Iran International
The softened tone of Tehran’s statements on nuclear negotiations with the United States, along with unprecedented remarks from media commentators, suggests Iran may be open to a "suspension for suspension" agreement with Washington.
The softened tone of Tehran’s statements on nuclear negotiations with the United States, along with unprecedented remarks from media commentators, suggests Iran may be open to a "suspension for suspension" agreement with Washington.
Except for state television, the hardline daily Kayhan, and a few low-profile newspapers, most Iranian media outlets this week have discussed “positive signals from Washington” or even “an imminent final deal.”
Outlets frequently cite what is seen in Tehran as optimism in US coverage.
President Donald Trump told reporters on Wednesday that he advised Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to launch a strike on Iran, saying a deal with Tehran was “very close.”
Tehran-based Rouydad24 noted that even traditionally skeptical figures—such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Rafael Grossi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—have acknowledged the possibility of a US-Iran agreement within weeks.
Early signs of a shift
The clearest signal yet of Iran’s openness came on Wednesday, when prominent lawmaker and National Security Committee member Abolfazl Zohrehvand told the conservative Nameh News that Tehran could suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for partial sanctions relief.
“Omani officials are telling us: Let’s try this,” Zohrevand said, recalling Iran’s acceptance of a similar deal under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the early 2000s.
President Masoud Pezeshkian also praised Oman’s mediation role during his visit to Muscat on Tuesday, calling the country the only active intermediary that Iran trusts—another nod to potential flexibility.
This comes along with hints that Tehran “may reconsider its longstanding ban on US nuclear inspectors,” as part of an agreement with Washington, according to Iran’s nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami.
Interim deal to avoid war
The pro-reform daily Arman Melli highlighted the apparent shift in tone, suggesting that a “halt for halt” arrangement might be in the works—one often called an “interim agreement” by officials, perhaps to make it more palatable for hardliners.
But nothing is done until it is done, the paper warned.
“Making a deal is as likely as is a sudden change that might stop all negotiations without much explanation,” it wrote, asserting that technical-level discussions are ongoing alongside secret bilateral talks.
Prominent reformist figure Mohammad Sadeq Javadi Hesar told Etemad newspaper that the government’s flexibility aligns with Iran’s national interests.
Likewise, reformist commentator Hamid Reza Jalaipour told Khabar Online that Iran cannot strengthen ties with Russia and China without first mending its fraught relationship with the US.
He predicted that a deal could marginalize the hardline minority who push anti-American rhetoric, call for Israel’s destruction, and stricter control at home..
Tehran, he noted, appears to have shifted its motto from “no negotiations, no war” to “negotiations to avoid war.”
Ali has been living in Canada for eleven years. When he and his wife immigrated, the Islamic Republic's embassy in Ottawa had already been closed, with diplomatic ties severed two years earlier.
Although Ali has never returned to Iran since arriving in Canada, his wife has made necessary trips back and had to renew her Iranian passport through the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic in Washington, DC.
One of these renewals contained legal errors — leaving her stranded in Iran at the time of the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752.
On January 8, 2020, amid heightened tensions between Iran and the US following the killing of Qassem Soleimani, Flight PS752 was shot down by two missiles fired by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) just six minutes after takeoff from Tehran.
All 176 people on board — as well as an unborn child — were killed.
Of those passengers, 138 were ultimately headed to Canada. The loss of 55 Canadian citizens and 30 permanent residents turned the downing into a national tragedy and further deepened the diplomatic rift between Ottawa and Tehran.
Canada cut diplomatic ties with Iran and shut down its embassy in Tehran in 2012, citing several concerns: Iran’s support for the Assad regime during the Syrian civil war, its defiance of United Nations resolutions on its nuclear program, ongoing threats against Israel, and security risks to Canadian diplomats after the British embassy in Tehran was attacked in breach of the Vienna Convention.
Iran’s message to Canada’s new government
In a rare development, CBC's senior international correspondent Margaret Evans was granted access to Iran earlier this month. During a press conference, she asked Esmail Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about the future of diplomatic relations with Canada.
Baghaei responded: "The relationship was frozen unilaterally by Canada, not by Iran, and we never welcomed that decision because we think that decision was not for the benefit of either of the two nations."
He added: "I think it's for Canada to decide what course of action they want to take. I think the first step they have to take is to unravel the many sanctions and restraints that they have imposed on themselves and on our bilateral relations. We were never in favor of severing ties. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians live in Canada, and they were the first to suffer from this situation."
