Despite recent public outcry and opposition to the construction of a mosque in one of Tehran’s public parks, the head of the city council definitely said: "We should build prayer rooms and mosques in all parks."
Tehran’s citizens swiftly demanded the municipality stop the building of the mosque with a petition that circulated on social networks, garnering over 147,000 signatures within just a few days.
But, this all transcends the mere building of a mosque in Qaytariyeh Park in the north of Tehran.
Since 1979, the Islamist regime has escalated the count of mosques in Iran from approximately 25,000 to roughly 75,000 presently. Yet, as stated by a senior cleric within the regime, around 50,000 of these mosques remain shuttered, devoid of congregants for prayer.
Various polls converge on a singular explanation: the remarkable and rapid transformation of the Iranian populace towards irreligiosity and apathy towards religious rituals over the past four decades.
Last year, in a government study titled the National Attitude Survey of Iranians, respondents were asked about the change in the level of religiosity among the people compared to five years prior. 85% of respondents stated that, based on their observations, the level of religiosity among Iranians had decreased, while only 7% reported an increase.
So, why does the Islamist regime insist on building mosques that are likely to remain empty?
First: New mosques are constructed in areas where Basij bases and repression centers are absent or few, and the government uses the mosques as cover to expand its social and political control.
The Basij, which plays a significant role in quelling dissent, is a paramilitary volunteer militia force that operates under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
In the past, the country's mosques have indeed been used to mobilize forces during street protests, and protesters have even been shot by Basiji snipers from rooftops. The government also seeks to establish a surveillance and information-gathering infrastructure within neighborhoods, without paying the price associated with public intimidation.
Second: The mosques are a base for gathering and recruiting for the regime's repression organizations. Today, the Islamist regime is desperately seeking to expand the network of Basiji forces and its plainclothes forces. In the past, these forces were the ones who assassinated the opposition figures. There were mosques with Imams such as Mojtaba Tehrani and Azizullah Khushvaght who were accused of issuing fatwas for killing dissidents and writers.
The attendees of their mosques were mostly working for the Iranian security agencies. The assassin who shot Saeed Hajjarian, an advisor to former President Mohammad Khatami, in the head, was affiliated with one of the politicized mosques.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has filled his security, military, and paramilitary apparatus with worshipers of the same type of mosques.
Third: The state-controlled mosques have become centers of brainwashing and political propaganda. These mosques host kindergartens and indoctrination classes that propagate anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism, and political Islam.
All of the aforementioned objectives are centered around security and political agendas.
The objective of attaining complete state control over mosques in matters of religion and religiosity entails direct intervention by governmental institutions in the organization and execution of religious ceremonies. This is achieved through: the appropriation of public spaces by advocating Sharia as a way of life, and by substituting religious teachings with governmental directives.
Prior to the establishment of the Islamist regime in 1979, Iranian mosques served as civil institutions for worship and congregation, with ownership being shared. The Imam of the congregation was selected by the local community, and management was overseen by a board of trustees elected by the locals, with minimal political involvement. Every class and group of Muslims could claim the local mosque as their own.
However, the Islamist regime usurped the mosques by establishing Basij bases, appointing Imams, and constructing new and additional mosques. Following the usurpation, it treated the public domain as its conquered property.
Over the past 45 years, any Imam who has made a critical statement against the government has been dismissed from their position. Sunnis are unable to have even a single mosque in major cities like Tehran, Mashhad, Kerman, and Shiraz.
The country's mosques underwent governmentalization through three specific processes.
The first involved the formation of the Headquarters of Imams and Congregations to appoint and control mosque imams. This institution was established in every province and operates under the supervision of the Leader’s office.
The second process entailed the establishment of Basij bases in mosques as the initial government institution installed there.
The third process involved setting up "cultural centers" within mosques, managed by the Supreme Headquarters of the Cultural and Artistic Centers of the country's mosques, aimed at countering the "cultural invasion of the enemy" as mandated by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution in 1992.
This way, the Islamist regime turned mosques that the Iranian people voluntarily built with their own hands and funds, into government institutions.
