mini earthquake,” Azizi told Iran International. “Even if it doesn’t lead to immediate change, it tells us how reformists are imagining a post-Khamenei Iran.”
Whether the letter proves to be a turning point or just another forgotten appeal may depend less on reformist leaders than on whether ordinary Iranians are willing to rally behind them.