But for many in the Iranian-Canadian community, the presence of an Iranian embassy in Canada is not seen as benign — nor missed.
A matter of security and influence
Many Iranian Canadians argue that Iranian embassies abroad function less as diplomatic institutions and more as extensions of the regime’s intelligence and influence operations.
Critics say these missions monitor dissidents and facilitate connections with proxy groups abroad.
Ali, for one, opposes any effort to reopen the Islamic Republic’s embassy in Canada. "Despite weak immigration enforcement that has allowed many former regime officials to settle here," he says.
"The continued closure of the Islamic Republic's embassy in Ottawa has at least prevented further infiltration and harmful activity."
Canada’s official position: no plans to reengage
The Canadian government has made it clear that it has no intention of reestablishing diplomatic ties under current conditions. In response to a request from Iran International, Global Affairs Canada stated:
“Iran must make fundamental changes in its behavior — both domestically and internationally — before the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada can be considered.”
The statement went on to say that Canada remains deeply concerned about:
Until meaningful change is seen, Canada will continue its pressure campaign, which includes:
Conservatives: No normalization with a terrorist state
Since the beginning of Iran’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022, Canadians have repeatedly expressed support for the Iranian people. In 2024, the Canadian government officially listed the IRGC as a terrorist organization — a move long advocated by Conservatives.
Garnett Genuis, the Conservative MP who first introduced a motion in 2018 to designate the IRGC as a terrorist entity, reaffirmed his party’s position in an exclusive comment to Iran International:
“Proposals to re-establish ties with this extremist, terrorist-supporting regime are completely unacceptable. While the Liberals have historically supported reopening relations, Conservatives are proud of our record of standing up to the regime and supporting the Iranian people.”
“The Iranian people deserve the opportunity to choose a government that reflects their aspirations for justice and peace. We stand with the people of Iran — not the regime. That will not change.”
Diplomacy — or expanded access for the Islamic Republic?
Some argue that diplomatic relations might help resolve bilateral issues — such as the investigation into the downing of PS752. Others believe such ties only give the Islamic Republic more room to maneuver. They point to countries like Sweden and the UK, where Iranian embassies exist but have done little to increase Tehran’s accountability.
Iranian Canadians have voiced their stance clearly in recent years. Tens of thousands have participated in public rallies, demonstrating not only their distance from the clerical establishment, but also their commitment to keeping Canada informed about the real demands of the Iranian people.
Today, many like Ali say they are willing to accept the consular complications that come with the absence of an embassy — if it means limiting the Islamic Republic’s access and influence in Canada.
The core dispute is enrichment.
While Iran has signalled willingness to eliminate its stockpile of highly enriched Uranium (HEU) and accept more intrusive inspections, it insists on its right to enrich Uranium to low levels (LEU) for peaceful use.
Trump argues that even this capability leaves Iran with a latent weapon option.
Iran’s enrichment programme has long served as a symbol of national pride. But beyond its political value lies a costly, outdated infrastructure with limited technological merit and major economic consequences.
This article examines the evolution and efficiency of Iran’s programme, its global standing, and the burden it has imposed on the country’s economy and people.
Missed chances and escalation
Iran’s Uranium enrichment began in 1987, amid the Iran–Iraq War, with help from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network. The programme’s roots, however, go back to the Shah era of the 1970s, when Iran pursued a civilian nuclear project under the US-led Atoms for Peace initiative.
In the 1990s and 2000s, Iran partnered with China and Russia on development of nuclear power plants while covertly constructing enrichment facilities like Natanz and Fordow, later exposed to the IAEA.
In the early 2000s, Iran had an opportunity to demonstrate transparency. But the concealment of facilities and obstruction of inspections—combined with no clear economic rationale—fuelled suspicion.
Years of negotiations led to the 2015 JCPOA, which capped Uranium purity and stockpiles, reduced centrifuge numbers, and expanded IAEA oversight in exchange for sanctions relief.
The deal also aimed to reintegrate Iran into the global economy. Although President Hassan Rouhani supported limited engagement, the Supreme Leader blocked foreign investment and rejected deeper ties with the US.
Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA marked the collapse of that effort. Iran responded by breaching its commitments gradually, leading to the reimposition of sanctions.
Powerful actors – especially the IRGC, which benefits from sanctions and thrives under isolationism or a “Protection for Sale” framework – opposed the deal from the outset.