The regime transferred religious institutions such as seminaries, mosques, endowments, and mausoleums from civil institutions into completely state-owned entities.
Iranian authorities and state media invariably refer to anti-government protests as “riots”, so the accused are always dubbed as “leader of riots” or “leader of strikes”.
Informed sources in Iran say those who are accused of “leadership of riots” are usually held incommunicado for long periods in solitary confinement and are deprived of the right to have legal counsel or phone calls to their families.
In most cases, the accusation of leadership is based solely on participation in anti-government protests, lacking concrete evidence of any unlawful organized activity. Often, the only evidence presented is social media posts calling for peaceful protests on platforms like Instagram.
Earlier this week the BBC published a report about teenage protester Nika Shakarami. The report confirmed allegations that the she was molested by security forces during her arrest and was killed by them.
The report relies on a leaked document purportedly authored by security agents. This document referenced suspicions of the teenage girl being a "leader" of the protests. According to the leaked document cited by the BBC, the arresting team deployed one of its operatives disguised as a protester to confirm Nika's alleged leadership role within the demonstration.
A report by the IRGC-linked Fars News Agency in October 2023, for instance, claimed that journalist Elaheh Mohammadi had “confessed to leadership of street riots”. Fars has close ties with security bodies and access to court documents unavailable to other media.
Mohammadi who was arrested a few days after the protests began in September 2022 for her role in reporting on Mahsa Amini’s death in the custody of the morality police, was accused of collaboration with foreign services including the CIA and “anti-revolutionaries”.
Fars published a wiretapped conversation, acquired from security bodies, between Mohammadi and a friend. In the conversation, Mohammadi mentioned encouraging people to chant "Woman, Life, Freedom" during a protest and discussed making calls to protest with other activists. However, there was no indication of any incitement to riot or engage in armed activity.
“Participation in peaceful protests is not a crime and therefore being a leader in peaceful protests is also not a crime,” Musa Barzin, a Turkey-based human rights lawyer, told Iran International.
Arshia Takdastan, an 18-year-old protester from Nowshahr in northern Iran who was sentenced to death for “war against God” and “corruption on earth” was also dubbed as a “leader of riots” by another IRGC-linked news agency.
Authorities alleged that Takdastan and two others, Javad Rouhi and Mehdi Mohammadifard, had acted as “leaders” and “incited riots” by dancing, clapping, chanting slogans, and burning headscarves of the female protesters for them. The three young men were all sentenced to death. “The activities [of the accused] resulted in the gathering of about 3,000 people” at a protest rally at one of the squares of the city, the court ruling in Takdastan’s case said.
Rouhi who had been subjected to extensive physical and psychological tortures died in suspicious circumstances in prison in August 2023. His lawyer maintained that Rouhi had only danced at a protest gathering and burned the headscarves of some female protesters for them and had no role in organizing protesters.
Any contact with foreign-based Persian language media such as Iran International has also been cited as evidence of being “leader of riots”.
In January 2023, the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Tehran Ali Salehi said one of the “leaders of riots”, a member of the underground United Youth of Iran (UYI), had confessed to “continuous contact” with Iran International TV and foreign intelligence services and alleged that he had been paid money in the form of cryptocurrency to incite riots. The name of the accused was not mentioned and there has been no further reference to the case.
“Leadership” of labor strikes is also considered a crime. “Eight leaders who had a direct role in organizing labor strikes in South Pars and Asalouyeh [gas fields] through social media and their activities have been arrested,” Akbar Pourat, the political-security deputy governor of Bushehr Province, told the media on May 14, 2023.
Iranian authorities claim they have been able to identify “leaders” of protests even outside Iran by conducting extensive surveillance of expatriate Iranians’ rallies in various countries.
Unlike charges of “corruption on earth”, “war against God” and “propaganda against the Islamic government” which have been brought against numerous political prisoners and have clear definitions in the Islamic Penal Code of Iran, there is no reference to “leadership of riots” in the laws.