Ultimately, the enrichment programme became a political tool rather than an energy strategy, a token of pride pursued at the cost of people’s welfare.
An outdated, inefficient program
Iran’s programme relies heavily on IR-1 centrifuges, based on 1970s Pakistani designs. These machines are inefficient and prone to malfunction. By contrast, advanced enrichment facilities in the West use high-output centrifuges that deliver more work per unit of energy.
Although exact figures remain classified, estimates suggest Iran’s enrichment costs per Separative Work Unit (SWU) – a standard measure of enrichment effort—range from $200 to $300, compared to roughly $40 in advanced economies.
Iran’s Uranium mining is equally inefficient. According to IAEA data and Iran’s own reporting, the production cost of Uranium oxide (U₃O₈) stands at around $1,750 per kilogram, compared to $60 in Canada.
Iran’s commitment to nuclear self-sufficiency – while politically expedient – has become economically self-defeating.
Worse, there is little domestic demand for Iranian-enriched Uranium. The Bushehr nuclear plant operates on Russian fuel under contract. No Iranian reactor uses domestic LEU. Globally, most countries import nuclear fuel rather than enrich it – making Iran’s programme economically irrational and strategically symbolic.
Sanctions: a decade of economic pain
Iran’s nuclear stance has exacted a high price.
Since 2011, sanctions have devastated trade, investment, and GDP growth. Oil exports dropped from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to under 400,000 during Trump’s first term. Though they rebounded to 1.5 million in 2024, levels remain far below that of pre-sanctions era.
Iran’s real GDP shrank by 13% in 2011. It has yet to recover to its 2010 GDP per capita level. Had Iran maintained its pre-2011 trend line with an average growth rate of 5.9%, 2024 GDP would be more than double current levels – roughly $828 billion versus $400 billion today.
Even after adjusting for global shocks like COVID-19 and commodity price spikes, the opportunity cost of the nuclear programme and associated sanctions is estimated at $399-414 billion.
The rial has collapsed, from IRR 14,200 per US dollar in 2011 to over IRR 818,000 in 2025. Inflation has averaged 40% annually for six years. Real wages have stagnated, fixed-income households have been hit hardest, and inequality has deepened.
Iran’s exclusion from the SWIFT banking system and refusal to comply with FATF standards have further hampered trade, including humanitarian imports. Capital formation has turned negative, and core industries have withered.
The state’s rhetoric of "resistance economy" offers little comfort to citizens facing chronic hardship.
Sanctions have also undercut Iran’s scientific and industrial base. Universities and research institutes face brain drain. Industrial firms struggle to access spare parts, software, or global partnerships. From car production to pharmaceuticals, entire sectors have regressed.
State survival vs people’s welfare
Iran’s enrichment program today serves political survival, not public welfare. It allows the supreme leader to project defiance, enriches the IRGC through sanctions arbitrage, and sustains the state’s ideological base in times of unrest.
But the cost is immense: capital flight, brain drain, and widespread emigration of Iran’s educated youth. Investments in clean energy, digital infrastructure, and global commerce could have transformed Iran’s economy. Instead, resources are wasted on a technology with minimal strategic gain and substantial economic isolation.
Iran’s future cannot rest on symbolic resistance.
The enrichment programme, as currently structured, has brought little benefit and enormous cost – economically, politically, and socially. It has deprived the country of trade, investment, global legitimacy, and, most importantly, the welfare of its people.
The fifth round of Iran–US talks ended without progress. But continued engagement suggests both sides see value in a deal. For Iran, enrichment no longer offers strategic or economic gain. It remains only as a political prop.
Several proposals are under discussion.
One envisions a Persian Gulf regional consortium to oversee enrichment in Iran. This idea lacks a concrete and substantive foundation, but it may open a path to preserve enrichment in principle without allowing full implementation. Another suggests recognising Iran’s theoretical NPT right to enrich while freezing domestic activities. A third offers financial compensation for dismantling facilities.
More creative proposals may yet be found. What matters now is avoiding war.
Iran’s leaders must choose between entrenched defiance and a future grounded in rational diplomacy. The enrichment program has cost far too much – not just in lost GDP, but in the lives and futures of ordinary Iranians.
Symbolic pride is no substitute for real prosperity. It is time to move on.
Mahdi Ghodsi is an Economist at The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
Behrooz Bayat is Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East and Global Order (CMEG)