“Judicial authorities use this vague term to make the crimes allegedly committed by the accused look weighty and significant so they can meet out heavier sentences to them,” Barzin said.
“The term ‘leader of riots’ entered the jargon of courts from security bodies’ reports and is now being routinely used in the rulings of Revolutionary Courts across the country,” he added.
The use of terms like "leader of riots" and "leader of strikes" by Revolutionary Courts was uncommon before the anti-government protests of December 2017-January 2018. These courts were established after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 to handle political, security-related cases, blasphemy, as well as other crimes like drug trafficking and large-scale financial corruption.
On November 30, 2019, the head of the Justice Department of Lorestan Province, Mohammad Razm, told the media that those arrested in the protests were divided into “leaders” as well as, disruptors of public order and those with possible connections with foreign intelligence services. “Severe legal punishments is awaiting the leaders of recent riots,” he said.
US lawmakers Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Angus King (I-Maine) urged the Biden administration on Wednesday to disclose its strategy for addressing concerns regarding Iran's Bitcoin mining operations, citing potential national security risks.
In their letter addressed to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, senators requested information about Iran's crypto mining operations since 2021, including details on how the Iranian government has benefited.
Warren and King emphasized that crypto mining, which involves verifying crypto transactions and generating new tokens, has become increasingly "lucrative" for Iran, despite numerous international sanctions imposed on the country due to its nuclear program.
The first study to estimate Iran's potential profits from evading sanctions via cryptocurrency was published in 2021. At the time, Reuters reported that Iran's bitcoin production would generate revenues close to $1 billion a year, which was echoed in the letter.
"One estimate indicates that Iranian Bitcoin mining could have produced as much as $1 billion in revenue in 2021," the letter said, pointing to Bitcoin mining reportedly generating more than $186 million for Iranian crypto platforms between 2015 and 2021, with Tehran being one of the top eight Bitcoin-producing countries at the time, the lawmakers said.
The senators stated that crypto miners in Iran are required to sell their products to the Iranian central bank, which, in turn, enables the Iranian government to evade sanctions.
As experts have often said, the Iranian government has a self-inflicted “muddled relationship with crypto-currencies”, which have served to obscure various forms of trade, aiding in evading sanctions, while simultaneously presenting avenues for illicit activities.
In 2022, the state’s Intelligence Ministry claimed they blocked over 9,000 accounts belonging to 454 individuals used for illegal or undeclared exchanges of currency and digital currency. Based on the exchange rate during that period, the relevant trades amounted to 600,000 billion rials or approximately $2 billion.
Reports in Iranian media suggest that large-scale crypto mining has been taking place by influential or well-connected networks, as well as some Chinese companies that are using cheap and subsidized electricity in mining farms they set up in Iran. This could have been permitted only by Iran's intelligence services and the Revolutionary Guard.
The senators' warning about Iran's use of crypto mining coincides with the Treasury Department's request to Congress in April, urging lawmakers to pass new legislation authorizing the department to intervene in terrorist financing and sanctions evasion methods that utilize cryptocurrency. As part of that Senate hearing session, it was also revealed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) has been using cryptocurrency to fund Hamas and the Islamic Jihad of Palestine.
The letter from Warren and King also mentions the benefit that Iran's proxies are gaining from this low-profile trade.
"The Iranian military has used crypto to fund known terrorist groups like Hezbollah, the organization believed to be partially responsible for the January 2024 drone strike in Jordan that killed three US service members," officials said. "Unless we take action, Iran will continue to use crypto to fund attacks against Israel."
In their letter, Warren and King asked the officials to "describe the steps the administration is taking to address threats to US national security posed by Iran’s reliance on crypto mining and cryptocurrency more generally to earn revenue and bypass sanctions."
Furthermore, the senators inquire about the Binance fiasco. In 2022, it was reported that the cryptocurrency giant Binance had processed Iranian transactions worth $8 billion since 2018 – despite US sanctions intended to isolate the country from the global financial system.
The founder and former CEO of cryptocurrency exchange Binance was sentenced to four months in prison this week for violating US money laundering law and failing to comply with sanctions against Iran.
